how any action could be free, or any event contingent, upon the fuppofition of the divine providence or decree.

Others have attempted to folve the difficulty by founding the decrees upon foreknowledge, and this upon God's diftinct and perfect view of every perfon's difpofition, and how men will determine in every circumstance in which they can be placed. But this is liable to two objections, first, That foreknowledge makes no difference as to decrees; for whether God confidered the thing as a confequence of another or not, if he forefaw the confequence, he admitted and ordained that event as a part of the general fyftem. The other objection is, that it takes for granted the fyftem of what is called moral neceffity, which brings back the fame difficulty with redoubled force. It is remarkable that the advocates for neceffity have adopted a diftinction made ufe of for other purpofes, and forced it into their fervice, I mean moral and natural neceflity. They fay natural or phyfical neceffity takes away liberty, but moral neceffity does not; at the fame time, they explain moral neceflity fo as to make it truly phyfical or natural. That is phyfical neceffity which is the invincible effect of the law of nature, and it is neither lefs natural nor lefs unfurmountable, if it is from the laws of fpirit, than it would be if it were from the laws of matter. To fee how fome people are loft upon thefe fubjects, you may obferve that the great argument that men are determined by the strongest motives, is a mere equivocation, and what logicians call petitio principii. It is impoffible even to produce any medium of proof

that it is the ftrongest motive, except that it has prevailed. It is not the greateft in itself, nor does it feem to be in all refpects ftrongest to the agent ; but you say it appears strongest in the mean time-Why? Because you were determined by it: alas! you promised to prove that I was determined by the Arongest motive, and you have only fhewn that I had a motive when I acted. But what has determined you then? can any effect be without a cause ? I anfwer, Suppofing my felf-determining power to exift, it is as real a caufe of its proper and diftinguishing effect, as your moral neceffity; fo that the matter just comes to a stand, and is but one and the fame thing on one fide and on the other.

But even fuppose the system of neceffity true, the difficulty of reconciling it with the guilt of fin, and the righteousness of God's judgment, is as great as upon any fuppofition whatever. Others have made ufe of a metaphyfical argument to reconcile foreknowledge with liberty. They fay, when any thing is done in time, it only fhews the futurity of the action, as the school-men fay. It was a true propofition from all eternity, that fuch a thing would be done, and every truth being the object of the divine knowledge, God's foreseeing it was no more the caufe of it than a man's seeing another do a thing at a distance is the cause of its being done. But even this does not fatisfy the mind, as the difficulty arises from the certainty of the event itself, as being inconfiftent with the freedom of the agent, not the way in which it comes to be known.

It deferves particular notice, that feveral able VOL. VIII. L

writers have fhewn, that with respect to the most difficult part of the decrees of God, all the feveral fects of Chriftians at bottom fay the fame thing, except that clafs of Socinians who deny the omnifcience and foreknowledge of God altogether, and they are fo directly oppofite to the letter of Scripture, that they deferve no regard. The Arminians fay, that God has decreed that all that he forefaw would believe and repent, fhould be faved; for which purpofe all have fufficient grace given them. But could not Omnipotence have given them effectual grace to overcome their obftinacy? Yes, without doubt. And are there not fome that had as obftinate and profligate natures as those that perish, overcome by divine power? Yes, it is not easy to deny this-that he did not give the effectual grace to fome, and gave it to others. So that they must at laft fay, "Even fo, Father," &c.

It is more easy to fhew that the Supralapfarians and Sublapfarians are at bottom of the fame principle. All then have this difficulty before them— to account for the divine purpose confiftently with the guilt of fin.

But I would go a little farther and say, the difficulty is the fame in natural as it is in revealed religion, and the fame in the course of nature as in both. The certainty of events makes as much against common diligence in the affairs of life, as againft diligence in religion. The fates which the Stoics of old held, was called the ignava ratio of the Stoics.

For my own part I freely own, that I could never fee any thing fatisfactory in the attempts of divines

or metaphyficians to reconcile the fe two things; but it does not appear difficult to me to believe precifely in the form of our Confeffion of Faith; to believe both the certainty of God's purpose, and the free agency of the creature. Nor does my being unable to explain thefe doctrines, form an objection against one or the other.

LECTURE XIV.

Of the Covenant of Works, and the Fall of Man.

HIS feems to be the next thing in order.

THIS

That I may treat of it as concisely as poffible, I will make the following observations.

1. It is juftly and properly by divines confidered as a covenant. The word covenant is not indeed made use of by Mofes in giving the hiftory of the fall, for which many reasons may be affigned. The Scripture does not so much limit the phrafe, as fix the thing itself, which we now exprefs by it. The word covenant is used with latitude in Scripture. Thus, Jer. xxxiii. 20. 25. “Thus faith the Lord, if you can break my covenant," &c. It may be obferved, that there muft of neceflity be fome impro priety in calling any tranfaction between God and man a covenant, because it muft differ confiderably from an engagement of perfons equal and free. But as far as there can be a covenant relation between God and man, it evidently took place here. The giving a fpecial command, with a threatening annexed, does evidently imply in it fuch a cove

nant.

2. It feems juft and proper to fuppofe, that merely abstaining from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, was not the only duty prefcribed and demanded by God, but that the demand extended to univerfal obedience.

The Jewish Rabbies fay that God gave Adam fix precepts: 1. To worship God; 2. To do justice; 3. Not to thed human blood; 4. Not to make use of idols or images; 5. Not to commit rapine and fraud; 6. To avoid inceft. But all this is without the leaft proof.

It

3. We may confider the choice of the command for trial, not to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil. This may give occafion to many conjectures, and likewife to many folid remarks. is conjectured by many, that the tree had in it a noifome quality that made the body liable to corruption, as God often orders his commands fo, that obedience to them is of itself happiness, and difobedience is mifery. If we fuppofe the eating this tree had nothing in itself either good or evil, and it is afked why God thought fit to fufpend the fate of the human race on a pofitive precept? It may be answered, first, as an act of fovereignty, to which we have no right to object. 2. It might also be more proper for the trial of obedience, as the mere authority of God would be the fanction. 3. It was a juft and natural acknowledgment that the creature held all created comforts of God. 4. There were then fo few relations, that there could be no trial upon the precepts of the fecond table.

4. It appears that Adam, in the covenant. of works, was to be confidered as the federal head and