rily evolved, and it is to fly in the face of reason to affirm that "To say that man can disobey the law of his own nature is to deny that he has a nature." 10 For even according to the philosophy of evolution the law of man's nature is evolved out of the permanent qualities and relations of his nature, and hence is not essentially different from the laws evolved in communities of men; and it is as reasonable to say that there is no state because the laws of the state can be broken, as to say that the denial of a nature to man is implied in the affirming that he can break its laws. According to this reasoning the words advancement and retrogression, improvement and deterioration should be dropped from the vocabulary of men, since progress in excellence cannot be a law of our nature if we obey the law equally in actions that promote our progress, and in those that hinder it. If there were a law of progress, we should obey it in the act of retrograding, if a law of right, we should obey it in doing wrong, for no law can be disobeyed. In fact, it is difficult to see how a law can exist where there is no difference in the quality of actions, where disobedience is not thought of, and where men only do what they must do. And to add to the confusion of the picture, there is the fact that men all the while believe themselves to have actually disobeyed the law, and to be acting from choice. Indeed, the condition of human nature which this theory sup poses defies explanation without a new vocabulary adapted to this new philosophy.

It is to be expected that this sort of reasoning should end in the denial of a personal Lawgiver, and we accordingly find it said that "A legislator who makes his subjects as well as his laws, has failed in one or other of his functions if the laws are habitually broken, whether the reason of the breach be that the will of the subjects rejects them as bad, or that the nature of the subject is bad, i. e., imperfect or abnormal or irregular in its manifestations. And since the laws which we have best grounds for calling divine are seen empirically to be but imperfectly binding on man, we conclude the relation be10 Natural Law, p. 41.

tween man and God if there be a God not to be the relation of omnipotent sovereign and lawful subject; and accordingly a secular theory of law must seek elsewhere for the seat of supreme power and the source of real obligation." " Yet why a law may not be conceived to exist as an ideal standard, as an expression of what ought to be, instead of what is and must be; why it may not be regarded as the utterance of the will of the highest intelligence and goodness of a community or of the universe, towards the realization of which men are enjoined to strive; why law and lawgiver should be declared to have no existence because they are sometimes disobeyed; and how it is possible for man to be conscious of a law unless conscious of an obligation to obey and an ability to disobey it these are questions to which this philosophy gives no

answer.

The natural theory of Morality proceeds on essentially the same principles as those already considered, and an attempt to review it in detail would lead to a restatement of the objections given above. The position assumed throughout is that morality has its origin and ground in that part of our nature which has in itself no moral quality, that is, in our intellectual faculties. Morality is developed through the perception of existing relations, and consists in the feeling that under the pressure of these inexorable relations we must act in a certain way.

"The feeling of obligation is merely the consciousness of causation." 666 Ought' is what I feel obliged to do, because for ages and ages the stream of human tendency has set in favor of such doing, and my present inclinations have been moulded by the stream." "The so-called instinctive condemnation of injustice, cruelty, or falsehood, is simply a generalization from the feeling excited in practice by unjust, cruel, or faithless conduct." "Morality consists in consciousness of constraint, not in any inherent property of moral acts." The evolution of moral principles takes place pari passu with the growth of general feelings as to the price worth paying for each indulgence as it offers." Moral choice, it is furthermore 11 Natural Law, p. 68.

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said, is simply doing under difficulties what we should have done instinctively, had the difficulties been absent. One hardly knows which to wonder at most in such statements as these, the prodigality of assumptions, or the freedom with which words of established meaning are used in new senses. Moral choice is declared to be doing what a natural instinct forces us to do. The questions naturally suggest themselves, how, if all our actions are performed under the pressure of a necessity or of a resistless instinct moulded by the stream of tendency, any action can be moral? why by this theory all actions are of the same quality? why the consciousness of men does not correspond with this assumed state of things? why, if "stream of tendency" has for ages been moulding the human faculties to act according to necessity, they do not yet recognize the situation, but still suppose that they are acting from choice? why, if moral principles are evolved at equal pace with the growth of the feeling as to the price worth paying for an indulgence, it so often happens that moral principles are in advance of the calculation, and we feel remorse for having purchased the indulgence at any price? and finally, how the existing sense of responsibility and duty to a Supreme Lawgiver can be supposed to have been "evolved" in the midst of tendencies operating "for ages and ages" directly against such a sentiment and belief?

But there is no place for a Supreme Lawgiver in the philosophy of the universe that we are considering. It dispenses with all ideas of causation, choice and will in its account of Natural Law, and enthrones Necessity in the realm of morals. One naturally becomes anxious to know how a philosophy of religion can be constructed on these premises. We are not to be disappointed. It has been found that religion can exist without an object of worship, without belief in an overruling Power, without the sense of responsibility, the fear of punishment or the hope of reward. As morality, we are told, is the feeling of voluntary subjection, so religion is the feeling of treedom. It is the sense of harmony between our desires and aspirations, and the necessity that rules the world- the feel

ing that we are no longer struggling against the "stream of tendency," or the not-self, but are co-operating with it towards the fulfilment of the natural end of existence. The world is stronger than we, and when, bruised and weary with the conflict to realize an ideal good, we submit to the necessity that mocks our feebleness, and become resigned to our fate, we have already entered upon the enjoyment of the religion of Natural Law. The faith that is commended to us is that "by our own efforts and the help of others we may attain the measure of excellence which has been granted to us implicitly by our antecedents." In the struggle with weakness and passion, with adversity and our own inherited imperfections, we are to trust that the order of nature will do for us what it can ; but we are not to forget that the sooner we resign ourselves to its "strongest tendencies" the better it will be for us. Unspeakably pathetic is the picture that is presented in the following words: "There is nothing harder on earth than the agony of a solitary soul in pain or temptation. And there is no God to make the rough ways smooth. But though the struggle is hard, victory is always possible to the single-minded lover of truth and rectitude; and what more is needed, in the hour of trial, than faith in the possibility of victory? alone, or helped by gods or men, the struggle is hard, or why this craving for some help? But though it is hard, it is none the more hopeless, although there are no gods to help." 12 And the victory that is promised us is subjection to the destiny which our "antecedents" have prepared for us; our deliverance is harmony with the "strongest tendencies" of the not-self; our joy, that we are floating like bubbles along with "the stream of tendency," which proceeds we know not whence, and is rushing we know not whither. Around us is the play of light and shadow, the air is vocal with the songs of birds, and the endless procession of glad existence passes across our field of vision; but for us there is no voice from the heavens above, nor from the depths beneath - no revelation of eternal life, no whisper of hope, no foregleam of immortality; our destiny is

12 Natural Law, p. 203.

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one with that of the ephemeral life that flits and perishes around us, and whose swift fate mocks our proud ambition.

To call this sentiment religion is a monstrous misnomer. It is like defining hope in terms of despair, or painting sunlight in colors of stygian darkness. The first lesson of religion is the dependence of the finite being upon the All-Powerful, the overshadowing of the human soul by the mystery of an Infinite Presence, the feeling that it is held in the arms of a Divine sympathy. In the place of this the philosophy of Natural Law puts the consciousness of the Not-self holding the soul of man in the iron grasp of Fate. Religion is the striving of the finite spirit towards the Infinite Spirit, with the sentiment of love and worship, and with the desire to be perfect as He is perfect. In the place of this the religion of evolution substitutes submission to the resistless forces of nature. Religion is aspiration after fellowship with the Father of Spirits, the longing to be reconciled to Him in a life of holiness, and to dwell with unspeakable peace in the light of His favor. In the place of this, science offers us the struggle for harmony with the "strongest tendencies" of the "Not-ourselves." Religion sustains us in the conflicts and trials of life with faith in the divine Goodness and the hope of immortality. For this the philosophy of Necessity offers us the dreary prospect of personal annihilation and the doubtful immortality of our influence. In religion human nature receives honor and dignity from the divine interest and protection, and through the promise of a triumph over sin and death. The first lesson of evolution is the infinite littleness of man-his life but a flashing moment in the endless procession of cosmic forces-the insignificance of his existence, and the folly of his assuming as an individual to occupy a permanent place in the order of being. This philosophy, then, has given us for law in the material world the notion of force acting without design; for morality, the feeling of what we must do, without choice and without sense of right, in obedience to the influences which "the stream of tendency" rolls in upon us; and finally for religion, reconciliation with the inevitable, a sigh of resignation and a cry of despair.