state of the heart will infallibly be right. He has properly adapted the causes in operation to the nature upon which they were to operate, just as mechanical forces are proportioned to the machinery on which they are to act. Were this not the case, the whole world of morals would be thrown into disorder. To expect in us a right state of heart, when a due consideration of all things open to our observation was adapted to produce a wrong one, could not be otherwise than unreasonable; and it must be to the full as unreasonable to complain of such an expectation, when nothing more than a due consideration of known or discernible truths is requisite to its fulfilment. No further than we neglect such consideration does God condemn us; and in this respect surely we cannot pretend to justify ourselves.

The author should perhaps apologize for occupying his readers so long with topics which may perhaps truly be called metaphysical and abstruse; if, however, they have done him the kindness to accompany him attentively, he hopes they will not fail to derive advantage which will amply recompense their labour. Should a single perusal not have enabled any

one to master the subject, a second may do much to diminish the difficulty, or may probably overcome it altogether. We shall hereafter find how necessary a clear view of the elements of mental and moral philosophy is to a proper understanding of the questions to which we are approaching, and how decisively the principles which have been stated bear upon the chief points of the controversy. If as yet we seem to have made no progress, it is only because it is much better to determine our general principles, apart from any reference to the particular subject to which they are to be applied. A little further extension of the reader's patience is requested in the perusal of the following chapter.

CHAP. II.

Definition of Terms.

AFTER the brief exhibition given in the former chapter of the elementary truths relating to the intelligent and moral nature of man, it may be important to put down a few definitions of terms relating to these subjects; both that we may the more clearly know what they mean when they occur, and that precision in their use may aid the accuracy and conclusiveness of our reasonings. They will often, indeed, of themselves, decide points which have been long and laboriously disputed.

DISPOSITION, INCLINATION.

Terms of definite import are very desirable for the various states of feeling, or excitements of the heart. The habitually prevalent state of the heart in any respect, we call the DISPOSITION of a man in that respect. It differs from INCLINATION, which is not necessarily

either habitual or prevailing; it may be neither. It differs also from AFFECTIONS, which are occasional, temporary, and subordinate states of feeling. It differs, lastly, from WILL, which we conceive to mean either simply a determination, or the faculty of determining according to our feelings.

POWER, ABILITY.

Another term of great importance in the ensuing discussion is POWER, or ABILITY; and it is highly material to have a settled opinion respecting it before we proceed further. When may it be said that a man has POWER to perform a given action? To this we answer without hesitation, when he possesses the means of doing so. Let the definition be tried by examples. My power to walk consists in having the free use of my limbs;

possessing the means of walking.

that is, in

My power

to think consists in having the use of a sane understanding; that is, in possessing the means of thinking. My power to pay my debts consists in having sufficient property for this purpose; that is, in possessing the means of paying them. My power to be sorrowful consists in having a heart susceptible of being

affected by afflictive considerations; that is, in possessing the means of being sorrowful.

Is any thing else necessary to constitute power, besides the possession of means? and if so, what is it?

This question is put the more pointedly, because we shall have proceeded but a very few steps before the definition of power above given will be objected to, and something else will be deemed essential to it: we beg to suggest, however, that if any objection be made, it should be made now, and not be brought out just when and where the pressure of the argument may be most severely felt, and when it can scarcely fail to have the appearance and the effect of an evasion. What more, we again ask, is necessary to constitute power, than the possession of means?

Is our having a disposition towards any action essential to our having power to perform it? This is the important question with which we shall find ourselves involved hereafter, and which it will be much better to settle now, without asking which side of the argument it will favour. We conceive that it is not.

Suppose a case for illustration. A man is in full health, at perfect liberty, and with