They sent deputies at the same time to Argos, into Sicily to Gelon tyrant of Syracuse, to the isles of Corcyra and Crete, to desire succours from them, and to form a league against the common enemy.

The people of Argos offered a very considerable succour, on condition they should have an equal share of the authority and command with the Lacedemonians. The latter consented, that the king of Argos should have the same authority as either of the two kings of Sparta. This was granting them a great deal: but into what errors and mischiefs are not men led by a mistaken point of honour, and a foolish jealousy of command! The Argives were not contented with this offer, and refused to enter into the league with the Grecians, without considering, that if they suffered them to be destroyed, their own ruin must inevitably follow.

> The deputies proceeded from Argos to Sicily, and addressed themselves to Gelon, who was the most potent prince of the Greeks at that time. He promised to assist them with two hundred vessels of three benches of oars, with an army of twenty thousand foot and two thousand horse, two thousand light armed soldiers, and the same number of bowmen and slingers, and to supply the Grecian army with provisions during the whole war, on condition they would make him generalissimo of all the forces both by land and sea. The Lacedemonians were highly offended at such a proposal. Gelon then abated somewhat in his demands, and promised the same, provided he had at least the command either of the fleet or of the army. This proposal was strenuously opposed by the Athenians,

* Herod. L. vii. c. 148-152. VOL. 3.

6

Ibid. 153-162

who made answer, that they alone had a right to command the fleet in case the Lacedemonians were willing to give it up. Gelon had a more substantial reason for not leaving Sicily unprovided of troops, which was the approach of the formidable army of the Carthaginians, commanded by Amilcar, which consisted of three hundred thousand men.

• The inhabitants of Corcyra, now called Corfu, gave the envoys a more favourable answer, and immediately put to sea with a fleet of sixty vessels: But they advanced no farther than to the coasts of Laconia, pretending they were hindered by contrary winds, but in reality waiting to see the success of an engage. ment, that they might afterwards range themselves on the side of the conqueror.

"The people of Crete, having consulted the Delphic oracle, to know what resolution they were to take on this occasion, absolutely refused to enter into the league.

Thus were the Lacedemonians and Athenians left almost to themselves, all the rest of the cities and nations having submitted to the heralds that Xerxes had sent to require earth and water of them, excepting the people of Thespia and of Platea. In so pressing a danger, their first care was to put an end to all discord and division among themselves; for which reason the Athenians made peace with the people of Egina, with whom they were actually at war.

Their next care was to appoint a general: for there never was any occasion wherein it was more nec

"Herod. 1. vii. c. 168.

Ibid. c. 132.

a Ibid. c. 169-171.

Ibid. c. 145.

Plut, in Themist. p. 114.

e

essary to choose one capable of so important a trust, than in the present conjuncture, when Greece was upon the point of being attacked by the whole force of Asia. The most able and experienced captains, terrified at the greatness of the danger, had taken the resolution of not presenting themselves as candidates. There was a certain citizen at Athens, whose name was Epicydes, who had some eloquence, but in other respects was a person of no merit, was in disreputation for his want of courage, and notorious for his avarice; notwithstanding all which, it was apprehended that in the assembly of the people, the votes would run in his favour. Themistocles, who was sensible that in calm weather almost any mariner may be capable of conducting a vessel, but that in storms and tempests the most able pilots are at a loss, was convinced that the commonwealth was ruined, if Epicydes was chosen general, whose venal and mercenary soul gave them the justest reason to fear that he was not proof against the Persian gold. There are occasions, when in order to act wisely, I had almost said regularly, it is necessary to dispense with and rise above all rule. Themistocles, who knew very well that in the present state of affairs he was the only person capable of commanding, did for that reason make no scruple of employing bribes and presents to remove his competitor : and having found means to make the ambition of Epicydes amends, by gratify. ing his avarice, he got himself elected general in his stead. We may here, I think, very justly apply to

Quilibet nautarum vectorumque tranquillo mari gubernare potest; ubi orta sæva tempestas est, ac turbato mari rapitur vento navis, tum viro et gubernatore opus est. Liv. 1. xxiv. n. 8.

ε χρήμασι την φιλοτιμιαν εξωνήσατο παρά τη Επικυδε

Themistocles what Titus Livius says of Fabius on a like occasion. This great commander finding, when Hannibal was in the heart of Italy, that the people were going to make a man of no merit consul, employed all his own credit, as well as that of his friends, to be continued in the consulship, without being concerned at the clamour that might be raised against him; and he succeeded in the attempt. The historian adds. "The conjuncture of affairs, and the extreme danger the commonwealth was exposed to, were arguments of such weight, that they prevented any one from being offended at a conduct which might appear to be contrary to rules, and removed all suspicion of Fabius's having acted upon any motive of interest or ambition. On the contrary, the public admired his generosity and greatness of soul, in that, as he knew the commonwealth had occasion for an accomplished general, and could not be ignorant or doubtful of his own singular merit in that respect, he had chosen rather in some sort to hazard his own reputation, and perhaps expose his character to the reproaches of envious tongues, than to be wanting in any service he could render his country.”

"The Athenians also passed a decree to recal home all their people that were in banishment. They were afraid lest Aristides should join their enemies, and lest his credit should carry over a great many others to the side of the barbarians. But they had a very false

Tempus ac necessitas belli, ac descrimen summæ rerum, faciebant ne quis aut in exemplum exquireret, aut suspectum cupiditatis imperii consulem haberet. Quin laudabant potius magnitudinem animi, quod cum summo imperatore esse opus reip. sciret, seque eum haud dubie esse, minoris invidiam suam, si qua ex re oriretur, quam utilitatem reip, fecisset. Liv. 1. xxiv. n. 9.

· Plut. in. Arist. p. 322, 323,

notion of their citizen, who was infinitely remote from such sentiments. Be that as it would, on this extraor dinary juncture they thought fit to recal him; and Themistocles was so far from opposing the decree for that purpose, that he promoted it with all his credit and authority. The hatred and division of these great men had nothing in them of that implacable, bitter, and outrageuos spirit, which prevailed among the Romans in the latter times of the republic. The danger of the state was the means of their reconciliation, and when their service was necessary to the preservation of the republic, they laid aside all their jealousy and rancour and we shall see, by the sequel, that Aristides was so far from secretly thwarting his ancient rival, that he zealously contributed to the success of his enterprises, and to the advancement of his glory.

The alarm increased in Greece in proportion as they received advice that the Persian army advanced. If the Athenians and Lacedemonians had been able to make no other resistance than with their land forces, Greece had been utterly ruined and reduced to slavery. This exigence taught them how to set a right value upon the prudent foresight of Themistocles, who, upon some other pretext, had caused one hundred gallies to be built, Instead of judging like the rest of the Athenians, who looked upon the victory of Marathon as the end of the war, he, on the contrary, considered it rather as the beginning, or as the signal of still greater battles, for which it was necessary to prepare the Athenian people; and from that very time he began to think of raising Athens to a superiority over Sparta, which for a long time had been the mistress of all Greece. With this view he judged it expedient to