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And whereas the disaffection to God is very common, | and rooted and confirmed in men by their being disused to converse with things above the reach of their senses, (which might tend to invite their hearts and attract their affections,) how horrid a thing were it if such a vicious custom were to obtain the force of a law! or, if men were to be allowed to do so and so wickedly, only because they have been wont so to do! if the oftener the swearer, the drunkard, the fornicator, and the murderer, have indulged their respective vices, the more lawful it should be for them to continue such practices! if men, in a word, should be so far a law to themselves, as to be permitted to do whatsoever they have been used to do! or, as Seneca says, if a reasonable creature should go like a sheep, not the way he ought, but that which he has been used to: what, I say, can be more unreasonable and unfit than this?

oblige no longer! Then may any subject be a sovereign;
since there would be no need of any thing more to make
a law cease to oblige him, than for him to disobey it.
[6.] Consider that our not seeing God is so far from
having a necessary tendency to preclude the love of him,
that if things were with men as they should be, and as
they have been with some in the world, it would very
much promote our loving him. For though we cannot
see him, yet we see many things that are great arguments,
and should be powerful inducements, to us to love him.
It is true we do not see God with our bodily eyes, but we
see the effects of his wisdom, his goodness, his mercy,
and patience every where; and of his mighty power over
all, especially over those who are for God and lovers of
him.

If we take a view, as we can do with these eyes, of the [3] It must be considered, that though it is the wisdom beautiful and glorious works of his creation, we continualof a ruler to regard the inclinations of a people in makingly behold in the visible things that are made, the invisible laws, yet sure there must be a distinction made between power and Godhead, (Rom. i. 20.) which we are called things indifferent and things necessary. But is there any upon to adore and love. And in the works of his provithing of higher and more absolute necessity than the love dence and the ways of his dispensations towards men, of God, though we see him not? Doth not our experience great arguments of love do daily occur. And into what tell us, that we stand in need of somewhat that we do not raptures of affection do we find holy souls transported see, in order to the continuance of our being? much more even by the help of their own eyes! the things seen reprein order to our happiness. If you had nothing but what senting to them the great unseen Object of love. In what you see to maintain life, do you think it were possible for an ecstasy do we find David, upon the view of the beauty you to live another moment? I would appeal to the con- and glory of this creation! "How excellent is thy name siderate reason of any man, whether he were not to be in all the earth, O Lord our Lord, who hast set thy glory thought a madman that should say, "I will be alive the above the heavens !" What put him into this rapture? next hour?" Man! there is somewhat invisible and un- The sight of his own eyes. He beheld "the heavens the seen that is the continual Sustainer of thy life; "in whom work of God's hands, the moon and stars which he had we all live, and move, and have our being," Acts xvii. ordained;" and therefore as he begins, so he ends the 23. Our own experience must convince us of this, that Psalm in a transport; "How excellent is thy name in all there is an invisible Being which hath dominion over our the earth!" Psal. viii. And thus our own eyes may serve Ives, otherwise every man could measure his own time. to be our instructors, and prompt us to the love of him, But do not we find men die before they are willing, and the great Author and Original of all that glory which we when they would fain live longer? Why, it is somewhat find every where diffused in this world. unseen that imposes this necessity upon them, "Here thou must expire!" No man hath power over the spirit to retain it, neither hath he power in the day of death, Eccl. viii. 8.

And again, is it at all necessary to us to be happy? Our own experience tells us that we are not as yet happy and satisfied. And common experience tells all the world, that all the things they can see and set their eyes upon, can never make them happy in this world. And if we expect to be happy in another, when will our eyes lead us to heaven? when will sense, inclination, and following the customs of this world, bring us to blessedness? It were a dreadful thing, if in a matter of so absolute necessity, custom or inclination were to be the measure of the law which must govern us. And again,

[4.] I add in the next place, that it is true indeed that rulers do consider the tempers and inclinations of a people under their legislature. And there is good reason they should do so, and not impose unnecessarily upon the people, things of mere indifferency, and so run the hazard of urging them into tumults about matters of very little consequence. But sure there is no such need or reason that the great Author and Lord of all things should so much concern himself what the inclinations of those are whom he is to govern. If they dislike his laws, and have an inclination to tumultuate or rebel against him, let their dislike and inclination be as strong as it will, He that sitteth in the heavens will laugh, and have them in derision; when they say, Let us break his bands asunder, and cast away his cords from us, Psal. ii. 3, 4.

[5] There is a very great difference in the consideration of laws already made, and of laws to be made. This law was made for man when he was no way disinclined to the love of God. It is a law as ancient as his being. He had it as soon as he had the nature of man. It is therefore a part of the law of nature, and one of the most deeply fundamental things in that law; for it is made the summary, and wraps up all laws whatsoever in itself; for all is fulfilled in love. And what! was it reasonable or fit that this law, so suitable at first to the nature of man, should be then repealed, when he thought fit to break and violate it? That were a strange way of superseding the obligation of a law, that as soon as it is transgressed, it should

The viewing God also in the ways of his providence, how hath it excited the love of holy men sometimes! When Moses and the children of Israel had seen that marvellous work of the sea divided, themselves conducted and brought safe through it, the waters made a wall on the right hand and on the left, and their enemies dead on the sea-shore, how did this set love on work in them! how is the blessed God adored and admired upon the account of what their eyes had seen of him! "Who, say they, is a God like unto thee? Who is like to thee among the gods, glorious in holiness, fearful in praises, doing wonders?" Exod. xv. 11. And after the people of God had seen that great salvation wrought that we find recorded in the fourth chapter of Judges, what a mighty raisedness of heart do we find in the next chapter, all shut up in this. all thine enemies perish, O Lord, but let them that love him be as the sun when he goeth forth in his might," Judg. v. 31. Here was love set on work and raised to the height, so as even to pour out blessings upon all the lovers of God. What a phrase of benediction is that, "Let all that love him be as the sun when he goeth forth in his might!" which proceeded from the view of his excellent greatness.

"So let

So that this pretence, that God is not seen, doth not make it unreasonable or unfit that the duty of love to him should be imposed upon men by his law. They are not for this reason necessarily disinclined to love him, and therefore this excuse for not loving him is neither reasonable nor fit, nor can exempt men from the obligation, as the objection supposes. Let us then see,

2dly, What can be alleged to prove, that the love of God is most fit and reasonable to be the matter of a standing and indispensable law. And to this purpose, in order to show how reasonable this is, we shall only note in general, that if any should object against the fitness of loving God on this ground, because he is not seen, and affirm that for this reason men should not be required to love him; what they have to say in this case, if it signifies any thing to the purpose, must be as strong an objection in all cases of like consideration, and must at last come to this; that it is unreasonable and unfit that men should be effected with any thing they cannot see. But the falsehood hereof, and the reasonableness of this injunction upon men, may

be gathered from this fourfold consideration; to wit, that we may be as sure of the objects of the mind, as we can be of the objects of our sight; that those of the former sort are generally more excellent; that we are concerned in them, as much at least, and in many of them infinitely more, than in the others; and finally, that what can only be the object of the mind may be more intimately present with us, than those things which are the objects of sense. And if we can make out all these, which I hope we may, then it must be concluded that God is so much the more to be loved, yea, infinitely more than any thing our eye can see or make a discovery of.

[1.] We may be as sure of the real existence of the objects of our mind, as we can be of any objects of our sight; or in other words, we may be as certain of the existence of invisible beings, as of visible ones. We may frame a notion of their existence with as much assurance; and form certain conclusions concerning their nature, though they are invisible to the bodily eye. We may especially be most sure of the existence of God, though we cannot see him; more indeed than we can be generally of the existence of visible things.

Sometimes the objects of our mind and sight meet in one, there is somewhat visible and somewhat invisible. As for instance, in actions that are capable of moral consideration, there is the action itself, and there is also the rectitude or irrectitude of that action. Now here is at once an object of my sight and of my mind; and I may be as certain of the one as of the other, in many instances. As, suppose I see one strike, wound, or kill an innocent person; or, suppose I see one affront a magistrate, injuriously or barbarously; here I have the object of my eye and mind at once. That the action was done, I am certain, for I saw the stroke; and I am no less sure of the affront, though that be an object of the mind. As soon as I see such an action done, do not I apprehend it to be ill done? Is not the thing which my mind apprehends, as real as that which my eyes see? Am I not as sure that it was ill done, as that the action was done at all? though the one falls under my eye, and the other only under the cognizance of the mind.

Again, if we look no further than ourselves, our own frame and composition, we may be as certain of the existence of what we see not, as of what we do see. We have a body. We are sure we have a body, for we can see it. It is many ways the object of our senses, or the external organs that are planted there. But we cannot see our minds; yet I hope we are nevertheless sure that we have minds. We are as certain that we have somewhat about us that can think, can understand, as we are that we may be seen and felt. I go not about to determine now what it is that thinks, whether material or not, mortal or not; but every man that will consider, is as sure that he has a mind which he cannot see, as that he has a body which he can see.

ever.

To bring this matter home to our present purpose concerning the Supreme invisible Being, the blessed God. It is most apparent that we may be as certain of his existence as of any thing; and unspeakably more certain of his constant existence, than we can be of any being whatsoThere is no man that will use his understanding, but must allow this. For, suppose an object of sight before me, I am certain that it doth exist; for I see it. Now the following conclusion may be as certain to any one that considers, to wit, something is, therefore something hath ever been. I will appeal to any understanding man, whether this be not as certain as the other. For if we should suppose a time when nothing ever was, when nothing existed, any man's understanding must tell him, it was impossible that any thing should ever have been. Suppose a season when nothing was, and then was it possible any thing of itself should arise out of that nothing, when there was nothing at all conceivable? that a thing should be before it was, and do something when it was nothing? Therefore it is hence most necessarily consequent, that there must needs be some original, eternal Being, subsisting of itself, that was always, and never began to be; and therefore was necessarily, and so can never cease to be.b

b This argument is urged at large, with great force and strength, in the Auhor's admirable Treatise, entitled the Living Temple. Part I. Chap. 2.

Let this be but weighed, and let any sober understanding judge, whether this conclusion be not as certain as the former. That is, compare these two conclusions together, I see something, therefore something is; and this also, something is, therefore something hath ever been, some original Being that always was of itself, and could not but be. A man, I say, feels as great a certainty in his own mind concerning this, as concerning the other. He must renounce his understanding as much in one case, as his eyes in the other, if he will not grant this to be certain, that as some beings now exist, there has been always an original, self-existing Being.

And then supposing the existence of the thing already, I may form as certain conclusions concerning the attributes of what I cannot see, as of that which I can see. To apply this also to the invisible, eternal Being; look to any visible thing, and your eyes can tell what are its visible accidents. I look upon the wall, and see it is white. I know it is so, because I see it is so. Cannot I as certainly conclude concerning this original, eternal Being, that he is wise, holy, just, and powerful? I know that there is such a thing as wisdom, and justice, goodness, and power, in the world. I know that these things are not nothing, and that they did not come out of nothing; therefore they must needs originally belong to the original Being. Is not this as certain, and as plain, as any visible accident of any thing is to a man's eye? Must not these attributes necessarily first be in God, as in their original seat and proper subject? yea, a great deal more certainly, than any kind of quality we can suppose to be lovely in the creature can agree to it; because, as for the original Being, that existed of itself; and therefore is necessarily and by consequence eternally and invariably whatever it is. Therefore since these perfections are originally in God himself, or derivations from him, what should rationally keep a man in suspense, when by the intervention of his mind he sees such an invisible object, but that he should fall in love with that, as well as with any visible object, that commends itself as lovely to the sight. And I should next add,

[2] That invisible excellency is infinitely greater than any visible excellency can be. As there is a reality in unseen things, and especially in this invisible object, as much as in any thing we see with our eyes; so there is generally a higher excellency in invisible objects, than in those that are visible, and infinitely more in this than in other invisible objects. But this and the other considerations I cannot reach to now.

SERMON VII.*

THE second head of discourse which we are still upon is this, That men are not released from the obligation to love God though he be invisible; and that it is not only an evil, but a most horrid and intolerable one too, not to love him, notwithstanding the excuse that we cannot see him. And this, as we observed, you have from the plain words of the text; inasmuch as all the force of the apostle's reasoning depends upon it. For he is endeavouring to evince how unreasonable it is we should not love one another. because upon this would ensue that infernal thing, our not loving God; rather than admit which, it is supposed that men would admit any thing. For the prosecution of this truth we propose to evince, in the first place, that this is a very vain excuse; and have already shown from many considerations, that it is not impossible to love God in these bodies of flesh, wherein we have such a dependance on the senses; neither is it unreasonable or unfit it should be enjoined as a duty. Against the contrary principle we have designed to insist on sundry considerations, and have observed already in the

[1] Place, that we may be as sure of the existence of many invisible beings, especially of God, as we are of any that are visible. This we have shown, and also that it is *Preached October 4th, 1676.

as easy to form conclusions respecting the nature of the former, as it is of the latter. Both these we laboured to evince from several instances; and concluded with observing to this effect, that since all perfections are originally in God, which we may discern by the intervention of the understanding, therefore it is as reasonable to love him, as any visible object how lovely soever; and more so indeed, because he is eternally and invariably the same. For, to add something further on this head,

to contemplate something that can think, reason, and understand; that can form abstract notions of things, or compare one thing with another; something that can reflect upon itself, which our eye cannot do; that can control and correct the errors of sense; that can run through the vast compass of known things; is capable of solving problems and difficult questions; of laying down principles and maxims of truth, after having weighed and found them firm, so as that they may pass current; for such there are which pass unquestionably every where for undoubted principles. In a word, we have here a kind of being to contemplate, that is capable of taking up what lies within the compass of philosophy, policy, and the whole human orb of learning; of being instructed in all the great mysteries of mechanical skill of every kind; and in short, that can turn itself every way; and is of a nature unperishable and immortal, not liable to nor capable of corruption, but must last for ever and always endure. Who now would make any difficulty of owning, that this is a far more excellent thing than the other; this spirit, than that shape of a man which merely lives? But yet even this more excellent creature which we have been supposing, is somewhat diminished, and falls beneath a brighter order of beings, by its being proportioned to a human body. And upon this account man is said to be a little lower than the angels, Psalm viii. 5. at least this is one account that may

I see and converse often with such or such a person, who because of certain amiable qualities that I discern in him, hath attracted and drawn my love; but I am never sure those qualities will remain in him always. I know not whether they be of that kind, yea or no, that they will remain. But I most certainly know that he will not always remain with me the conversable object of my love. And therefore if sense, if the sight of what is lovely in him, be the only ground of my love to him, I could never have loved him longer than my eye could see him. For as soon as he is gone out of my sight, I know not but he is gone out of being, out of the world, and so the object of my love may be quite lost. But I know that the eternal Being doth exist necessarily, and always. It is impossible that God should ever not exist, or ever be other than he was; and therefore if loveliness and amiableness were found there at any time, it is to be found there at all times; without variableness and shadow of change, yesterday and to-be given of this passage; for it is a diminution of the day the same, and for ever.

And now upon all this, since it is very plain and evident, that we may be as certain concerning what we see not, as concerning what we do see; as sure of the existence of invisible as of visible beings; and more especially about the nature and existence (as far as concerns us) of the blessed invisible God; it is plain that there our love ought to have its exercise, as much as any where else, supposing such excellencies to be found in the invisible things, as may equally recommend the object to our love. Therefore we add,

[2] That, invisible things are really of far higher excellency, than those which are visible. As the things that we cannot see have as certain a reality as those that we can see; so, I say, they are of higher excellency; and this blessed invisible object infinitely more excellent, as we must acknowledge, while we acknowledge him to be God. If we speak of such things as lie within the compass of our being, how plain is the case and how evident the inference! Sure the invisible world must needs be of incomparably greater excellency and glory, than the visible world. And if you reduce all kinds of being in the whole universe to these two ranks and orders, visible and invisible, certainly the latter must be unspeakably more excellent.

We who are for our parts set in the confines of both worlds, visible and invisible; we in whose very nature both meet, unite, and touch one another, and are as it were comparted together; we who are of a nature partly visible, partly invisible, partly flesh, and partly spirit, or as the language of Plato's school was, Nss, yes, mind and dust united into one compound; surely we should not be partial in our judgment of this case. Who should be impartial if we are not, who are set as a middle sort of creatures between the two worlds, and so are capable of looking into and surveying the one and the other.

And if we contemplate both even in ourselves, methinks it should be no difficult thing with us to determine which is of greater excellency, this bulk of flesh, or this spirit which inhabits it, and keeps it from being a dead lump, a useless, rotten, putrid carcass. Yea, if we should suppose the body of a man to be animated by some inferior vital principle to that of a reasonable spirit, yet this would be the more excellent part. It is true, we should then have before our eyes a certain sort of human brute, of which kind there are but too many in our age, at least that live and carry it as such. We should, in short, to speak plainly, have somewhat before our eyes that wore the mere shape of a man, and could hear, and see, and smell, and taste, and move to and fro this way or that, and must ere long, after a few turns are fetched about, turn to dust, to rottenness, and corruption. But suppose we a spirit separately, such as is wont to animate a human body; here we have

spirit of a man, that it is proportioned to its habitation, the body. But then consider those purely intellectual creatures, of whom we know not how to form a notion which shall be more expressive than to call them INTELLIGENCIES; inasmuch as they are, as far as we can apprehend them, beings of knowledge and light, and also of goodness and love proportioned to that light of theirs; what can match the excellency of such creatures as these, among the whole sphere of visible beings?

But let us further consider how vastly numerous that order of creatures is, as we may very well suppose, and partly collect from intimations of Scripture, where they are said to be innumerable. "The innumerable company of angels, and the spirits of just men made perfect," Heb. xii. 22. How much of glory and excellency must then be in the invisible world, beyond what we can possibly conceive of in this lower visible region! If we do but bethink ourselves and consider what a mere punctilio, a little point, this earth is in which we dwell, in comparison of that vast expanse that doth surround and encompass it about; how unspeakably, how inconceivably more numerous must we suppose the inhabitants to be, that replenish those vast superior regions quite out of sight, than those which inhabit and replenish this point of earth! How vast, I say, must we suppose the invisible world to be, if we consider the number of its inhabitants who are parts of God's creation, whom we have reason to think do competently replenish all those vast regions that are, when our eye has gone as far as it can, far more exceeding the reach of our thoughts. What limits can we set to the creation of God in our most enlarged thoughts? Finite we must suppose it to be; but alas, we are never capable of measuring the bounds! And we have reason to believe it is every where replenished with such glorious invisible creatures as we speak of, in comparison of whom all the inhabitants of the earth, that ever were or shall be, are but an inconsiderable handful. Are we not then to think that the invisible world is far more excellent than that which is visible?

But then if we ascend to the great Author of all things, the blessed invisible object that we are concerned to speak about, that vast profound abyss of all excellencies, perfection, and glory, how much more must we conclude there is of excellency in that sort of being in general which is invisible, than in that which is visible! If we consider him inhabiting his own eternity, if we consider his immensity who was before all time, whom "heaven and the heaven of heavens cannot contain," (1 Kings viii. 27.) every where existing, and never not existing; in whom there is an infinite fulness, a rich fountain of being, life, wisdom, power, goodness, and holiness, and whatsoever we can conceive under the notion of excellency and perfection: to think of such a being that was every where before all time was, and continuing to be the same when time shall be no more,

668

ON THE LOVE OF GOD AND OUR BROTHER.

where no worlds are, and where never any shall be, re- | talk we of measuring our concernments by this present
plenishing all the space that we can imagine, and that we
cannot imagine, all, every where, and eternally full of be-
ing, life, and glory! what an object have we now to con-
template, and think of in the invisible order of things!
And what would we contine all excellency as well as
reality to this little, minute, inconsiderable earth? the
things that sense can reach unto? as if our senses were to
be the measure of all excellency, perfection, and reality,
and it was the same thing for any thing to be nothing, or
at least worth nothing, as to be out of our sight.

How unreasonable were such an imagination as this! And indeed well might we be ashamed, and count it a reflection upon our profession of the Christian name, that we may so often read pagans discoursing in transports of the INTELLECTUAL PULCHRITUDE, of the beauty and excellency of mental and invisible things; while our hearts, in the mean time, are taken with nothing but what our eyes can reach to see, or our senses to judge of. With what raptures do some of them speak of the first pulchritude, and the self-pulchritude, or that which is lovely of itself. Plato in particular calls him, "The being that is with itself, always agreeing to itself, always existing uniformly, never Thus he speaks varying from itself, and lasting always." of the first ORIGINAL BEAUTY, meaning the great object that we now speak of, to wit, the invisible God. But what a degeneracy is it to measure the objects of our love by the sight of the eye! whereas there is nothing fair or good, as philosophers speak, but what hath its derivation from the first pulchritude; or as it hath a kind of precarious beauty and comeliness derived to it from him, who is the first and original Beauty. If then we seriously bethink ourselves of this, we cannot but acknowledge that the prime object of our love lies among the invisible things. If we will but use our thoughts, we must say thus; this, I say, must be the conclusion, if we will not profess brutality, and renounce our humanity; that is, deny that we are human and reasonable creatures.

But because here it may possibly be said, "That admitting there be so great excellency and glory in the invisible sort of beings, yet we are to love where we are concerned; we are to place our love among things with which we have to do, and upon which we have dependance; but how little can we have to do with things invisible, and out of our sight!" Therefore I add,

[3] We are a great deal more concerned about invisible than visible things. They are of much more importance to us, as well as of greater excellency considered in themselves. It will certainly be found one day, that faith, holiness, humility, meekness, mortifiedness to this world, a mastery over insolent and brutish passions, tranquillity, peace, and composure of spirit, those great ornaments of the hidden man of the heart, are of unspeakably more concernment, than all the things of the visible world besides. These are of greater importance to our present comfort, and to our future and eternal well-being, than whatsoever our senses can bring to our notice. But the invisible God is so most of all, who is infinitely beyond and above all.

And what will any pretend, that they have no concern with God, because they cannot see him? no concern with him, "in whom we live, and move, and have our being, and in whose hand our breath is," without whom we cannot move a hand or lift a foot, or think a thought, or live a moment? Have we no concern with him? none in this present state? Or are we the less concerned with God, because we see him not? May we not be convinced, if we will allow ourselves to think, that it is somewhat invisible which our life and being depend upon? For we know our selves to be depending beings. We do know and feel, yea our own thoughts and hearts must instruct us in this, that we are not self-subsistent. We have not in our own hands the measure of our time, nor the command of our own We find ourselves controlled and overconcernments. ruled in many things every day. There are many thousands of things that we would have otherwise, if we could tell how. There is something invisible to which we owe our breath, and that hath dominion over us, whether we mind it or not. And have we no concern with that being, which hath such immediate power over our lives, and all our comforts, in this present state and world? But what

state? Have not our own souls a secret consciousness in
them, that they are made for eternity for a world where
they are to be perpetual inhabitants, after a little short
time is over? And have we not therefore now in this life
most to do with invisible things, especially with the great
invisible Lord, both of the visible and invisible creation?
We should soon know ourselves to be most concerned
with what is invisible, and most of all with God, if we
We did not come into this world
would but understand the state of our case. We know
ourselves to be creatures.

of our own choice, or by our own contrivance. We made
not ourselves, neither was it the object of our choice,
whether we would be of this or that rank or order of crea-
tures; but were put into that rank of beings wherein we
are, by a superior and higher hand. Yea, considering what
sort of being it is we have, and what a nature the great
Author and Parent of all nature hath furnished us with,
it is easy for us by a little reflection to come to this know-
ledge, that we are not what he made us; that we are
fallen creatures as well as reasonable ones; that we have
incurred the displeasure of him that made us; that we are
absolutely at his mercy; that there is such a darkness and
blindness upon our minds and understandings, and such a
stupidity and death possessing our very souls, that can
never be supposed to have been in the first formation of
such a creature by the hands of God. Lastly, we may
find, that we are become impure and corrupt; that there
are perverse sinful inclinations and affections, which we
ourselves cannot but disapprove of, and disallow upon re-
flection: and that hereby we are under a very egregious
guilt, and so subject to wrath and eternal punishment. If
we would but allow ourselves to consider this as our state,
we should soon know that we have more to do with the
invisible God, than with all the world of visible things.
Yea further, how amiable would he appear in our eyes, if
we did but understand ourselves! if we would but take
notice what dark, blind creatures we are, how would it
recommend him to us, who is represented as the light of
our eyes, and the life of our hearts! In a word, if we
would but consider what deformed creatures we are, how
impure, and, alluding to the expression in Job, (Job ix. 31.)
so plunged in the ditch, that our own clothes might abhor
us, O how delectable would the thoughts of him be! how
lovely would he be in our eyes that brings such overtures
of purification to us! I will sprinkle clean water upon
you, and ye shall be clean from all your filthiness; and
from all your idols will I cleanse you, Ezek. xxxvi. 25. And
he that offers this, will certainly effect it in all those who
are designed for a blessed commerce with him for ever, in
order to make them perfect in his own comeliness.

Then again, if we consider how liable we are to his
wrath, how fast bound with the cords of our own guilt,
how amiable would that notion and name of God be to
us, which was proclaimed to Moses, "The Lord, the Lord
God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant
in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, for-
giving iniquity, transgression, and sin," Exod. xxxiv. 6, 7.
But we measure things by the sight of our own eye, be-
Whereas if we did but
cause we will not allow ourselves to take any cognizance
of the true state of our own case.
consider the matter, and give ourselves leave to think and
inquire, we should know there are things which concern
us unspeakably more, that are out of sight, than what come
under our view day by day; and that especially we are
most concerned with him who is least in our sight, and
most remote from the view of our external eye. And then
add to all this,

[4.] That invisible things are a great deal more capable of being intimate to us, or we may be infinitely more conWe love a friend whom we have versant with them, than it is possible for us to be with things that are seen. But we cannot be with this often seen; and it may be, the oftener we have seen him the more we love him. friend always. The dearest friends must part. We cannot have him perpetually in our bosom to converse with in a friendly manner. A great many things must concur to the entertainment of our friends with delight, and to converse with them with pleasure. For instance, they must be in a pleasant humour, and at leisure for converse. We many

must be quite thrown aside. Our business for eternity and another world, the apprehensions of which, men cannot quite abolish out of their minds, must all stand still; and we live at such a rate that no man will be able to give a tolerable account what he liveth for, or what his business in this world is. For it is altogether inconceivable for what purpose such a creature as man is should be here in this world, furnished with so much higher and nobler faculties than the brute beasts, and yet to do no other business but what they might do as well as we.

times wait for visits, and they are not given; or we design | concernments, that should urge us more than all others, them, but are disappointed. Messengers may be sent to this or that place, one after another; and yet two friends, that would converse, cannot be brought together. Besides, when we are conversing with such lower objects of our love, we must make use of speech, and are fain to employ words, those necessary but imperfect instruments, or media of conversation. But we cannot convey by words our full and clear apprehensions to others, so as to let them know all that we would have them know. And most of the controversies in the world, about matters of opinion in religion, do arise from hence, that men cannot be brought to understand one another. I cannot tell how to make another master of my thoughts, but one way or other the notion will be misrepresented, and so not lie so distinctly clear in another's mind, as it doth in his that would propagate it. But if we could this way infuse into them a full and clear knowledge of what we ourselves do intend, yet we cannot thereby infuse a living sense, nor convey the affections that are in our own bosoms to another by words.

But how intimately conversant may we be with the invisible God, and that blessed Spirit that understands not only our words, but our sighs and groans, and the living sense thereof that is unutterable. God can also be conversant with us whithersoever we go, wheresoever we are, so that as soon as we are minded to retire, we find him with us. As soon as we retire into ourselves with a design to converse inwardly with the living God, he is immediately present with us, and it is as easy to converse with him as with our own thoughts. As soon as we think, so soon are we with God, and as soon is he with us. In the twinkling of an eye we find him. We look unto him and are lightened. Thus with a cast of the eye the soul is filled; it finds itself replenished with a divine and vital light, that diffuseth the sweetest and most pleasant influences and savours through the soul.

Surely then, what is invisible, and most of all the blessed God, is most fit for our converse; an omnipresent God, who is every where present with us in the very first instant; so that there are no bodies, or other circumscribing circumstances, to withhold and divert that commerce between him and us; but he is with us in our walking in the way, in our sitting down in our houses, in our lying down in our beds, in any wilderness, in any den or desert. Certainly it can be no way unfit, that he should be chosen for our converse, and for the great object of our love, though we cannot see him. Our not being able to see him detracts nothing from the reasonableness of placing our love there, upon all these accounts. Therefore the pretence for our not loving God because he is invisible, is altogether insufficient, and carries nothing in it that a valid excuse should have to make it so. I should now proceed to show the intolerable absurdities of not loving God because he is invisible; but the time doth not give me leave now to speak them.

SERMON VIII.*

HAVING in the three last discourses shown the invalidity of the excuse for not loving God, drawn from his invisibility, we now proceed in the

2. Place, To evince more fully the obligation we are under to this duty, and to show the intolerable absurdity of this excuse, that is, of pleading that we do not love God, only because we cannot see him. For,

(1.) It would infer, that we are to be affected or moved with no invisible thing whatsoever; or that nothing but what can strike our senses ought to touch our hearts. For if this be a good reason in the present case, we do not love God because we cannot see him, wheresoever the case is alike, the reason will be so too; and so we are to be moved by nothing at all, but what is to be seen. No threatening danger then is to be feared or provided against, and no distant good to be cared for; and so our greatest

* Preached October 11th, 1676.

(2.) It would hence be consequent, that the blessed God would be everlastingly excluded our love, or that he could never be loved by his reasonable intelligent creature, for an eternal reason; because he can never be seen, as we see our brother with eyes of flesh. None of us in this sense can ever behold God; and if this reason be conclusive, to all eternity he must be excluded our love. And so it may be affirmed even of his reasonable creatures, "None do love him, nor ever shall." And again,

(3.) According to this way of reasoning, God would lose his interest in our love by the excellency of his nature. And how monstrously absurd is it, that by how much the more excellent an object is, so much the less it should be loved! For it is owing to the excellency of his nature and being, that God cannot be seen. And is it not a horrid consequence, that because he is so excellent as he is, therefore he is not to be loved? Nothing is more manifest, than that by how much the more excellent any thing is, so much the more it is remote from our sight. And shall this be admitted a as principle, that by how much the more excellent any thing is, the less it shall be loved? Shall God lose his interest in our love, merely because he is so excellent and perfect as he is? or shall he for this reason be less loved than visible objects are? Again,

(4.) All commerce would hereupon cease, or rather never be, between the blessed God and his intelligent creature, at least all intellectual commerce suitable to such a creature. For if this were a good reason, He is not to be seen, therefore he is not to be loved, it would also follow, that he is not to be trusted, feared, or obeyed. All which would infer, that God hath made an intelligent being with whom he can converse no way suitable to its nature, than which nothing can be thought more absurd. Further,

(5.) All differences of moral good and evil, in such a case, would be quite taken away, or all apprehensions of them, from among men. For the rectitude or irrectitude of actions is not to be judged of nor discerned by the sight of our eye. We cannot by this means alone, tell whether this or that thing be right or wrong. And this by conse quence would necessarily render mankind incapable of being governed by laws; because the reason why a law should oblige, doth not fall under any man's sight. The decency and fitness of a thing the eye does not reach; for to discern this is the business of the mind. And so it would be left altogether impossible for any one to assign a reason, why it should be more congruous to equity and justice for one to embrace his friend, than to murder him; why a man should relieve the poor who cannot help themselves, rather than oppress them; or why a man should not as well, and with as great reason and equity, affront a ruler, as obey him and be subject to his authority? So that in short you take away the foundation of converse with man, at the same time you take away the foundation of religious converse with God and invisible things. By this kind of argument you not only overturn the practice of godliness and piety, which is a great part of that love to God we ought to be exercised in, but you do as effectually by the same means destroy all civil commerce between man and man, howsoever related; and leave no foundation for human society, considering the members of it in relation to governors or rulers, and to one another. And,

(6.) It would hence follow, that the original constitution of man's nature was made up of inconsistencies; nothing else but a piece of self-contradiction. That is, it would be necessary to do a thing, and yet at the same time impossible. It is necessary by the constitution of the human nature that man do love a known good, and therefore most

a See Sermon V. p. 662.

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