which the disappointed hopes of the patriots find vent, and solemnly commit them to an auto da fé. One thing is certain: Cavour, the soul of the whole Italian movement, did not attempt to disguise his disgust at the conclusion of the war. He was the leader of the patriot party, and though we have always disapproved of the language he held against Austria, and the perversion of facts by which he attempted to prove his cause, still the honesty with which he resigned an office no longer compatible with his principles, goes some length to rehabilitate him.

Another puzzling circumstance is the peculiar position which Prince Napoleon has assumed with reference to Italian matters. During the grand Sunday display on the Place Vendôme, neither he nor his consort was visible: they would not even tacitly sanction the treachery which had been displayed towards Italy. If ever he should be put forward as king of Etruria, this circumstance, we may be sure, will have great stress laid on it. There is no doubt the emperor would be glad enough to get rid of him, for he is terribly in the way at home; still, on behalf of human nature, we can scarcely credit that a hundred thousand lives were sacrificed for such an impotent result. Indeed, we have too high an opinion of Louis Napoleon's sagacity to think that he seriously meditates any such scheme in the present temper of Europe, for every crowned head regards him with a certain degree of suspicion, because he played fast and loose with the revolutionary party. That a ruler who colonised Cayenne and Lambessa with political exiles should enter into an alliance with such men as Kossuth and Klapka, proved that he was perfectly unscrupulous as to the means he employed to gain his object. To coerce a foe into a peace by threats of instigating rebellion in his country was a policy left for Louis Napoleon to inaugurate. Even the firebrand Palmerston, when he sided with the Italians in 1848, held aloof from such extreme measures as these, for they were double-edged tools.

To us who sit quietly watching the course of events on the Continent, it seems as if the star of Louis Napoleon attained its culminating point in the peace of Villafranca. Through a hollow thirst for glory he entered on a war which soon threatened to assume gigantic proportions, and he was compelled to call to his assistance a turbulent and dangerous ally in the revolutionary propaganda, whose progress he felt himself powerless to check. The villanous associations which periodi cally disturb the peace of Italy have their offshoots throughout the Continent, and one of their strongholds in France: any revolutionary movement in Italy has ever been followed by disturbances in Paris, or vice versa. The revolution, then, had raised its hydra head in Italy: all shades of republicans had combined into a compact party in France; the master was absent, and the Ledru Rollins, and men of that kind, were preparing for action. Any discomfiture before Verona would have kindled a flame in France, and Louis Napoleon might have found his retreat intercepted had he delayed his return. Probably we shall never know how he contrived to wring a peace from Francis Joseph: the story current has an air of probability, as being characteristic of the Napoleons, but it still awaits confirmation; at any rate, the Emperor of the French must have made large concessions ere he could secure a friend in the haughty representative of the Habsburg pride. For our part, we consider that far too much stress has been laid on the surrender of Lom

bardy: Austria was only too glad of a decent pretext to get rid of that ungrateful province, as she proved in 1849; and by the retention of Venetia, she secured what Lord Malmesbury justly called "a bulwark to all Germany on the Tyrolese frontier." We may, therefore, fairly assume that the bait held out was the restoration of the dukes.

Conscious of the grave mistake he had committed by engaging in the war, Louis Napoleon has tried to repair it by a worse fault. The amnesty he has announced is the most fatal step he has taken since his ascension to the imperial throne, for it is a condemnation of the Deux Décembre. Through the persistency of his conduct, people had begun to believe in his policy and imagine that France could only be governed in one waynamely, by eliminating all the dangerous elements of political society; but by this sudden concession to the democratic party, Louis Napoleon has given a formal démenti to his past policy. If he thought by this liberality to condone for his deception of the republican party in Italy, he is sorely mistaken, and by his ill-timed generosity he only strengthens its hands. The men who put forward Orsini as their representative will accept no compromise; they demand life for life.

We must not be supposed to include all the republicans in this category of blood: such men as Louis Blanc and Victor Hugo, however mistaken they may be in their views, are yet gentlemen, and would be the first to denounce any designed assassination of their arch-foe. Such men we must honour, while we pity them; but there is another class which disgraces our hospitality, who will eagerly accept the armistice, for the sake of causing perturbations in France, from which they can derive some advantage. They are the scum who rise to the surface in any revolution, and fill their pockets during the first excitement, before the popular will is sufficiently strong to drive them from their usurped authority and condemn them to universal execration. Even the wellmeant liberation of the French press, we fear, will prove a disappointment, and confusion will arise from it. Remembering that the press overturned Louis Philippe, we cannot but think that, ere long, the Emperor of the French will have to reconsider his announced policy, and he will be sure of general adhesion, for he will have proved that any measures he may take will be once again purely in self-defence.

But by far the worst result to Louis Napoleon of the war into which he rushed so blindly, is the temporary interruption of his good understanding with England. Strong in our moral support, he was secure on his throne, and old national jealousies were gradually subsiding. All at once he gave the lie to his celebrated statement that the "Empire was peace, ," and commenced a war which Lord Derby truly said was undertaken under false pretences." From that moment the suspicions of England were aroused, and preparations are being made which his conduct has certainly justified. The excuses he put forth for the war against Austria were so transparent that our national pride took the alarm, and we felt that the same frivolous pretexts might eventually be employed as an occasion to invade England. It is all very easy for Messrs. Cobden and Bright to lament the language employed by public writers, but it must not be forgotten that the feeling has been equally strong on the other side of the Channel. Bearing in mind that M. de Cesena very recently made a most rabid attack upon England, in which he avowed that France would never be tranquil until Waterloo were

avenged, and that this article was written while the press of Paris was still cowering under the censorship, we do not feel inclined to withdraw one word we have written in the New Monthly as to the danger to which England is exposed by the aggressive policy of France. To those who prefer their pocket interests to the national honour, the proposed reduction of the French army and marine will be an eminently satisfactory guarantee of Napoleon's honesty of purpose, but, for our part, we regret to say we cannot lay that flattering unction to the soul. So palpable is the fallacy by which the Emperor of the French seeks to lull us into tranquillity, that we should but insult our readers were we at all to dilate upon it.

Reverting to the subject-matter of our paper, we sorrowfully confess that we still see much danger for Europe in the settlement of the Italian question. It is quite certain that matters cannot go on for any length of time; and, to quote the Ost Deutsche Post once more, "the more immediate question is not about war between France and England, or France and Prussia; the great question-one that affects all Europe-is to know whether Austria and France, after the settlement of the peace of Zurich, will remain friends or not, and act conjointly in Italy, or whether the germs of this old rivalry will spring up anew after the three first months upon Italian soil." And this is, assuredly, a tremendous difficulty for we cannot, judging from the past, believe that Austria will give up her influence over Italy, sans coup férir, or desert the cause of the grand-dukes. On the other hand, we possess sufficient knowledge of human nature to feel assured that Louis Napoleon did not engage in the war without some advantage looming in the future. What that may be, however, it is impossible for us to predict; he is in the habit of keeping his own secrets very closely, and will not speak till the moment for action has arrived.

Still, we are able to form one conclusion from the past campaign, and it is that the war has rendered the solution of the Italian question more difficult than ever, for no compromise now appears possible. Europe will not suffer a prince of the House of Napoleon to ascend the throne of Etruria, while, on the other hand, the influence of Austria over the peninsula will become more pronounced than ever. It is quite certain that, before long, popular excesses will compel an armed interference, and whichever power may send the army of execution, the consequences will be equally disastrous to the cause of Italian constitutionalism.

In a matter requiring such delicate treatment, the English state ship will need very careful steering to avoid all the breakers ahead. If France acquiesce in Austria still remaining the gendarme of Italy, and content herself with the influence she has gained in Sardinia and Lombardy, all may yet be well. If, on the other hand, she attempt to exercise a dictatorship over Central Italy, and extend her authority from Rome to the frontier of Venetia, it will behove England to interfere energetically. Any sacrifice must be esteemed small which will prevent France extending her dominion to the Adriatic, and thus shortening the route to Egypt by one-half.

The last question that remains for us to discuss is, whether Lord Palmerston is equal to the emergency? We are afraid we must answer it in the negative, for his notorious leanings to the cause of Italian liberty

may place him, ere long, in open antagonism to both Austria and France. We are fully convinced that by so doing he would play into Louis Napoleon's hands, for his great object is to isolate England. One by one he has secured the friendship of our natural allies, and has aroused the worst passions against us by his clever combinations. The bias of the present government was shown in the miserable despatch Lord John Russell addressed to Lord Bloomfield, in which he sought to intimidate Prussia, and at that time the Whig ministry doubtlessly believed in the sincerity of Louis Napoleon's behaviour to Italy. If they are true to themselves, they must protest against any armed interference in Tuscany, and thus widen the breach already unhappily existing between this country and France. On the other hand, such conduct will only serve to exasperate Austria, for she will see in it encouragement given to revolt: even now her organs are publicly accusing our government of fomenting the dissension in Italy, and the mission of Lord Minto in 1848, under the auspices of our prime minister of to-day, is a sufficient excuse for such views.

How different was the conduct of the last ministry, and how thoroughly English, a perusal of the Blue-book will show. While justly apprehensive of the growing predominance of the French empire, Lord Malmesbury sedulously avoided any expression of opinion. Regarding the quarrel between Austria and France as purely local, he considered it was England's sole duty to prepare for eventualities. He warned the Germanic Diet that if they adopted the resolution of declaring war against France, they must not expect aid from England; but this was a very different matter from threatening, as Lord John did not hesitate to do. Gradually, as the war extended, when revolutionary passions were called into play, Lord Malmesbury, on behalf of the cabinet, recognised the dangers to which Europe was exposed: he allowed that "the breaking up of the great fortresses, which form a bulwark to Germany, would be but an inducement to France to make a further attempt to subvert the arrangements on the Rhine, and that it would be suicidal policy on the part of Germany to stand by and see this done." The Conservative cabinet saw that England was aimed at through Austria, and confessed the necessity for our interference before long. Sir John Pakington went so far as to say that if the war went on England could not long keep out of it. The hasty patching up of the peace is the most triumphant confirmation of the Conservative views.

If, then, the position of England was delicate during the war, it has become doubly so since the peace. Already rumours are rife of strong interpellations having been made by our foreign minister to the two courts on behalf of Italian independence, and what the result will be it requires no ghost from the dead to tell us. France will not swerve from her settled purpose at the dictate of Lord John, while Austria bears rancour in her heart against our liberal government for deserting her at the decisive moment. All England could do to prevent the partition of Poland was to hand in a dignified protest, and we fear we shall yet see the farce renewed on behalf of hapless Italy. One thing is certain, however her independence is now more remote than ever.

NEW MONTHLY MAGAZINE.

THE CHANNEL ISLANDS.

THE Romans, the pioneers of discovery and civilisation in Europe, knew and favoured the Channel Islands, and besides their designations of Cæsarea (Jersey), Sarnia (Guernsey), Aurica and Redima (Alderney), Sargia (Sark), and Arnica (Herm), there are existing traces of their occupation of these rocky yet fertile islands in the Fort de César, near Montorgueil Castle, and the entrenchment known as La petite Césarée, near Rozol, in Jersey, as also in the rocky promontory called Jerbourg, or Cherbourg (Cæsaris burghum), in Guernsey. Numerous Roman

coins and other relics have also been discovered in both islands.

Cæsar and Tacitus both concur in describing the Channel Islands as one of the strongholds of Druidism, and numerous Celtic relics and Gaulish or Druidical remains exist to bear evidence to the fact. With the Caskets, Sark and the Dirouilles, and Pierres de Lecq, or Paternosters, Artac and Alderney, they appear indeed to have constituted stepping-stones in the Channel by which Celts, Romans, and Normans have successively advanced to the occupation of the British Islands. Those who may feel interested in the history of these remarkable islands will find ample information in the pages of Falle's "History of Jersey;" in Duncan and Tupper's "Histories," and the Rev. Mr. Durell's "Historical Sketch of Guernsey ;" as also in the eloquent volume lately published by the son of Victor Hugo, the Channel Island exile; and last and not least in the valuable papers of Mr. Lukis, the Channel Islands antiquary par éminence, in the "Archæologia."

These islands are, geographically speaking, decidedly French, as they are also by the language of the people, and their annexation to England is an incessant source of vexation to a nation which is so pre-eminently jealous of its armed superiority. The aborigines, doubtless, also sprang from the Celtic tribes spread over the adjacent continent; but the present inhabitants are universally recognised as the lineal descendants of the warlike Normans, who, under the auspices of the famous Rollo, conquered and established themselves in the north of France in the ninth century. The islands were united to the British crown at the Conquest; and though repeated descents have been made, and even temporary possession has been held, as in the reign of Edward III. (1340), in the time of Du Guesclin, in that of Henri IV., in the days of the Count de Maulevrier, in the reign of Edward VI., and, lastly, in the piratical times of the Baron de Rullecourt, none of them were attended with such success as to lead to a permanent occupation of the islands.

The islanders, proud of an unconquered name, and gratified at the

Oct.-VOL. CXVII. NO. CCCCLXVI.

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