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these which has rendered the religion of the Hindoos so grossly absurd and contemptible. To admit that all things, whether possible or impossible to our understanding, are possible for God, is certainly favourable to the idea of a mixed nature of God and man, but at the same time would be highly detrimental both to religion and society; for all sorts of positions and tales, however impossible they may be, might in that case be advanced and supported on the same plea. I now conclude my reply, with noticing in a brief manner the modes of illustration that Trinitarians adopt both in conversation and in writing in support of the unity of the Godhead, in consistency with the distinction of three persons. 1st, That as the soul, will, and perception, though they are three things, yet are in fact one, so God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, though distinct persons, are to be esteemed as one. Admitting for a moment the propriety of this analogy, it serves to destroy totally their position, as to the three existences of the Godhead being distinct substances; for, according to the established system of theology, the soul is believed to be the substance, and will and perception its properties, which have no distinct existence; in the same manner as weight and locality are the properties of matter, without having existence as separate substances. If this analogy, then, were to hold good, the Father would be acknowledged as a separate existence like the soul, but the Son and the Holy Spirit must be considered his attributes, as will and perception are of the soul: a doctrine which resembles that of the heretic Sabellius and the early Egyptian Christians. It is therefore necessary, that, in endeavouring to prove the reasonableness of the idea respecting the unity of three distinct substances of the Godhead, from comparison between them and the soul, and its will and perception, they should establish first that the soul, will, and perception, are three substances, and that they are at the same time one; and then should draw such an analogy, shewing the possibility of the position which they assume. 2ndly, That as notwithstanding the distinct existence of the sun, his rays of light and his rays of heat, they are considered as one; so God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, though separate substances, are one. Were we to admit the separate existence of heat, a point still disputed among philosophers, it would serve as an analogy so far as these three distinct substances, though different in nature, are connected together; but by no means would answer the purpose of illustrating their position, that these distinct persons are one in nature and essence; for the sun is acknowledged to be a compact body; rays of light are fluid substances subject to absorption, and frequently found emanating from other bodies, as well as the sun ; and heat, an existence of which the most remarkable property is its power of expanding other substances, is frequently unaccompanied by the rays of the sun. But it is universally acknowledged, that whatever argument tends to prove a distinction between substances, must necessarily overturn their unity in essence and existence; and therefore the unity in nature and essence which they assert to exist in the three persons of the Godhead not being found in the sun, light, and heat, the analogy attempted to be drawn must be abandoned. Again, it is advanced, that as a single substance possesses various qualities, and consequently is viewed differently; so the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, are in fact one God; yet |the Deity in his capacity of Creator of the world, is called the Father, and in his capacity of Mediator is termed the Son, in which he is generally supposed inferior to the Father; and in his office of sanctification is named the Holy Ghost, in which he is deemed inferior to both. I know not whether to consider such an argument as reasoning, or as a mockery of reason 3 since it justifies us in believing, that one and the same being in one of his capacities is superior to himself, and again, in reference to another quality, is inferior to himself; that he is in one case his own beloved Son, and then in another capacity is at the disposal of himself according to the entreaty of his .." This mode of arguing, after all, serves to deny the Trinity, which represents the Godhead as consisting of three distinct persons, and not as one person possessing different attributes, which it is the object of Trinitarians to prove. They allege the united state of the soul and the body as analogous to the union of the Father and Son; but no one who believes in the separate existence of the soul, can for a moment suppose it to be of the same essence as the body :

so that unless they admit the immateriality of the Father alone, and assert the materiality of the Son in his pre-existent state, this illustration also must be set aside. Some allege, that as the Son of Man designates human nature, so the Son of God expresses the nature of God. Were we to admit the term “God” as a common noun, and not a proper name, and Godhead as a genus like mankind, &c., and that Jesus was actually begotten of the Deity, this mode of reasoning would stand good ; but Godhead must in this case be brought to a level with other genera, capable of performing animal functions, &c. Some represent God as a compound substance, consisting of three parts, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, a representation in support of which they can offer no scriptural authority. I would, however, wish to know, whether these parts (Father, Son and Spirit) are of the same nature and existence, or each possessed of a different nature or essence. In the former case, there would be a total impossibility of composition; for composition absolutely requires articles or parts of different identity and essence; nothing being capable of composition with itself. Besides, the idea of such a compound substance is inconsistent with that distinct personality of Father, Son, and Spirit, which they maintain.—In the latter case, (that is, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit being of dif. ferent natures,) a composition of these three parts is not impossible; but it destroys the opinion which they entertain respecting the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, being of the same nature and essence, and of course implies, that the Godhead is liable to divisibility. The argument so adduced by them would include in reality a denial of the epithet God to each part of • the Godhead; for no portion of an existence, either ideal or perceptible in a true sense, can be called the existence itself; as it is one of the first axioms of abstract truth, that a part is less than the whole; but we find in the Scriptures the Father constantly called God in the strict and full signification of the term. John, ch. xvii. ver. 3: “This is life eternal, that they may know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.” 1 Cor. ch. xv. ver. 24: “Then cometh the end, when he shall have delivered up the kingdom to God, even the Father.” I Cor. ch. viii. ver. 6: “To us there is but one God, the Father.” Ephesians, ch. iv. vers. 5, 6: “One Lord, one faith, one baptism; one God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in you all.” Another argument which has great weight with that sect is, that unless Jesus is God and man, he cannot be considered as qualified to perform the office of mediator between God and man ; because it is only by this compound character that he intercedes for guilty creatures with their offended God. This mode of reasoning is most evidently opposed to common sense, as well as to the Scriptures; though their zeal in support of the Trinity has not permitted them to see it. I say, opposed

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