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posed his being enrolled among the gods of Rome, which the opposition of the Senate hindered from taking effect." //If some of the Heathens from the nature of their superstitions could rank Jesus among their false gods, it is no wonder if others, when nominally converted to Christianity, should have placed him on an equality with the true God, and should have passed a decree, constituting him one of the persons of the Godhead. These facts coincide entirely with my own firm persuasion of the impossibility, that a doctrine so inconsistent with the evidence of the senses as that of three persons in one being, should ever gain the sincere assent of any one, into whose mind it has not been instilled in early education. Early impressions alone can induce a Christian to believe that three are one, and one is three; just as by the same means a Hindoo is made to believe that millions are one, and one is millions; and to imagine that an inanimate idol is a living substance, and capable of assuming various forms. As I have sought to attain the truths of Christianity from the words of the author of this religion, and from the undisputed instructions of his holy apostles, and not from a parent or tutor, I cannot help refusing my assent to any doctrine which I do not find scriptural.

Before concluding, I beg to revert to one or two arguments respecting the nature of Jesus Christ, which have been already partly touched upon. It is maintained that his nature was double, being divine as Son of God, and human as Son of Man -that in the former capacity he performed mira

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cles and exercised authority over the wind and the sea, and as man was subject to, and experienced human feelings-joy and sorrow, pleasure and pain. Is it possible to consider a being in the human shape, acting daily in a manner required by the nature of the human race as the invisible God, above mortality and all the feelings of mortal beings, from a mere figurative application of the terms "Son of God" or "God" to him, and from the circumstance of his performing wonderful works contrary to the usual course of nature? what can prevent one from esteeming Moses and others, as possessed of both divine and human nature? since Moses, likewise, is called God distinctly. (Exodus, ch. vii. ver. 1: "I have made thee a God to Pharaoh ;") and he is also called man, ("wherewith Moses, the man of God, blessed Israel," Deut. ch. xxiii. ver. 1;) and consequently it may be alleged, that in his divine capacity, Moses performed miracles, and commanded the heavens and the earth, ("Give ear, O ye heavens, and I will speak; and hear, O earth, the words of my mouth," Deut. ch, xxxii. ver. 1; "For it (the word of Moses) is not a vain thing for you, because it is your life," ver. 47;) and that in his human capacity, he suffered death and other miseries. Neither Jesus nor Moses ever declared, "I say so, and perform this as God; and I say so, and perform that as man." If we give so great a latitude to the modes of reasoning employed to justify the idea of one being possessed of two sorts of consciousness, as God and man; two sorts of

minds, divine and human; and two sets of souls, eternal and perishable; then we shall not only be at a loss to know what is rational and what is absurd, but shall find our senses and experience of little or no use to us. The mode of interpreting the Scriptures which is universally adopted is this, that when two terms, seemingly contradictory, are applied to one person, then that which is most consistent with reason and with the context, should be taken in a literal, and the other in a figurative sense. Thus God is declared to be immaterial, and yet to have hands, eyes, &c. The latter expressions taken literally, being inconsistent with reason, and with other passages of the Scriptures, are understood as metaphorically implying his power and knowledge, while the former is interpreted in its strict and literal sense: in like manner the term "Lord God," &c., applied to any other than the Supreme Being, must be figuratively understood. Were any one, in defiance of this general mode of interpretation, to insist that the term "God," applied to Jesus, should be taken in its literal sense, and that, consequently, Jesus should be actually considered God in the human shape, he would not only acknowledge the same intimate connexion of matter with God, that exists between matter and the human soul, but also would necessarily justify the application of such phrases as "Mother of God" to the Virgin Mary, and "Brother of God" to James and others, which are highly derogatory. to the character of the Supreme Author of the universe; and it is the use of phrases similar to

these which has rendered the religion of the Hindoos so grossly absurd and contemptible. To admit that all things, whether possible or impossible to our understanding, are possible for God, is certainly favourable to the idea of a mixed nature of God and man, but at the same time would be highly detrimental both to religion and society; for all sorts of positions and tales, however impossible they may be, might in that case be advanced and supported on the same plea.

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I now conclude my reply, with noticing in a brief manner the modes of illustration that Trinitarians adopt both in conversation and in writing in support of the unity of the Godhead, in consistency with the distinction of three persons. 1st, That as the soul, will, and perception, though they are three things, yet are in fact one, so God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, though distinct persons, are to be esteemed as one. mitting for a moment the propriety of this analogy, it serves to destroy totally their position, as to the three existences of the Godhead being distinct substances; for, according to the established system of theology, the soul is believed to be the substance, and will and perception its properties, which have no distinct existence; in the same manner as weight and locality are the properties of matter, without having existence as separate substances. If this analogy, then, were to hold good, the Father would be acknowledged as a separate existence like the soul, but the Son and the Holy Spirit must be considered his attributes, as will and perception are of

the soul: a doctrine which resembles that of the heretic Sabellius and the early Egyptian Christians.

It is therefore necessary, that, in endeavouring to prove the reasonableness of the idea respecting the unity of three distinct substances of the Godhead, from comparison between them and the soul, and its will and perception, they should establish first that the soul, will, and perception, are three substances, and that they are at the same time one; and then should draw such an analogy, shewing the possibility of the position which they assume.

2ndly, That as notwithstanding the distinct existence of the sun, his rays of light and his rays of heat, they are considered as one; so God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, though separate substances, are one. Were we to

admit the separate existence of heat, a point still disputed among philosophers, it would serve as an analogy so far as these three distinct substances, though different in nature, are connected together; but by no means would answer the purpose of illustrating their position, that these distinct persons are one in nature and essence; for the sun is acknowledged to be a compact body; rays of light are fluid substances subject to absorption, and frequently found emanating from other bodies, as well as the sun; and heat, an existence of which the most remarkable property is its power of expanding other substances, is frequently unaccompanied by the rays of the sun. But it is universally acknowledged, that whatever argument tends to prove a distinction between substances, must necessarily

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