6. same motion, remaining after sense, has been al- PART I. ready said in the first and second chapters. And because going, speaking, and the like voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the imagination is the first internal beginning of all voluntary motion. And although unstudied men do not conceive any motion at all to be there, where the thing moved is invisible; or the space it is moved in is, for the shortness of it, insensible; yet that doth not hinder, but that such motions For let a space be never so little, that which is moved over a greater space, whereof that little one is part, must first be moved over that. These small beginnings of motion, within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions, are commonly called ENDEAVOUR. are. Endeavour. Appetite. Desire. Thirst. This endeavour, when it is toward something which causes it, is called APPETITE, or DESIRE ; the latter, being the general name; and the other oftentimes restrained to signify the desire of food, namely hunger and thirst. And when the endea- Hunger. vour is fromward something, it is generally called AVERSION. These words, appetite and aversion, Aversion. we have from the Latins; and they both of them signify the motions, one of approaching, the other of retiring. So also do the Greek words for the same, which are opμn and apopμn. For nature itself does often press upon men those truths, which afterwards, when they look for somewhat beyond nature, they stumble at. For the Schools find in mere appetite to go, or move, no actual motion at all but because some motion they must acknow 6. PART 1. ledge, they call it metaphorical motion; which is but an absurd speech: for though words may be called metaphorical; bodies and motions can not. Love. Hate. Contempt. That which men desire, they are also said to LOVE and to HATE those things for which they have aversion. So that desire and love are the same thing; save that by desire, we always signify the absence of the object; by love, most commonly the presence of the same. So also by aversion, we signify the absence; and by hate, the presence of the object. Of appetites and aversions, some are born with men; as appetite of food, appetite of excretion, and exoneration, which may also and more properly be called aversions, from somewhat they feel in their bodies; and some other appetites, not many. The rest, which are appetites of particular things, proceed from experience, and trial of their effects upon themselves or other men. For of things we know not at all, or believe not to be, we can have no further desire, than to taste and try. But aversion we have for things, not only which we know have hurt us, but also that we do not know whether they will hurt us, or not. Those things which we neither desire, nor hate, we are said to contemn; CONTEMPT being nothing else but an immobility, or contumacy of the heart, in resisting the action of certain things; and proceeding from that the heart is already moved otherwise, by other more potent objects; or from want of experience of them. And because the constitution of a man's body is in continual mutation, it is impossible that all the same things should always cause in him the same appetites, and aversions: much less can all men consent, in the desire of almost any one and the same object. PART I. But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good and the object of his hate and aversion, Good. evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. Evil. For these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth them there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves; but from the person of the man, where there is no .commonwealth; or, in a commonwealth, from the person that representeth it; or from an arbitrator or judge, whom men disagreeing shall by consent set up, and make his sentence the rule thereof. 6. The Latin tongue has two words, whose significations approach to those of good and evil; but are not precisely the same; and those are pulchrum Pulchrum. and turpe. Whereof the former signifies that, Turpe. which by some apparent signs promiseth good ; and the latter, that which promiseth evil. But in our tongue we have not so general names to express them by. But for pulchrum we say in some things, fair ; in others, beautiful, or handsome, or gallant, or honourable, or comely, or amiable ; and for turpe, foul, deformed, ugly, base, nauseous, and the like, as the subject shall require; all which words, in their proper places, signify nothing else but the mien, or countenance, that promiseth good and evil. So that of good there be three kinds; good in the promise, that is pulchrum; good in effect, as the end desired, which is called jucundum, 6. PART 1. delightful; and good as the means, which is called utile, profitable; and as many of evil: for evil in Delightful. promise, is that they call turpe; evil in effect, and Unpleasant. end, is molestum, unpleasant, troublesome; and Unprofitable. evil in the means, inutile, unprofitable, hurtful. Profitable. Delight. Pleasure. Offence. As, in sense, that which is really within us, is, as I have said before, only motion, caused by the action of external objects, but in apparence; to the sight, light and colour; to the ear, sound; to the nostril, odour, &c. so, when the action of the same object is continued from the eyes, ears, and other organs to the heart, the real effect there is nothing but motion, or endeavour; which consisteth in appetite, or aversion, to or from the object moving. But the apparence, or sense of that motion, is that we either call delight, or trouble of mind. This motion, which is called appetite, and for the apparence of it delight, and pleasure, seemeth to be a corroboration of vital motion, and a help thereunto; and therefore such things as caused delight, were not improperly called jucunda, à juvando, from helping or fortifying; and the contrary, molesta, offensive, from hindering, and troubling the motion vital. Pleasure therefore, or delight, is the apparence, or sense of good; and molestation, or displeasure, the apparence, or sense of evil. And consequently all appetite, desire, and love, is accompanied with some delight more or less; and all hatred and aversion, with more or less displeasure and offence. Of pleasures or delights, some arise from the sense of an object present; and those may be called Pleasures of pleasure of sense; the word sensual, as it is used by those only that condemn them, having no place till there be laws. Of this kind are all onerations sense. 6. and exonerations of the body; as also all that is PART I. GRIEF. These simple passions called appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief, have their names for divers considerations diversified. As first, when they one succeed another, they are diversely called from the opinion men have of the likelihood of attaining what they desire. Secondly, from the object loved or hated. Thirdly, from the consideration of many of them together. Fourthly, from the alteration or succession itself. For appetite, with an opinion of attaining, is called HOPE. The same, without such opinion, DESPAIR. FEAR. The same, with hope of avoiding that hurt by resistance, courage. Sudden courage, ANGER. Constant hope, CONFIDENCE of ourselves. the mind. Grief. Hope. Despair. Fear. Courage. Anger. Confidence. Diffidence. Constant despair, DIFFIDENCE of ourselves. ceive the same to be done by injury, INDIGNATION. Indignation. GOOD NATURE. Good nature. |