It would therefore be neither agreeable to God,

nor useful

Here is the proper place for Wisdom, wherein (fetting afide, and in a manner fufpending the Exercife of his Power) he attains his Ends by Prudence only, by mere Dexterity of acting, and brings it to pass that fo many jarring Wills depending on themselves alone, and no more inclined to either Side by the Divine Power, than if there were no fuch thing, fhall yet confpire together to promote the Good of the Univerfe. 'Tis impoffible that this Exercife of Wifdom fhould not be very agreeable to the Deity, if any thing in his Works may be efteem'd agreeable to him. But if he were oblig'd to interfere with his Power, that would feem to argue a Defect of Wisdom; for what occafion is there for him to interpofe and ftop the Liberty of Election before granted, if his Wisdom could provide fufficiently for the Good of the whole without altering his Defign +?

VI. From hence it seems fufficiently evident why God would not interpose his Power, or intermeddle with our Elections, fince that could neither be advantageous to ourselves nor to the whole Syftem, nor agreeable to God. 'Tis no wonder then that to us, that abfolute Goodness permits Evil Elections, fince for fhould al- the moft part they could not be prevented without ways hin- greater Evils. But if that can ever be done, there's no doubt but God will take care that the very best fhall be done. (71.)

God

der bad

Elections.

NOTES.

SUBSECT.

(71) What has been urg'd in the foregoing Subsection about the Divine Interpofition in human Elections must be understood in a limited Senfe, viz. as relating only to an immediate Influence, or an abfolute Determination of the Will, i. e.

See Dr. Jenkin, 2d Vol. C. 12. p. 240. & 5th Edit

to

SUBSE C T. IV.

Concerning the Efficacy of Prayer.

that God is not fo

1. SOME may apprehend timmediately in the Devout

for a

Affairs of this World as is here afferted; and that Men hope the Laws and Order of Nature are not of fo great change confequence with him, but that he may be eafily in the and frequently induced to difpenfe with them, course of contrary to what we have here advanc'd. For Nature, through this feems to be the common Opinion of Man- their kind. Every Supplicant that addreffes himself Prayers. to God, believes that this is effected by the Deity thro' his Prayers for if he perceiv'd

Ee 2

NOTES.

it

to fuch an intermedling with Elections as would make them to be no Elections at all. For it appears from the following Subfection, that our Author did not intend to exclude all kind of Interpofition in the Government of Free Agents, but only that particular fort which would fubvert their natural Powers, or be deftructive of their Freedom. Tho' God has establish'd general Laws both in the animate and inanimate World, yet he has not left these entirely to themselves, but influences, directs, and governs them in fuch a manner as is most conducive to the great End for which he defign'd them; which End could not be attain'd without fuch a particular Influence, as will be fhewn below. In determining the manner of this Government we must beware of the two Extremes of fuppofing either first, that the Deity always influences fecond Caufes or acts (as Malebranch terms it) by particular Wills, in the Natural or Moral World; which would diffolve all Laws of Na ture, destroy the Liberty of the Creature, and reduce every thing to Fate: or fecondly, that he never interpoles in the Government of either World, but lets the general Laws of

:

it to be otherwife, he could hope for nothing from the Prayers he offers to the Deity. For if all came to pafs according to the natural Order of things, and the Series of Caufes, who could hope to be delivered from a Diftemper or Calamity; from Evil Affections or Temptations, by virtue of Prayer? These things are either effected by the immediate Interpofition of the Divine Power, or are requested of God in vain. For if they depend upon their own proper Causes, which may not be alter'd, thofe Caufes

NOTES.

Mechanism or of Liberty take their natural Course, and operate as it were independently of himself; which would entirely deftroy a particular Providence, and render the general one in a great measure ufelefs. The bad Confequences which would attend the former of thefe Schemes have been touch'd upon above: The latter (which is particularly efpous'd by Leibnitz in his Syftem of Pre-establift'd Harmony, and by Mr. Whiston in his New Theory of the Earth) will be obviated in the following Subfection. I thall here only add the Opinion of S.C. on the prefent Subject: "[.] 'Twas highly fuitable to the Divine "Wifdom in the Government of the World, both to pre-or"dain fome of the principal Events with relation to the en"tire human Community, or to the more confiderable parts of "it, and to referve to himself a Right of interpofing and influencing particular Agents, as in other Cafes, fo more efpecially in order to the accomplishment of thefe Events. That he has actually done fo is abundantly clear from Scrip"ture-Prophecys, and Hiftories. And that in fo doing he “has acted in a manner moft worthy his Wifdom, is no less "manifeft. For hereby it appears that the Divine Govern

ment is equally oppofed to Chance and Destiny. Had the "Deity taken no Care of Futurity, but left every Man to the "Conduct of his own Inclinations, and natural Effects in 66 general to the Influence of their Caufes, without ever interpofing to direct them to the attainment of his great Design; this would have been almost in effect to diveft himself of the Government of Rational Agents, and to fubject their Affairs to Chance, and to the hazard of the utmost Disorder

[.] Impartial Enquiry, &c. p. 115

"and

Caufes would produce their Effects as well upon the omiffion as the offering of these Supplications. But if God fometimes vouchfafes to fufpend or change the Order and Laws of Nature to gratify his Votaries; why may not the fame be done to prevent the abufe of Free-Will and Natural Evils? Either this Interpofition must be admitted in order to oppose these Evils, or it must be rejected with regard to Prayers. This Difficulty deserves an Anfwer. We attempt to folve it in the following man

ner.

not hear

II. 'Tis to be observ'd then, in the first place, Gol does that all Prayers are not heard by God, nor do we all Prayhope that all things fhall be done which are requeft- ers. ed of him, but only fuch as he has declared to be

66

Ee 3
NOTES.

agreeable

and Confufion. Or had he, on the contrary, abfolutely or fatally determined every Event, tho' this would have been "far enough from divesting himself of the Government of the

World, yet it would have been a Government unworthy of "the Deity, a Government entirely exclufive of all proper "Sin and Punishment, Virtue and Rewards: wherein himself "would in effect have been the only Agent, and all the Crea"tures ftupid and paffive. Whereas, by pre-ordaining the "moft material Events, and fuffering the Creatures freely to exert their Faculties in all convenient Cafes, he appears moft wifely to have chofen the middle way, and thereby to have equally avoided the Mischiefs of both Extremes". See alfo

66

66

66

P. 116.

All the Difference between this ingenious Writer and our Author is, that in the Government of the World he fuppofes the general Law of Liberty to be fometimes fufpended, as well as the Laws of Motion. Whereas our Author, tho' he afferts the fame of the latter, yet he denies it of the former; at least does not grant that fuch an Abridgment of Liberty is neceffary to the aforefaid Government: How on this Principle he occounts for that which we generally mean by a Particular Pro vidence, answering the Prayers, and thereupon often influencing and over-ruling the Affairs of Mankind, will be fhewn in its proper place.

God is ob

by his

and by

Covenant.

agreeable to his Will, and has in some respect promis'd to perform. Those things then which are unneceffary, trifling, inconfiftent, hurtful, or petitioned for in an unlawful Manner, are not to be expected by the Petitioners, tho' they be requested never fo frequently.

III. Secondly, God may be under a two-fold lig'd to the Obligation to his Creature, firft from his Goodness, Creatures, whereby he is oblig'd fo to order all external things, Goodnefs that Exiftence fhall be better than Non-existence to all who duely perform their Duty. Secondly, By fome Covenant or Agreement whereby he engaged, under certain Conditions, to bestow fome Favours upon Men, notwithstanding they were Sinners: Which Covenant, tho' it may not be esteem'd a natural one, yet it cannot be judg'd to be against Nature, or to offer Violence to it.

What may

be requel

ed of the Deity re lates ei

IV. Thirdly, The things which are requested of God either belong to the Mind, viz. that the Mind be found and vigorous, and able to govern the Affections, &c. or to the Body, that Life and Strength be prolong'd, &c. or to external things, the Mind, that the Weather be ferene and feasonable for the the Body, Fruits of the Earth, &c. Now thefe differ from nal things. each other, and ought not to be prayed for under

ther to

or exter

God does

not give

Affiftance to our

Minds at

random,

but under

as certain

Laws as thofe of the Natural

World.

the fame Conditions.

V. Fourthly, As to the Mind, fince the Elective Power is the chief Part of Man, and is felf-motive, 'tis fcarce conceivable how it fhould be determin'd from without itself. For that which determines itfelf is entirely different from that which ftands in need of another to move it, and thefe appear to be no more applicable to the fame thing, than a Square and Circular Figure are to the fame Surface, at least their Natures must be chang'd to make them compatible. But yet this Faculty, as well as others, may be vitiated by abuse and a perverfe manner of

acting,