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sidiary proof which comes from Design in the universe, and from the Moral affirmations of the human conscience. We have said that the idea of Independence is the key-stone of the Intuition argument. We further say that the Intuition argument is the key-stone of the Theistic proposition in its completeness. We have thus the apprehension of man in all his manly powers, in the several grades and directions of the varied qualities of his being. The article named also makes a fatal omission so we are constrained to think - in not asserting the idea of Independence as the highest and the creative quality of It or Him (we see not how one can hesitate in the selection of the pronoun) in whom we live, move and have being. Our closing word in this too brief and certainly crude analysis, is that of fixing attention upon the primal term and the primal fact. God does not cause unless we define the term so as to harmonize with the nature of independent action. He makes. "The Lord is our Maker - the Maker of heaven and earth and of all that therein is." In this we have the substance of all that can be said, even though we were to push our amplification to an indefinite extent it is the all of Theism.

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It is the Maker we recognize in all the sequences of physical nature — in all its adaptations, and in the rational intent which ordains them. It is the Maker we recognize in the mandate of our moral faculty, which asks us to obey regardless of hazards; and which compels us to confess allegiance even in the act of disobeying the mandate. It is the Maker we recognize in the cry of the heart for the Rock that is greater than we the cry of heart and flesh for the living God. It is the Maker we recognize in the solemn and exalting act of adoration - the worship of Him who is a spirit, in spirit and in truth. It is the Maker alone we trust when we rejoice in the Lord and give praise at the mention of His holy name. The Maker in the comprehensiveness of His relations, is the totality of the Theism which is possible to man.

Designedly we use the words, "possible to man." We have no right to assume that man's nature is a complete reflex of

the Divine. For aught we can know to the contrary, there may be created beings as much superior to man, as man is superior to the brute. There may be existences which are distinguishable from man not simply by greater powers, but by different and higher quality of powers. There may be tiers of being of which we know nothing and can know nothing. If there are these higher and specifically different creatures (as we think very probable), God doubtless reveals to them attributes of which mere human faculty can have no apprehension. If so, the Theism which is intelligible and conclusive to them, is one not "possible to man." But that matters not practically. The portion of His ways which He reveals to us, an


swers our precise and our full need. If we have not the all of God, we have a sufficiency, and the wants of every rational creature are fully met and satisfied.

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It will be seen that our survey of the several stages of Theistic theology, makes but little account of demonstratio::. In truth it is not so much the object of Theistic statement to demonstrate the being of God, as to show that all attempts to invalidate the truth of that being utterly fail. Theistic reasoning is only indirectly constructive—it is formally and specially critical. It is a defence rather than an aggression. The heart in its primitive belief, is satisfied. It has no doubt. It is confident and it rejoices in hope. Could it remain in undisturbed possession it were well. But the skeptical spirit meddles therewith. Theism renders its highe-t service -- a very great one we hold as a "repairer of the breach." That in this service Theism gives a certainty depends upon the meaning we give to this pivotal word. pivotal word. By the aid of the Unabridged it may be easy to give a definition to the word certainty, that shall render it impossible that we affirm it of the being of God, of the historic reality of Jesus and the Apostles, and also as a modern logician has ingeniously made it appear of that of Napoleon Bonaparte! It is enough that we receive a rational probability, one of such strength that it operates as if it were certainty. We really get no more than this for the existence of the physical universe itself. We do



not wish anything more as pertaining to the Maker of the uniWe pass by the clamor that the Theist has not made a full demonstration of God's being. We treat it as the idle wind which we heed not. Theism has never undertaken that task. It has done enough in sweeping away every shadow of plausibility in any and every atheistic attempt to destroy the inborn confidence and trust of the soul of man.

Finally, we are ready to confess that any faith which rests merely upon intellectual statement, upon analysis meant for argument, is most inadequate. The God of argumentative Theism is as unlike the Pervading Presence of the Psalms and the Heavenly Father of the Gospels, as the glittering ice peaks of the Alps are unlike the trickling rill which makes green and fruitful and fragrant the valleys at the base of those awful heights. The God of analysis and the Father of the Scriptures are also identical in the same sense - which is a real sense that the mountain glacier and the quickening rill are identical. They are the same in substance. The difference is purely a practical one. The difference is simply the formal one of God for the mind as distinct from God for the heart. The mountain snow feeds the river-the directly practical river. Seed for the sower and bread for the eater, immediately dependent upon the quickening moisture, are remotely but not less actually dependent on that which keeps the moisture supplied the icy reservoirs of the dreary and desolate up-lands of plateau and mountain. The gracious and loving Father is the constant need. The Theistical unfolding is demanded only in a contingency. Then and there it is potentis indispensable, is practical.


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Thought and Feeling in Religion.

THE exact relations of Thought and Feeling to Religion, is a question of vital importance to all whose position puts them in the attitude of religious teachers. In what proportion do the intellectual faculties and the emotions and affections enter into the religious development of man, has long been a problem which has agitated the minds of men. To the Christian minister of to-day, it is continually presenting itself as a question of the deepest importance. There is scarcely a proper function of the office of the ministry that does not, in some way, stand related to this subject. In his pulpit efforts; in his pastoral visitations; in his ministrations to the sick and sorrowing; in his work with the young, and in every place where the duties of his office call him, the minister has to deal with human thoughts and human feelings; and being himself a recognized teacher of religion, these thoughts and feelings with which he comes in contact are in many cases closely related to the subject of religion.

Joseph Cook once declared that no intelligent discussion of any question is possible, till there has been given a clear definition of the leading terms employed. In this particular we believe the great "Lecturer" is good authority; and therefore we shall seek a definition of the principal term used in stating our subject the word Religion. Without presuming to be wiser than those to whom we constantly go for definitions, we will take the language of Webster, and say that religion is "the recognition of God as an object of worship, love and obedience; right feelings toward God, rightly apprehended." Religion,' according to this definition, involves both thought and feeling; fer there can be no recognition of God as an object of worship, love and obedience, unless there is thought concerning him; and, on the other hand, unless there is right feeling toward him, the worship, love and obedience will not follow. What relative proportion do thought and feeling sustain to religion, 6


as thus defined, is the question here raised for consideration. Man has often been described as a religious being, by nature. If by this it is meant that man has natural inclinations and aspirations of a religious nature, we concur fully in the opinion expressed. Recognizing man as thus naturally inclined toward religion as tending in the direction of worship and reverence toward a power greater than himself, we recognize also that he possesses both the intellectual and the emotional in his make-up. We notice furthermore, that both these qualities bear an important relation to his religious development; this fact man's history clearly demonstrates. Each one fills an important office in connection with his religious experience.

When we say that both thought and feeling have to do with religion, it is manifest in all human experience, that they do not hold an equal place in any one individual. One or the other predominates in each case; in no case are they equally balanced. While in some persons there will appear to be quite as much of the one as of the other; yet on a close analysis we shall discover a preponderance in favor of one or the other. This being the case, it is natural for the deeply intellectual man to claim that religion is largely a matter of intellectual conception; while on the other hand, the man of fervent emotions declares that religion is the result of deep feeling. Now, a correct judgment concerning this matter cannot be reached by accepting wholly the conclusions of either side; for both are extremists, and view the question from but one side.

I. Let us look first at the intellectual side. Accepting the definition of religion already quoted, as a "recognition of God as an object of worship, love and obedience," it seems clear that thought has very much to do with religion. By what possible means is God recognized as an object, in any sense, unless man is permitted to think about him? It is through man's intellectual faculties that he gains a knowledge of all other objects, and learns his relations to them. How can he learn his relations to God, if not through the same faculties. Although the religious instinct prompts man to look up toward

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