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But it is in the sublimity of thoughts that Milton excels all other poets ancient or modern, Homer excepted. He borrows the words of foreign languages, that his thoughts may not seem vulgar and familiar. He sometimes brings in his poem, words of other arts and sciences, to show his learning. Some of his episodes are objectionable such as, his complaint of blindness &c. but they contain so much beauty that a reader would not easily let them away.

(43.) Dryden calls the Devil, the hero of Paradise lost but Addison makes Messiah, the hero.

(44.) The style of Addison is languid and effeminate but elegant and graceful.

ISSER CHUNDER Doss,

Hooghly College, 1st Class, College Dept.

Mental Philosophy and Logic.

REID'S INQUIRY.

Answer 1st.-The words heat, cold, hardness, softness, &c., may be used in two significations. They may be used to signify the sensations which suggest the external qualities, or to signify the external qualities which give rise to those sensations. The sensations which give us a conception of, and create a belief in the existence of these external qualities are perfectly distinct from the qualities themselves. When I attend accurately to the sensation which suggests hardness, I can perceive no resemblance between the sensation and the quality of hardness. The sensation is in the mind and can only exist in being felt, the quality is external and may exist without being perceived.

Answer 2nd.--There is a resemblance and necessary connection, says Reid, between the visible figure and magnitude of a body, and its real figure and magnitude, for the former can be deduced, by Mathematical reasoning from the latter. A blind man can never, by any reasoning process, have a conception of color, but he may if he can know the real figure and magnitude of a body, and also its direction and position from the eye, deduce mathematically its visible figure and magnitude, for the appearance which bodies present to a sound and perfect eye is, the same as their projection on the surface of a hollow sphere, the eye being placed in the centre. A blind man may be made to conceive, that the distance of any two points with regard to the eye is proportional to the angle which lines passing from those points to the centre of the eye, make with each other, he may be made to conceive that a circle placed in a certain position, will appear to the eye, a straight line; that visible figures have no thickness and that distance forms no object of sight. From these data he can find out the visible figure and magnitude of a body having its real figure and magnitude, its direction and position. It may be shewn from what has been said, that the properties of visible lines and triangles, are in every respect the same with the properties of real spherical lines and triangles. Hence when the visible triangle is very small, its properties will closely resemble the properties of real plane triangles; but the figure which the eye can distinctly take in at a single glance is very small, therefore the visible figure seen at one glance, will

resemble the real figure. Again as the perspective of a house or garden, cannot be said to have no resembance to the real house or garden, neither can the visible figure of a body be said to have no resemblance to its real figure.

Answer 3d. The primary qualities of bodies, as mentioned by Reid in his "Inquiry" are, hardness, softness, roughness, smoothness, extension, figure, solidity, and motion. All those qualities which give rise to the various sensations of taste, smell, and hearing, besides the qualities of color, heat, and cold, are called by him secondary qualities.

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Reid maintains, that there is no resemblance between any of our sensations, and the external quality of which that sensation is a sign. We know nothing, says he, of secondary qualities but as the unknown causes of known sensations." Of Primary qualities, on the contrary, we have a distinct conception. We know not what color or heat is in bodies, but we know what hardness is.

Although, according to Locke, there is no resemblance between our sensations of color, heat, and cold, and the qualities designated by those names, yet the sensations by which we arrive at the knowledge of primary qualities, have a resemblance to those qualities. The quality of hardness, for instance, Reid classes with the primary qualities, whereas according to Locke, it is a secondary quality.

Answer 4th.—The first class of natural signs, says Reid, consists of those in which the connection between the sign and thing signified is established by nature, but arrived at by experience. This class of signs forms the foundation of true philosophy. The object of all science, is to discover the laws of nature. By laws of nature is meant the uniformities of sequences, under similar circumstances. To take an example, all bodies under certain circumstances fall to the earth. This is a law of nature. Now we have here two phenomena, 1st a body under the specified circumstances and the earth, and 2nd, the fall of the body to the earth. The first may with propriety be called a sign of the second Phenomena. The connection between this sign and the thing signified is established by nature; but we arrive at a knowledge of the connection after a long patient and careful induction. The second class of natural signs, consists of those whose connection with the things signified is established by nature, but arrived at by an original principle of our constitution. All the fine arts are founded on this class of signs. Let us take an example from the art of music. Certain modulations in sound have the effect of raising in our minds pleasurable or painful emotions. The modulations in sound is the sign, the emotions which these modulations excite in us, the things signified. The connection between them is established by nature but we do not arrive at a knowledge of this connection by experience, but by a natural principle. The third class of natural signs consists of those in which the sign though there is no connection between it and the thing signified, do suggest it and at once give us a conception of it and create a belief in its existence. Let us take for example, the sensation of hardness. This sensation has no resemblance or connection with the quality of hardness; but we no sooner have this sensation then we immediately have a conception of the quality

and a firm belief in its existence.

Answer 5th.-The original perceptions of sight are the signs of the acquired perceptions. Of these the perception of distance is the most important. Reid lays down five methods by which we judge of the distance of an object from the eye.

(i.)—The changes in the conformation of the eye.

That the eye may perceive objects distinctly at various distances, it is so constituted that certain muscles are contracted to look at an object at one distance, and others, to look at it, at another distance. The efforts consequent upon these contractions become, by experience, the signs of the respective distances.

(ii.) The different inclinations of the optic axis. In order to distinct vision the optic axis must be so inclined as to meet in the object observed. The efforts consequent upon their different inclinations, become as before, the signs of the different distances of objects.

(iii.)——The gradual decay in the vividness of color, and the indistinctness of the parts as an object is taken at a greater distance from the eye, become through experience, a sign of the distances of objects. This sign, however, can be of no avail where the original color is not known.

(iv.) The distance of intervening objects, is a sign whereby we may judge of the distance of an object.

(v.)-The diminution of visible figure and magnitude is also a sign by which we may know the distance of an object, on condition we know its real figure and magnitude.

The perception of distance by the eye is important, because if we know the distance and the visible figure and magnitude at that distance, we can judge of the real figure and magnitude. Again if we know the distance with the visible color of the object, we can judge of the real color, by making allowance for the clearness or thickness of the atmosphere and other circumstances.

The original perceptions of color figure and magnitude by the eye become by experience the signs of the acquired perceptions.

Answer 6th-Our belief in the existence of a material world, according to Reid, is not the result of reasoning, but is based on principles of human nature which are the foundation of all reasoning. Why do I believe in the existence of a material world? Because it is impossible to believe the contrary. I am so constituted that whenever I have certain sensations, I immediately conclude that there must be some external cause of those sensations. This inference is irresistible, though there is no resemblance whatever between the sensations and the things signified by them.

Answer 7th.—There are certain principles in human nature, which it is impossible to shake off by any strength of argument or effort of the will. The truths which they lead to, are the foundation of sound philosophy, and are taken for granted by mankind in all the common concerns of life. These principles, Reid calls, the principles of common sense.

Besides the confutation of the ideal system, the argument from common sense, has been applied to prove the truths of Consciousness. No reason can be assigned for a belief in personal identity, or the existence of the mind itself. A sensation, says Reid, may be felt, remembered, or imagined. When we have a sensation we immediately believe in its present existence, when we remember it, we believe in its past existence, when we imagine it, we have no belief about its existence at all. We can assign no reason for these phenomena of belief. They can only be resolved to the original principles of our constitution.

Answer 8th.-In no part of his " Inquiry" does Reid clearly and distinctly lay down the criteria, by which we can distinguish the principles of common sense from the prejudices of the illiterate. The distinction, however, is of great importance inasmuch, as it enables us to know with certainty the original principles of our constitution. Those who are unacquainted with the truths of astronomy cannot but suppose that the

earth is still, and the sun daily moves round it. For they see (though it is by an illusion of sight) the sun moves, and they do not find the earth moving. But we can never, on these grounds, acquisce in their opinion. The deductions of science contradict it, and we know the contrary to be true. What then are the criteria by which we may distinguish the principles of common sense? Those which have been proposed are, first, that the truths of common sense are not only relied on with implicit confidence by the learned few, but by all mankind. Second, that this belief in the truths of common sense, is not only universal but irresistible. Even those philosophers, says Reid, who imagined that they have proved the non-existence of the material world, did really believe in its existence, as much as one who was not tutored by philosophy:

Answer 9th. The expression Common sense itself, which is of so vast an importance in Reid's theory, is an inexact expression. It admits of more than one signification, and is apt to mislead one, engaged in an investigation of truth. The word " suggest" which Reid, so often uses, is liable to the same objection. Reid was, no doubt aware of this difficulty, and his mode of using the terms, speaking generally, leaves little doubt as to the meaning which he annexed to the terms.

Answer 10th.-A concrete name is the name of a thing.

As rose, table, pen.

An abstract name is the name of an attribute of a thing. As whiteness, goodness.

A connotative name is a name which denotes a subject, and implies an attribute.

As man, bird.

A non-connotative name is a name which denotes a subject only or an attribute only.

As John, Thomas.

All concrete general names are connotative as man.

Those abstract names which denote an attribute and imply an attribute of that attribute, are connotative. As fault, eloquence.

All proper names are non-connotative.

As John, Thomas.

Answer 11th. When from an extensive observation of particular phenomenon, we come to the knowledge of a general truth, we are said to reason from particulars to generals. Thus knowing from observation and testimony that an immense number of individuals have died, and are dying, I conclude, All men are mortal.

This is a general proposition inferred from a sufficient number of particular propositions. We may now make this general proposition, the premiss of an argument and conclude from it a particular proposition.

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Here we reason from generals to particulars. We also reason from particulars to particulars, and indeed this kind of reasoning is the foundation of those already mentioned. The conclusion that A is mortal is really an inference from particulars to particulars. Why is A mortal? Because, his father was mortal, and his grandfather was mortal, and every individual of his fellow creatures, is mortal.

Answer 12th.-Before the time of Bacon, the method of the sciences was deductive. Men deviated from the true way of discovering truth,

viz. the way of observation and experiment; but trusting to the creations of their imaginations, proceeded to deduce conclutions from them. These conclusions, could not be realized in nature, as their source was not truth. Bacon changed the method of the sciences, and taught men, that they can only arrive at truth by a careful and extensive observation of facts. They must interrogate nature, before she will open her store of truths to them. Hence arose experimental sciences in which every induction, was the result of seperate observations and experiments. At present the method of sciences is "rapidly reverting from experimental to deductive." Men have at last come to discover not only marks or signs of a phenomenon, but marks of those marks. In the experimental sciences, the generalizations are distinct, such as, a is a mark of b, c of d, e of f from which nothing can be deduced. But suppose it is found out by a lucky discovery, that b is a mark of c and d of e. We may then conclude that a is a mark of f. Again if it be discovered that b, d, f, are marks of g, we may conclude a b c to be marks of g. By such processes, the sciences of Mechanics, Hydrostatics, Astronomy, with many others, are rendered purely deductive. But though this deductive process is taking place, yet new experiments and observations are therefore no less necessary. They add effectually to the store of a science. From data already given, many new truths can indeed be inferred but it is no less true, that as the data is increased, the fund from which truths are to be inferred is rendered richer. New discoveries must always add to the store of a science, or else after a certain stage the science will retrograde.

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(1.) The words heat, hardness, colour &c. are ambiguous on account of their being employed to denote two things which however nearly allied (rather conjoined with one another) are distinct in their nature. The two things are (i.) the sensation and (ii.) the quality in the body which excites the sensation. They are however perfectly distinct for the sensation belongs to the sentient mind but the Quality is conceived as belonging to the body. The one is a state of the mind, the other of the body external to the mind.

This ambiguity arising from the double devotation of the terms, has its source in the unwillingness to have recourse to new terms when the former notions have outgrown them. The terms as commonly applied mean nothing more than the Qualities in the body which excite the sensations nor have we anything to do with the sensation in the common purposes of life. Philosophers have however applied them to the sensations, thus introducing that conflict with common sense which has tended to discredit metaphysics.

(2.) The visible figure and magnitude of a body is that the conception of which suggested by seeing the body while the real or tangible figure and magnitude is suggested by touch, yet there is a resemblance and necessary connection between them because of the following reasons:

(i.) Visible figure is mathematically deducible from the real by the principles of projection and perspective. Thus a sphere will appear a circle to the eye because it is projected by lines parallel to the axis of the eye on the plane of vision.

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