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memorial of the merchants, ex pressed herself to the following pur. port::

"That she came not to the as sembly to stir up the zeal of their High Mightinesses for the preserva. tion of the country, of which they had given evident proofs on every occasion; but to entreat them to take into their serious consideration the augmentation of the land forces, which was so necessary in the present critical circumstances of the state, in order to guard its frontiers from insult. That with regard to the fourth deputation of the mer. chants, and the speech, of which she had delivered to them a copy, she had as yet made no remarks on it, only that it was not expressed in proper terms to bring things to an amicable conclusion, notwithstanding the assurances she had given the merchants. That she hoped, by her repeated solicitations, to bring matters to an happy issue in England; that she therefore laid it before their High Mightinesses, and left it to them to do in that affair as they should think proper: that the time became more and more urgent, for thinking of the safety of the republic: that if the equipment proposed by the merchants should be judged necessary, it ought immediately to be carried into execution jointly with the augmentation of the land forces, that the state might be put on a respectable footing by sea and land: that she therefore hoped that on her solicitation, and that of the provinces of Guelders, Utrecht, Overyssel, and Groningen, their Mightinesses would exhort the province of Holland to desist from its opposition to the said augmentation; and that all the confede. fates would unanimously consent to

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Translation of a rescript sent by Count Kaunitz, prime minister to the Empress-Queen, to the imperial ministers at the several courts of the empire.

The unfortunate issue of the last campaign, gave the enemy a fine game to play. He had it in

his
power, from the beginning of
spring, to form his plan of offen.
sive operations as he thought best.
We, for our part, could only have
one principal object, namely, the
putting our army on a proper foot
ing, and endeavouring to make in
time every other disposition for de-
fence. This was accomplished, no
labour or money being spared, to
the great surprize of the enemy
himself: in a few months our army
was put on such a footing, that it
did not hesitate to present itself be
fore the enemy. At the same time,
a negotiation was commenced with
Russia, to induce that court të
march, even in the winter, a body
of 30,000 men straight into Mora-
via. That court was so complai-
sant as to declare, that they would
march a body of 30,000 fresh
troops, either to be employed in
Moravia, or to reinforce the im-
perial army of Russia, and so push
the operations of the war with vi
gour. Their march was left to the
option of the court of Vienna.
Though at that time our own de-
fensive operations were not brought
to maturity, their Imperial Majes-
ties, in consideration of the common
cause, generously receded from their
first demand, and signified that the
reinforcement in question, ought
rather, to join the imperial army of
Russia, that it might continue to act
vigorously.

"The

.

«The crown of France was at the same time required to send, pur. suant to treaty, an auxiliary body of 24,000 men at least. It is unne. cessary to mention the interesting circumstances of things at that precise period when this corps ought to have marched; and though, some time after this, it was very uncertain what turn the siege of Olmutz would take, the court of Vienna itself insisted upon postponing the march of those succours till another time; and laboured to concert new measures to divert the unforeseen storm that threatened to burst over the estates of the patriotic and well intentioned members of the empire a point which hath been effectually accomplished.

"What was done on our side during the siege of Olmutz, is genesally known. The enemy retired through Bohemia and scarce had we enjoyed the smiling prospect of our hereditary states being entirely delivered from them, when, after mature deliberation, a resolution was taken at Vienna, by no means to march the imperial and royal army into Silesia, but to carry it directly into Lusatia, as soon as the enemy, in abandoning Bohemia, should direct his march that way. The principal motives which determined us to take this resolution, were, among others, that by such La motion our army drew nearer to those of Russia and Sweden; that it opened a communication with those armies, and the enemy would be molested in the centre of his position. Advice was immediately given to the Russian generals of this resolution, and they were left to draw up what plan of operations they should think proper.

In the mean time the imperial

army of Russia, and the body of reserve, had drawn near the estates of the enemy. In a council of war it was debated, whether they ought to advance straight to Frankfort on the Oder, or towards Lower Silesia, or penetrate by the Wartha into the New Marche. Several diffi. culties were started with regard to the two former projects, both with regard to the subsistence, and the necessity of preserving a communication with the kingdom of Prussia.

The third project was therefore made choice of, and executed; which the court of Vienna learnt with the greater satisfaction, as it had conceived some uneasiness concerning the march of the Russian army towards Frankfort on the Oder, or towards Silesia; seeing that with regard to the first case, the corps of general Dohna was already assembled in that part; and on the other hand, the King of Prussia, in retiring from Bohemia, was marching to Silesia, so that he would have it in his power at once to employ his whole force joined to Dohna's corps, against the Russian army; and this army, by marching towards Landsberg, would be removed from the Prussians, and would moreover have the Oder and the Wartha before it.

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"The first news of the part taken by the Russian generals, was receiv ed at Vienna at the time that mar. shal Daun was already advanced with his army towards Gorlitz, and almost at the same time that un doubted intelligence was received from several quarters, that the King of Prussia in person was in full march with a body of 15 or 16,000 men to join general Dohna, and on the 12th of August arrived near Lignitz.

very sensible loss, to bring all his forces into Saxony, against the imperial and royal army, and the combined army; and by that - means the Russians and Swedes, as well as the bodies of forces left on the frontiers of Bohemia and Mo. ravia, under the generals Harsch and de Ville, would have their hands much more free, to act efficaciously.

It was the less possible to prevent or hinder this march, as the enemy had, through his own country, a much shorter road than we had, and could scarce be at any loss for subsistence; that, besides -the Russian army, by its march to Landsberg, was removed farther from our army, which had on its flank, on the side of Silesia, an army of 30,000 of the enemy's troops. "The real advantage that must In these circumstances, the fol- result from all this, doubtless conlowing points were taken into consisted in dislodging the army under sideration. Whether, for the good Prince Henry, and delivering Dres of the common cause, the marshal den and the greatest part of: Saxoought not to march forward with ny. his whole army, either towards Berlin, or towards Frankfort on the Oder, or whether he ought to direct his operations towards Silesia, or towards Saxony? It was considered that the first of these projects could be regarded as a coup de main only, and by no means as a decisive blow and there were the fewer motives to follow it, as it was easy to imagine that the King of Prussia swould give battle to the Russians before we could, for want of subsistence, get into the Lower Lusatia with our whole force.

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"It seemed at the same time highly improper to transfer the theatre of war into Silesia, because nothing essential would thereby be gained, and it would give to the troops of the enemy that were left in Silesia, an opportunity of taking an advantageous camp near some fortress in that dutchy, and so pro. tract our operations. The court, therefore, as well as marshal Daun, thought it would be best to march towards Saxony. It was thought that by taking this step essential advantages would be gained, or that at least the enemy would be forced, by the apprehension of suffering a

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"To attain this important end, M. Daun's first project was to advance with his whole army straight to Meissen, there cross the Elbe, and at once march up to the enemy, at the same time that he should be attacked by the combined army, and thus deprived of an opportu nity of throwing himself into Dresden. But at that time, that is to say, on the 3d of September, Sonnestein was not yet in our possession, and the enemy had taken such an advantageous position, opposite to the combined army, that it was thought scarce feasible, and highly dangerous, for this to make the first attack, and yet, unless it did so, Prince Henry would still have it in his power to throw himself into Dresden, whilst the imperial and royal army passed the Eibe near Meissen, and to maintain himself on this side of the river, and lopena communication with the King. DA "Marshal Daun did not think it consistent with the dignity of arms, or the interest of the service, to make useless marches, and to take insignificant positions. Noridid he think it prudent to remove to a greater

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greater distance, either from the Russians of the Swedes, or even from Lusatia or Silesia; he therefore suddenly took a resolution to draw near to the combined army, and to direct his march towards Stoipen; and this the rather, as the city of Dresden could not be attacked in form, and as the news of an entire defeat (as it was falsely called) of the Russian army, was received at the same time. It was therefore very natural to imagine, that the King of Prussia would hasten back with a considerable army, and render the siege of Dresden of no effect.

As soon as the imperial and royal army had fixed its camp at Stolpen, the field-marshal employed himself in reconnoitring the position of the enemy, and in forming new plans to give him an effectual blow. On the 9th, he held a conference with the Prince of Deuxponts, at which he proposed a design, a little too bold, perhaps ; namely, that this prince should attack the enemy next day; that for this end he (the marshal) would approach that very night to the Elbe, pass it between the enemy's camp and Dresden, laying bridges between two fires at a small distance from each other, and carry over his whole army; attack the enemy, and cut him off from Dresden. The Prince of Deux-ponts entered wholly into this plan; only he found it impossible to make the attack next day, because the time was too short to make the necessary dispositions, call in the detached posts, and employ them where necessary.

Though the marshal insisted with the more vehemence on the necessity of making haste, as we had received sure accounts that the King was on his march with a consider.

able body, and there was not a mo. ment to lose, he saw himself forced, however, by the obstacles just men. tioned, to defer the attack till the 11th. It was agreed therefore, that in the night between the 10th and 11th, the imperial and royal army should approach to the Elbe, and lay bridges over it; that the combined army should advance in order of battle, and make those movements on the flanks which should be deemed proper; and that at day-break it should venture to make the attack. This plan of operations was executed, excepting the attack; for marshal Daun received the same day, the 10th, certain intelligence that the King was arrived near Dresden with a considerable body, and that the rest of the enemy's troops were not far off. On this account, it was, after mature deliberation, judged to be an enterprize too rash to attempt to pass such a river as the Elbe, between the army of Prince Henry and the city of Dresden, and that at a time when there was another army behind them; that in case of any misfortune, the imperial and royal army would be exposed to total ruin. The marshal, agreeably to his usual foresight and experience in war, came over to this opinion, and saw himself obliged to signify to the Prince of Deux-ponts, even the very night in which the attack was to have been made, that difficulties had occurred in relation to the attack which had been concerted, and even in some measure begun.

"Thus one principal project, namely, the speedy expulsion of Prince Henry, failed. We could not, however, have hindered him from joining the King a little further down the river, and from opposing

the

the siege of Dresden. But, on the other hand, we obtained the whole of the second principal object, that is to say, the drawing the enemy's forces into Saxony, and accordingly he brought into Saxony the greatest part of those troops he had in Silesia, as well as a numerous body from general Dohna's army; and thereby he has left himself more and more exposed in other parts.

"Such is the true plan of the present campaign: and though the issue of it be not as yet entirely satisfactory, and such as might be desired, the Imperial court enjoys, at least, the sincere satisfaction of reflecting, that according to the change of circumstances, it in stantly took the most vigorous resolutions, and that it was ne ver deficient in any thing that might contribute to the good of the common cause, and that it is still making at present prepara tions from which it may hope for the most happy consequences. I expect to be soon able to give you an account of them, being,

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Declaration delivered the 12th of June to all the foreign ministers at Petersburgh.

"The Empress having engaged in the present war, in order to succour her allies, has their interests as much at heart as her own: Her Majesty therefore, could not, without some concern, hear of the convention concluded the 11th of April last in London, between the King of Great Britain and the King of Prussia, as the British court thereby pretends not only. to make the war kindled up by that Prince her own quarrel, but, in all appearance, a firm resolu VOL. I.

tion is also taken to give no satis faction to the powers so unjustly at± tacked and so grievously wronged, and to carry on the war to the ast extremity. 'Tis doubtless on this principle that continual devasi tations exercised by the King of Prussia, even insome neutralstates are varnished over with the name of defence or support of the liberties of the Germanic body; that the opposition made by the Empress Queen against a total invasion of her. hereditary dominions, is termed a dangerous design upon the protestant religion; and, in fine, that the assistance given to that Princess by her allies, is represented as an aggression against the empire.di

"It is true, that in the said convention Her Imperial Majesty of all the Russias is not mentioned by name. But the King of Prussia having already published last year, as soon as the Russian troops entered Prussia, ca particular declaraz tion against Her Majesty (a step which he did not take against France when her army entered his territories, though it was notorious that she, as well as Russia, had no other design but to succour their allies), he has thereby plainly shewn, that he endeavours if possible to make the war waged in his German dominions common to the whole empire; and that, on the contrary, by entirely excluding Prussia, he strives to persuade neutral Princes that he is actuated by nothing but the interest of the empire, and that it is only in this object he desires their concurrence. As to the conservation of Prussia, perhaps he thinks himself singly strong enough to make sure of it; or that, in sacrificing it, he seeks M

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