Being such that His existence cannot rest on any contingent circumstance; He either exists necessarily and eternally, or not at all. The notion and being of a dollar may come to be, or cease to be, but the notion and being of God in man are of such a nature that they cannot either come to be or cease to be. The relation between the notion and being of a dollar is a separable relation, for the dollar may perish and man still retain the notion of a dollar. The relation between the notion and being of God is an inseparable relation; God cannot perish and the notion of God in man remain; if the Being of God is necessarily eternal, the notion of God is also necessarily eternal. God is the only Being possible whose notion and being are inseparable in human thought. If a man says, 'There is no God,' he is only contradicting in speech what he thinks, for if God were not in his thought, he could not say, 'no God.' Thus the kind of analogy Kant uses utterly fails. The resemblance between the nature of a dollar and the nature of God is very superficial, so superficial, indeed, that he thereby proves nothing, in spite of the apparent plausibility of the argument.

Kant next uses the analogy between the abstract principles of succession in time and the necessary sequence in the relation of cause and effect, to explain the nature of the necessary relation of cause and effect. With Kant, objects of sense and notions of the intellect are viewed as independent. The category of cause and effect in its necessity belongs only to the intellect. Cause and effect occur only in the senseworld, but he holds that, so far as objects of senseperception are concerned, there is no necessary relation between them. He can only regard them as bare matters of fact, and affirm that they are, and not that they must be. The 'must can only come

,

from the category as an affair of the intellect, for he holds that cause and effect and succession in time are sequences independent of each other. Seeing there is sequence in the one as well as in the other, he maintains there is an analogy between the two. They are still, however, so far independent, and the imagination alone can give the necessary unity to the two sequences, and only so can the necessary connection between cause and effect become an apodictic judgment or a genuine synthetic judgment, for he holds the imagination contains all that belongs to the unity of Sense and Intellect. His analogy, however, fails, for it alone cannot demonstrate the necessary relation between cause and effect and succession in time. is a mere illusion to say that abstract time can by the aid of the imagination become the essential connecting link between cause and effect. The analogy, then, is superficial, and in no way explains either the necessary relation of succession in time or the essential relation between cause and effect, for a perfect analogy contains in itself the principle of absolute identity, the absolute Ego of thought's own self, the creative power of the universe-that is, identity requires no analogy.

It

If so sober, honest and acute an intellect as Kant's could be misled by analogy, how much more easily may honest critics be led astray by analogy and induction in the wide field of literary criticism, Biblical or otherwise.

Kant wished thus to check the spread of the scepticism of Hume, but at the same time he struck a serious blow against the ontological, cosmological and teleological proofs of the existence of God; nevertheless, he laid the foundation for a sound, logical Theology, Christology and Humanology. The honest Biblical critics, while attempting to combat the looser and

more extravagant critics of the external contingent discrepancies of the Bible, and the miraculous element found therein, often fall into worse errors, so far as the knowledge of truth is concerned, and do not make the Bible any more acceptable to educated The critics need the steady power of sound logical philosophy.

men.

Induction and analogy are virtually linked together in the progress of human knowledge, and they are also in essential unity with intuition and reflexion in logical thought. In general, however, induction has too much neglected the highest generalization founded on thorough analogy, and this has led to the ignoring of the value of religious knowledge in human life. Analogy in the experiential sciences has led to many valuable results, yet on the other hand, in the philosophy of nature there has often been a frivolous play with superficial analogies. In different species of plants, resemblances in colour, shape, or in other respects, give no proof that such plants spring from one original species. The same is the case with regard to the different species of animals; if the existence of one created original species be admitted, then the belief in thousands of created original species is much more rational.

In the material, or inorganic world, matter certainly exists in a variety of forms; so different are some of these forms, that ether itself has been named, like light, 'immaterial and spiritual matter'; so on the same ground, gravitation may be named a kind of matter, but these cannot be named universal facts of sense-experience in the same way that it is a fact of experience that water freezes at a temperature of 32° F., whether we know the why or not. In all this difference, the principle of identity unites and pervades all in one common nature. We are logically

certain that this is necessarily so, notwithstanding the universal play of contingency, chance and freedom. Indeed, possibility involves contingency, and is as necessary as necessity itself, is absolute and universal. We do not attain such knowledge by mere superficial analogies. It is realized only through the principle of perfect induction based on thorough analogy, and this at bottom means identity in infinite difference. Now the scientific method on which the Higher Critics' claim to proceed in their Biblical researches is almost entirely the induction which rests on more or less superficial analogies-partly in the words, and partly in the precepts and doctrines found in the mythical teaching of the peoples with whom the Jews came in contact from the days of Abraham until the time of Malachi.

Philologists have met with great success; a linguist has come to be regarded as a prodigy of wisdom and erudition, even though in other respects he may have only a minimum of knowledge. Such men have been treated as experts, like the leaders of the evolutionary theory, to whom all non-experts must submit, or be held up as religious bigots shutting their eyes to the light of advancing science. Whilst metaphysicians have been laughed at as dreamers, spinning subtle cobwebs of empty thoughts, or evolving the universe out of the depth of their own consciousness, philologists have had no difficulty, after deciphering a few words from a discovered tablet, in reconstructing history and exploring the ocean of the prehistoric past.

All we have held most sacred must, since their discoveries, be treated as myths. Our mighty dead only lived in a vain show; their very names are made to fit into purely suppositional meanings; Jewish history is a plagiarism from Babylonian

myths. Professor Winkler makes the words, ' Joseph came at noon,' to mean that Joseph stands for the sun; Joshua is also the sun; Son of Nun-fish; Caleb (Kelb), a dog; so Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Simeon, Joseph, Joshua, Saul, are all reduced to myths. Surely here we have analogy 'run mad'! Yea, these critics strike at greater persons, as Moses and Jesus Christ. Yet these great personalities, whom we must now regard as myths or mere types, have made a great mark, and left an undoubted influence upon the thought and history of the world. The following may serve as an illustration to show that we need to be very careful in accepting all the conclusions of these critics, even though they may be experts' in some special subject.

Dr. Robertson Smith, when assistant Professor of Natural Philosophy in Edinburgh University, wrote a paper on Hegel and the Metaphysics of the Fluxional Calculus, in which he stated that Hegel had made 'an attempt to establish the calculus on a new and inaccurate basis.' This he did at a time when the philosophy of Hegel was almost unknown in Britain and America, and when it would scarcely fail to place Hegel and his philosophy under great suspicion as to whether or no it could be worthy of any attention from serious men. What he attacks is a 'Hegelian Calculus,' on which he says: "To this subject Hegel devotes his second note, professing to point out a purely analytical method, whereby without any application of the doctrine of limits, everything necessary for practice can be deducted.' Nowhere in the writings of Hegel is there the slightest attempt to do what he is here charged with. In the same paper Dr. R. Smith tells us frankly that he is unacquainted with the principles of Hegel's philosophy, and does not profess to be able to treat this question