285 tho' unwillingly, pafs over; as well as his judicious. Remarks and Reflections on feveral Particulars related in the Sequel of Joshua's Hiftory, wherein there was a miraculous Display of the divine Power: Thus, to mention only the chief of them, he has made a very nice Enquiry, Whether the Ifraelites were absolutely commanded utterly to deftroy all the Inhabitants of the seven Nations of Canaan? Whether they could upon no Terms enter into a League with any of them? Whether what the Ifraelites granted to the Gibeonites upon their Embaffy, was contrary to what God had commanded? and, How they at laft acquitted themselves of the League they had made with them? He then largely infifts upon the two great Miracles recorded in the Narrative of Joshua's Battel with the five Kings of the Canaanites; accounts for the latter's being expreffed in Terms no way conformable to the true Syftem of the Universe; and most acutely answers the Objections to the Truth of the Fact, (which muft neceffarily have engaged the Attention of the whole World) from the Silence of the ancient Aftronomers. Laftly, He difcuffes a Question which has been hitherto difputed amongst the Literati, viz. Whether Joshua was himself the Author of the Book which is called by his Name?

ARTICLE XXV.

Dr. Pemberton's Answer to the two Questions put by Philalethes Cantabrigienfis in the History of the Works of the Learned for the laft Month.

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O the firft queftion I answer, that I omitted? the words, as it ought to be by the fourth fuppofition (meaning the fourth fuppofition in his inter

Joshua x. 11, 12, 13.

a Works of the Learned Aug. 1737. p. 126. l. 16.

pretation

pretation of Sir Ifaac Newton's Lemma) because they are no part of the propofition, I cenfured, but are only his application of that propofition to the point there difcuffed.

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The fecond queftion relates to the admonition I gave Philalethes to farther his difcovering the meaning of Sir Ifaac Newton's Lemma. My general purport is very vifible, that he fhould confider, why he tranflated quovis and quavis differently. But in re gard to the particulars of this queftion I answer, that I looked upon the word fome as being properly his tranflation of quovis, and the other words as fubjoined by way of interpretation. And it is by this interpretation, that I know the more certainly, how widely he miftakes the fenfe of the expreflion tem pore quovis finito.

b Republick of Letters Nov. 1735. p. 371. 1. 31. Ibid. p. 375. 1. 20.

d Works of the Learned Aug. 1737. p. 127. l. 10.

Rep. of Lett. Nov. 1735. p. 371. 1. 24.

ARTICLE XXVI.

An Effay concerning rational Notions. To which is added the Proof of a God. By Charles Mayne, Efq;. London: Printed for Me Innys and Manby, at the Weft-End of St. Paul's. 1737. Octavo. Pag. 204, befides the Preface, &c.

THE

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HE former of thefe Pieces is divided into thirteen Chapters: In the firft our Author defines a Rational Notion to be, the Difcernment, Conception, or Apprehenfion of what is either agreeable or repugnant to Reafon, in any Cafe or Inftance whatfoever. He then, in order to prevent Miftakes about this Sort of Notions, or the confounding of others with them, diftinguishes Notions into two Sorts; those which every one acquires in the earlieft Ufe of his Understanding, fuch as Being, Exiflence, Unity, Number, Sameness, Diverfity, Whole, Part, and the like common and ordinary Apprehenfions of things; and, fecondly, thofe which require Reflection, or Confideration of the things they concern; as Requifiteness of one thing to the Being of another; Perfection of any Kind; Truth, or that which, fo foon as underftood, authorizes and commands our Affent to it, &c. It is the laft Sort only that are to be accounted Rational. Rational or Reflex Notions therefore are, as he fays, the Mind's fecond or After-Thoughts, whereby it acquires a more perfect and mature Knowledge of Things, and a deeper Infight into their Natures, than by thofe Notions which occur to it immediately upon its firft obferving and taking notice of Objects: and it is by them only, that the Mind ever does or can attain that Sort of Knowledge which is truly fatisfactory to it, or wherein the thorough Difcernment and right Apprehenfion or understanding of a thing doth confift: and they are withal fo very comprehenfive, as to be applicable to every thing; or there is no Object whatever of Thought, but affords Matter and Occafion for the continual Exercise and Employment of fome or other of them.'

As to the Number of thefe Notions, there muft, Mr. Mayne fays, be fo many of them, as there are Sorts of Agreement and Difagreement of things to Reason. Such of them as are of the moft general Ufe and Concernment are, as he conceives, Requifite

ness,

nefs, Properness, Fitness, Dueness and Suitableness. On the Explication of each of thefe he bestows a Chapter; and the Way he takes to explain them is chiefly by Examples, or by exhibiting the most material and important Cafes wherein they may be applied. From all which fufficiently appears, their great Usefulness as well as Extent; and the Neceffity there is of employing them in all our Confiderations. When he has given us exact Ideas of all thefe, he proceeds to fome others, that are not, as he imagines, quite fo eafy or obvious to common Apprehenfion, as the former; nor perhaps fo very clear and perfpicuous in themselves, but that there may be room for different Thoughts and Opinions concerning them: Thefe are Reftitude, Pulchritude, Goodness, Truth, and Implication. The three firft denote the feveral Sorts of Perfections, or Virtues and Excellencies of things, that are properly cognizable by Reason; and therefore may fitly enough fucceed thofe already fet forth, which concern their Beings and Natures regarded in general. But to convey to the Reader a more diftinct Notion of our Author's Differtations upon these Subjects, I will here fubjoin a brief Sketch of two or three of them: Thus, of Requifitenefs he fays,

When a thing does not fubfift of itself, our Reafon tells us that it requires fomething elfe to enable it to exift, and have that Sort of Being and Nature which it hath: which is as much as to fay, there is fome other thing requifite to its Being and Exiftence. For Inftance: The fenfible Qualities of Bo• dies, and the Faculties of the Soul, not having a Power of their own of exifting and being what they are, fomething elfe is requifite to their Being and Existence. And from this Confideration did < probably arife the Idea of Subftance, i. e. that which fubfifts by itself, it being plainly impoffible that any thing which does not fo, fhould any otherwife exift, or be that which it is, than by means of fomething which does. Subftance therefore is the general Requifite of all other things. And fince no❤

thing can act without a Power or Ability of doing fo, Power therefore is requifite to Action: fo is Caufe to Effect, and Means to an End, and Inftruments to Operations. Qualification, as being a Kind of Power, is requifite in feveral Cafes; as Skill in the Law is a requifite Qualification in a Judge, and Courage in a Soldier. Also whatever conftitutes, or ferves to conftitute the Being of a thing, is requifite to it: fo the animal Nature and Reason, are both of them requifite to the Being of a Man, be'cause it is constituted by them.And that is requifite, without which a thing cannot continue in its Being; as Food and Air to the Life of an Ani'mal. Or which preferves it in its due and natural ⚫ State, as both Exercise and Reft with respect to the Body's Health, &c.' I need not purfue our Author thro' any more of his Inftances upon this Head; but proceed, as a farther Specimen, to an Extract from what he fays under that of Fitness.

As whatever produces any Change or Alteration in another thing, muft have a Power peculiarly qualified for that purpofe; fo that which it acts upon, must have a certain Fitness or Aptitude, ufually • called Capacity, to receive its Influence and Impreffion Seeing that according to the different Fitneffes or Capacities of Subjects acted upon, the fame Cause may produce divers Effects; as Fire • melts Wax, hardens Clay, and reduces Wood into Ashes; from hence it manifeftly appears, that there is no difcerning the Nature of any Effect thoroughly and truly, without knowing the Fitness of the thing changed, for receiving the Force and Impreffion of the Caufe. But the Knowledge of the Fitnefs of a thing for being fo changed as we find it to be, often leads us to the Knowledge of fuch a Cause as alone is proper to produce it.This Sort of • Fitness is evidently the Ground of all manual Operations. Otherwife, a Potter might as well think of making a Cup of Sand or of Water, as of Clay. Or one might as well attempt to perfuade a Statue as T