possible?' remains unsolved, since from his standpoint such judgments are not possible, either for mathematics, physics or logic.

IMPERFECT CONCEPTION OF CATEGORIES

Kant conceived that he could show 'How are synthetic judgments à priori possible?' by his Transcendental Logic, his Schematism of the categories, and his Transcendental Synthesis of Imagination. By synthetic judgment,' he meant the conjunction of the objects of sense-perception and the empty notions or categories of the understanding. This he failed to do. Further, his attempt to make the notions of time and space the all-connecting links of Nature, only made his failure more glaring. Fortunately for the interests of a sound logical philosophy, thought, reason, idea, Ego, spirit, are not so empty, void, or barren of all matter and content as Kant represents, for they are each and all the fullness of Him that filleth all in all,' and contain, therefore, the entire system of the à priori synthetic judgments. In this, their true light, they are well-known things in themselves, and not Kant's merely supposed unknown things in themselves. Metaphysical is only another name, in the Biblical sense, for what is in its essential truth spiritual. The mathematical infinite is in its truth the metaphysical infinite. Here, then, on the ground of a sound logical philosophy, we have the basis of the metaphysics of physics, and the metaphysics of mathematics. Logic, then, is the ground-science of all the sciences.

To contend that objects must conform to cognition, is not enough, and does not meet the demands of logical philosophy. Creation or external Nature is an absolute free necessity of the logic of reasonthought in its relation to transitory thought or transi

tory objects. The only rational beginning of the world must be in thought. As before noted, many appear shocked at the conception of matter being created by thought, but have no difficulty in believing that thought may be evolved from matter. Thought as a first, is the only logical demand of thought itself, while only a thinker can be a creator. Thought is the spore of philosophy.'

THOUGHT NOT A HYPOTHESIS

Astronomy as a physical science became something approaching to a universal science under the influence of mathematics and the unknown force called universal gravitation. With a school of selfstyled advanced thinkers, God, or an eternal, universal, self-conscious being, became a mere hypothesis, of which Laplace is reported to have said he had no need. No man can have a true conception of science who discards a belief in the existence of God. Gravitation and matter were treated as one in absolute unity without considering their reality in necessary relation to Spirit and thought, which latter were regarded as belonging to the barren field of metaphysics. Reflexion on sense-objects apart from their relation to spirit, could never have given of itself the idea of universal gravitation, or of an 'Infinite and Eternal Energy.' The phrase 'Infinite and Eternal Energy' would be unmeaning but for the fact that thought is necessarily an infinite Personality: this is Immanuel, God with us..

Since thought, then, is the only known universal, can Spirit and matter, contrary in this case also to what the senses seem to warrant, be equally cognized as one in the unity of thought? that is, in the unity of the Ego, which Kant names, Die reine Apperception, die ursprüngliche Apperception, and die tran

scendentale Einheit des Selbstbewusstseins? (Pure apperception, original apperception, the transcendental unity of self-consciousness.) In whatever way Kant named the Ego, his treatment of it was defective. He, consequently, failed to explain, How synthetic judgments à priori are possible, for, all through his philosophy, in spite of the conjunctions of the manifold objects of sense, of their unity in the categories, and of their ultimate unity in the Ego, they are all treated by him as if absolutely separate from and independent of thought. Thus, his transcendental synthesis of imagination, with sense-perception on one side and the categories as purely intellectual notions on the other, is a mere fiction of the imagination, and not a logical deduction.

THOUGHT NOT A MERE MECHANICAL MATHEMATICAL

SYSTEM

The physico-mathematical philosophers virtually make the whole of existence into a mechanical physico-mathematical system, while a true conception of the Ego and its categories makes the whole into a logical system of thought. Though Kant failed to establish his idea theoretically, he introduced an entirely new principle into the philosophy of the universe, which in fact made God to be the centre and circumference of all in all, and this he did, in spite of his defective execution when treating the most vital questions involved therein. If this principle were logically carried out, science and philosophy would be brought into harmony with the true science of logical thought-the science of reason. This principle would harmonize philosophy with the moral and theological doctrines of the Bible, or, in other words, philosophy would be harmonized with the Christian religion; for man being 'the image

and glory of God,' man and God are both Ego. Kant failed to see the Ego in its fullness and transcendent glory, and thus he also failed to harmonize the teaching of the senses with the teaching of pure reason. In an important sense, both teach the truth, and in no real sense does the one exclude the other, but each is rather the complement, the one of the other, and so they are essentially one. Kant was mistaken when he came to think it was impossible to know things in themselves, but only possible to know their external appearance. He failed to recognize that there was a relation of ideas in all things of sense, or in all matters of fact, and that the relations of ideas were as truly there in all sense-objects as they are in the proposition, that the three angles of every possible triangle are, without exception, equal to two right angles.' In no case is the relation visible to sense-sight only; both sense-sight and intellectual insight are necessary to reveal this relation of ideas, since the transitory, however transient, is so far as real as the eternally permanent. Further, if the relation of ideas does not belong essentially to every sense-object, what becomes of the law of gravitation, wherein every material object is believed to attract every other object? Of course, Kant does not deny these relations, but his empty transcendental system of categories or notions does not furnish the necessary proof of their unity in Nature. If the objects are there, the relations are there, for the relations of ideas constitute the essential nature of every matter of fact.

HUME MATTERS OF FACT AND RELATIONS OF IDEAS

Hume divides all objects of human reason into two kinds, viz., matters of fact and relations of ideas. An example of what he means by the relations of

ideas is, 'That the square of the hypothenuse is equal to the squares of two sides,' which Hume says, 'is discoverable by the mere operation of thought, without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe.' But with him, matters of fact are not ascertained in the same manner'; 'nor is our evidence of their truth, however great, of a like nature with the foregoing.' We have already, in part, shown the incorrectness of this statement. He goes on to say, 'The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with equal facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow, is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmative that it will rise. We should in vain, therefore, attempt to demonstrate its falsehood. Were it demonstratively false it would imply a contradiction, and would never be distinctly conceived by the mind. It may, therefore, be a subject worthy of curiosity to inquire what is the nature of that evidence which assures us of any real existence and matter of fact beyond the present testimony of our senses or the records of our memory. All reasonings concerning matters of fact seem to be founded in the relation of Cause and Effect.' This distinction of Hume's is really absurd, for the testimony of the senses tells us that Nature is a matter of fact, and it can be shown by 'the mere operation of thought' that the Relations of Ideas are as truly present in Nature as in any circle or triangle, or in the truths demonstrated by Euclid.' The mere operation of thought' also clearly demonstrates that the non-rising of the sun is impossible. Hume's possibles' are as impossible as roundsquares or gold-men. Thought itself is always both