a Man.There is also another Kind of Fitness, called Expediency:-Means are expedient with respect to the Ends for which they ferve:- -Inftruments, with regard to all Workmanship; and Materials to every Structure. There is a Fitness of Seafon and Opportunity. Thus, the Night is fit for Reft, and the Day for Action. And the nicking of Time, as we call it, hath in every one's Experience a great Stroke in all the Affairs of Life, and conduces greatly to the Succefs of any Bufinefs or Defign.

Between fome things there is a mutual Fitness ⚫ and Accommodation: as in Friends complying with one another's Humours, and promoting each other's Interefts. And in general, between all things that have a mutual Dependance; as in the gable Ends of 'a House, where two oppofite Timbers, by meeting < together, and leaning against one another at the Top, (which is their mutual Accommodation) do fuftain and support each other; and in the Parts of an Arch, which are fo fitted to one another, that if any be taken away, the reft will fall; but being all 'connected, they continue in Strength and Firmness.'

To give one Sample more: Of Pulchritude (which is one of those rational Notions that denote the Perfections or Excellencies of things) he fays, By Pul

chritude is, in general, understood the Excellence of • Form: When confummate, as we here fuppofe it to be, there are two Qualities infeparable from it, namely, Amiableness and Admirableness; which together do plainly exhibit its true Character, and diftinguish it from other Perfections. Excellence of Form being in a peculiar and efpecial manner appli'cable to Beauty, it may fuffice here to speak only of this in particular.

That Beauty is amiable needs not be faid; and that it is admirable, muft likewife be confeffed. But unless these two Qualities do meet together, they will not be Properties of Beauty, or of any other Sort of Pulchritude. For there are fome things we admire, and yet do not love; as Prodigies, and

the extraordinary Phænomena of Nature: and there are others we love, without admiring; as delightful "Senfations.But when that which is amiable is 'alfo admirable, every one must then allow it to be beautiful.-There is a twofold Beauty: one inC ternal, or of the Mind; in which, when it is perfect, all the Virtues do confpire: The other is external, or of the Body. This laft does not wholly * confift in a Symmetry of Parts, and an agreeable Colour, tho' thefe are proper and requifite Ingredients: but it confifts chiefly and principally in fuch a Mein and Air, as indicates any of thofe excellent Qualities which command our Affection, and makes us 'conclude it is produc'd by the Virtues of the nobler Part of our Compofition. -That mental and corporeal Beauty but rarely meet together in the same Perfon, ought to be no Rule of judging in the Cafe: For 'tis certain that the Face, which is the Index of the Mind, is the true and proper Seat of Beauty: and Painters can draw Features that fhall express fuch and fuch a Virtue, and Pourtraits of this Kind are always painted beautiful; and when rightly defigned, are univerfally approved.Whereas, on the other hand, Vices are always painted ugly and 'deformed, with Looks that create Abhorrence and "Deteftation.Poetry and Mufick, when exquifite, do, as well as Beauty, charm the Mind, and fill it with Admiration; and therefore may come ' under the general Denomination of Pulchritude."

By these Specimens (allowing for fome Abatement in the Stile, from the Elegancy of which I was obliged to detract for the fake of Brevity) the Reader will form an Idea of thofe rational Notions which are treated on in this Volume: the Uses, and indeed the Neceffity of them in all our Ratiocinations, Difcourfes, and Judgments of things, are clearly fet forth in the feventh and thirteenth Chapters: whether they do together, as our Author has explained them, form a compleat Syftem, or are all that the Mind makes ufe of in the Exercife of its Reafon, is more, as he fays, than

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than he will presume to determine: But if, as can hardly be doubted, they are the chief and principal, they will be fufficient to juftify this Conclufion, viz. That by rational Notions the Mind is fully qualified and enabled to know and understand, in the most fatisfactory manner, whatever is poffible to be known or underflood. -Nor is there, as he adds, any other Way of knowing or apprehending what is reasonable, in any Cafe or Inftance whatfoever, but by the Inftrumentality of them; for to know the Reasonableness of any thing, and to have a rational Notion of it, fignify alike. And seeing that thefe Notions, which are the proper Acts and Operations, or the immediate Dictates of Reafon, are applicable to every Object of Thought, the Caufe of our Ignorance of fome things, which we can never hope thoroughly to understand, is not any Defect or Incapacity of our Reason, but the Want of fitting Means and Opportunity to make use of it. Thus, for Inftance, as he remarks, 'Tis impoffible for us to know, after what manner the feveral Properties and Powers of corporeal Subftances do fubfift; because our Senses are not acute enough to discern the internal Forms and Conftitutions of Bodies whereon they depend, and whereby they are produced: but had we more penetrating Organs or Faculties, there is no doubt but we might as eafily apprehend it, as we do the 'Powers and Forces of any artificial Machine of which we know the Contrivance and Mechanifm.' The Proof of a God, which is annexed to this Effay, is the Result of the Demonftration of the fol lowing Propofitions: I. There is a Self-exiftent Being. II. A Being which is not self-exiftent, was created by that which exifts of itself. III. A Self-existent Being can have but one Sort of Nature: and it must be precifely, in all refpects, that very thing which it is. IV. There is but one Self-exiftent Being. V. The Self-existent Being is eternal. VI. The Self-exiftent Being is immutable. VII. A Being which is mutable in any respect, was created by that which is Self-exiftent. VIII. The World was created by the Self

exiftent Being. IX. The Self-exiftent Being is Omnipotent, Infinite, Omniprefent, and a Spirit or incorporeal Substance. X. The Self-exiftent Being is abfolutely perfect; and confequently is Omniscient, All-wife, infinitely Good, and infinitely Happy.

ARTICLE XXVII.

Lon

An Enquiry into the Morals of the Ancients. By the Reverend Mr. GEORGE ENGLAND. don: Printed for A. Bettefworth and C.Hitch, at the Red Lion in Pater-nofter-Row; G.Hawkins, at Milton's Head between the Two Temple-Gates, Fleetftreet; and J. Leake, Bookfeller at Bath. 1737. Quarto. Pag. 369.

TH

HE Subject of this Work is of a moft illuftrious Nature; it is, as our Author himself obferves, very difficult to be treated of; however, I think he has handled it not unworthily. His Defign in it is, fairly and candidly to manifeft the tranfcendent Excellency of the Chriftian Syftem, both as to Religion and Morality; and confequently, to promote the following and practising it in a much better manner than it is at prefent obferved amongst Mankind. Pursuant therefore to this Intention, he makes a ftrict Enquiry into the Reafons why the ancient Heathens, who were certainly inferior to us in their Religion and moral Syftems, were notwithstanding (in their best Times) much fuperior in the Practice, to Chriftians in general, ever fince that thefe latter began to degenerate from the primitive apoftolical Purity.In the Profecution of this Point, he evinces that fome of the nobleft Effects of fome of the fublimeft moral Virtues were frequently found in Men ignorant of the true and only Sources from whence they can derive real Merit or true Glory; he shews,

how much thefe Virtues are neglected by thofe who know, and may be thoroughly convinced from whence they can alone arife juftly to deferve thofe Epithets which are given them when practifed with proper Views and Purposes; he accounts for the furprizing Disparity between Pagans and Chriftians in this matter; and demonftrates, that how much foever the former might exceed in great and heroic Sentiments and Actions, there never can be a constant uniform Course of moral Virtue to be expected from any but those who are thoroughly perfuaded of the Truth of the Chriftian Revelation, wherein future Rewards and Punishments are afcertained to the Practice of Virtue or Vice.'

The Virtues which were moft confpicuous amongst the ancient Heathens, and which gave Rife to all their grand Atchievements, may be reckoned, their Justice, their Love of their Country and publick Spirit, their Magnanimity, their Courage and Fortitude; their strong Regard to the Religion of their Country, and to the Notions of Morality fettled amongst them; their noble and almost inimitable Ideas of Friendship frequently put in Practice; their Simplicity of Life, Neglect of Ease, and Dislike of Luxury; their Contempt of Money, and their perfect difinterested Conduct whereever a View of Lucre could poffibly have influenced: all these together, and feparately, prevailed amongst them, and were almoft all fubfervient to the Love of their Country, which was their most predominant Palfion, the Spring of almoft all their other good Qualities and Deeds. Humility, Patience under Sufferings, and an univerfal Benevolence and Love to Mankind, were what they were Strangers to; their immoderate Affection for their Country confiderably impaired the latter; and nothing but the Chriftian Religion can produce the two former in their full Purity.

Amongst all the Ancients, the Greeks and Romans are thofe who, as our Author fays, defervedly hold the firft Rank, as to all the Virtues and Accomplishments which adorn Mankind: it is to these two Peo

ple