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desisted from them by virtue of his full powers; and in that case the Hanoverian general had no pretence left for executing the convention of Closter-seven. "On the 17th of October, 1757, Count Lynar wrote to His Majes. ty's electoral minister, that marshal Richelieu's courier was returned from Versailles with instructions, which expressly said the court would hear of no terms of peace; that it was resolved to hold to the scheme of explanation; and lastly, that it would less than ever desist from the condition of disarming the Hessians; and that it had rejected the offer of His Danish Majesty to receive these troops into his territories.

"It was therefore necessary to come to a determination on this head, or to wait to see the war kindled up afresh. The battle of Rosbach happened on the 5th of November, soon after the arrival of that letter. The King could not foresee that France would then change her tone: he saw himself obliged to take measures, in consequence of the declarations which he had been informed of by the letter of October 17; nor could he afterwards change them, when it at length pleased the court of Ver. sailles to come down, though very little, from her unjust pretensions. On one hand, he had already ad. dressed himself to His Prussian Ma.

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It is plain, that during the eon tinuance of a negotiation, and bes fore every thing be regulated and concluded, the two parties have a power to renounce their engages ments. If all difficulties had been removed by the convention of Closter-seven, what need was there of a new negotiation ?- France persisting to want further clauses and explications to be added to it, gave the King an incontestible right to declare himself according to the nature of the subject and circum stances.

"Not content with having com bated the motives which engaged the King to take up arms, they criticise violently upon the manner in which that was executed. 'Had there been,' say they, 'any honourable way of withdrawing from the execution of that solemn act, it would have been to declare it void, by putting themselves in 'the same position they were be 'fore it was concluded; but in"stead of that, the most odious means were made use of to vio late that capitulation, successively, and with impunity. The time was spun out for three months, to find an opportunity to break the convention. The French 'army was suffered tog go to Hal. jesty, and on the other, the proberstadt; and they waited till it ceedings of France shewed but too plainly, that he had reason to be diffident of her fidelity. Besides, it is not true that she desisted from the disarming of all the auxiliary troops. In marshal Richelieu's letter of November 9, he makes only mention of the Hessians, and is silent with regard to the fate of

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was separated by the bad season. They seized the opportunity of a repusle, to come out of the limits prescribed them, under pretence of extending their quarters: they afterwards took advantageous posts, under pretences equally contrary to the convention: they made all the dispositions for the 03

siege

siege of Harbourg, without any previous declaration of war; and 3 having made all these preparations, and when they thought the enemy sufficiently weakened and deceived to fight them with advantage, they declared that he stilities were to be commenced, and that they considered the-con, vention as broken, while they were marching against them, and attacking their posts.

The more the author of the Pa. allel exhausts his rhetoric in this sort of declamation, so much the less regard doth he pay to truth. It is certain and incontestible, that the Hanoverians conformed on their part, in every respect, to the con. vention, as it was signed. It was neither the King's generals, nor marshal Richelieu, who caused it to be broken by their declarations; but the court of Versailles, which would not look upon the conven, tion as obligatory, unless it should be extended to the disarming of the auxiliary troops, and unless the King would leave his country to the discretion of his enemies till a general peace. The King, there, fore, had the same right to look upon this affair as depending upon the resolution of the respective courts, and to take his measures accordingly. He made use of that right. It was natural not to commit hostilities as long as Count Lynar's negotiation lasted; but that minister, as the court of Versailles well knows, could never bring about negotiations of peace, which was, however, the true intention of the suspension of arms. Could it be thought strange if the King, by virtue of the right which the inflexible severity of his enemies gave him, determined himself according to the events that happenedy and ROMES

the victory gained over the French army at Rosbach? This event, however, did not influence His Majesty's resolutions. If any one will but calculate the date of these events, he will be convinced of the contrary. The battle of Rosbach happened on the 5th of Novem ber, and the motions of the Hano verian army were renewed on the 26th of the same month. The King could not have been informed at London, in so short a time, of that success, to give orders to his minister to solicit the consent of His Prussian Majesty, with regard to Prince Ferdinand, to whom the King offered the command of the army, so as to receive the King of Prussia's answer, to hear of the Prince's arrival, and cause hostili, ties to be renewed. If the rules of good faith had not been scrupu lously observed, the French army. might have been reduced to a more dangerous situation than it really was. In what a critical situation would it have found itself, if the King's troops, as they were fully authorized to do, had marched, on the first discovery of the design to disarm the auxiliary troops and at the same time that the battle of Rosbach happened, and when mar shal Richelieu was at Halberstadt with his army, had attacked him in the rear? The operations of the army did not begin till after the King of Prussia was gone into Silesia, and when the French were not only upon their guard, but the first columns of their army had even advanced beyond Lunen bourg, with design to obtain, by open force, the unjust conditions proposed by the court of Versailles. As to the pretended preparations for the siege of Harbourg, we know, nothing at all of them. We do,

not

not deny but the quarters of the troops were extended; but that we were obliged to do it through unavoidable necessity, the quarters destined to receive only the Hano verian troops, not being, at the same time, sufficient for those of Hesse and Brunswick also, which, by a natural consequence of the proceedings of France, could not be separated from the body of the army. Neither of the two French detachments were surprized: the two armies were assembled when the scene of operations was again opened; and in this respect they were in the same situation as at Closter-seven : nor was it in the year 1757, but the year following, that the French army was driven out of His Majesty's German dominions. The victory gained at Rosbach, the bad season, the diseases, and decrease of the French army, events which never followed from the King's resolutions, could not oblige His Majesty to maintain a convention, which in itself was not binding, and which France would not acknowledge as such when it was a proper time.

"We flatter ourselves we have fully answered the reproaches of the court of Versailles; at least none of the objections that relate to the decision of the subject have been wilfully forgot. We do not pretend to anticipate the judgment of the public: we leave it to pro. nounce, after having seen a true representation of His Britannic Ma. jesty's conduct, whether the ministry of Versailles are in the right, when they say, that such odious principles and proceedings can only be owing to the artifices and 'evil counsels of some corrupt ministers.' We will not trouble ourselves to answer this abusive lan.

guage; nor will we retort it, but pass over the above, as well as many other reproaches equally odious and trifling. The French ministry cannot be so ignorant of the judgment which their own nation forms of their principles, to doubt that we might, if we had a mind, reproach them with their evil counsels and measures, equally ruinous to France and Germany, in a manner which, even in France itself, would not fail to make an impression. It is however, ne cessary to add two remarks on what has been said. Our days have pro. diced a phenomenon, of which history does not furnish us with an example, we have seen the houses of Austria and Bourbon uniting their forces to give chains to Europe, and especially to Germany. Providence does not want means to prevent this misfortune. This dominion, so eagerly sought for, could not be exercised in concert, if they should make themselves masters of it. That alliance, the first years of which have flowed with rivers of blood, will occasion no less bloodshed when it comes one day to be broken; but the violent tumults, and the imminent dangers with which the politic system of Europe, and so many kingdoms and states are threatened during his crisis, merit the most serious atten tion of those who are at the helm of government. Especially it is manifest, that the protestant religion is in inevitable danger, not. withstanding the false protestations given to the professors of it. The pretended schemes of secularization, ascribed to His Britannic Majesty and the King of Prussia, are so ill. founded, that they are taken u upon the authority of an obscure work; every page of which chews the 04 author

author to have no right to be a negotiator of peace. Never had the catholic religion less to fear than at a time when its arms are united, and dissention reigns among the protestants. It is not the same with regard to what the latter have to fear from their enemies. The designs of the court of Vienna to render the catholic religion predo minant in Germany, have. been plainly exhibited by the reflections, and the advices of a very able mi. nister, who certainly would not have imposed upon his court, and who had his information from the fountain-head. The justice of his discoveries has been proved by the event, for we see not one catholic state of the empire, but what have bowed the neck to this new system, out of a zeal for religion, notwithstanding the real disadvantages that must naturally follow. It is only answered to these arguments, that the treaty of Versailles has been founded upon the treaty of West phalia. But are not the courts which have contracted these new engagements free to change them at pleasure, and according to circumstances? Besides, if the protestant states, as they pretend, are bound to adopt the treaty of the peace of Westphalia, in what sense the catholics please to give it, it is but too clear, that the protestants are already divested of the most important privileges granted to them by that treaty.

"All the King's measures will ever tend to, the general safety of Europe, to the liberty and indepen dence of the empire, and the main, tenance of the protestant religion. Neither the misfortune which his estates of Germany have suffered, nor the base treatment which he hath received from the court of

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Vienna, nor the conduct of several of his co-estates, which favour the unjust designs of that court, will ever be able to divert him from an end so worthy of himself. He hopes that the Divine Providence will continue to bless the arms which he has taken up in his own defence, and that it will make this the means of procuring peace to the empire, and also of blasting the wicked designs of those who have brought into it the flame of war, and have opened a scene of calamities, of which we have nor seen an instance since the peace of Westphalia,".

Extract from the manifesto of the

court of France, lately publishedby authority at Paris. THIS sophistical and scurrilous

piece consists of three parts the first contains what they call pre liminary eclaircissements the se cond is called, Parallel of the King's conduct with that of the King of England, Elector of Hanover and the third contains the vouchers of the facts mentioned in the two former.

The first labours to prove the justice of the King's sending his armies into Germany, and attack. ing the Elector of Hanover and Landgrave of Hesse-Cassel; and the reasoning in it would have. some foundation, if they had proved, that the King of Prussia was the first aggressor, and con. sequently the first infractor of the peace of the empire, But this: they take for granted, so that the whole is founded upon a petitio principu, or what we call a begging the question, therefore deserves no: notice.

As to the second part, after some; scurrilous strictures upon the con

duct

duct of Hanover, with relation to the convention of Closter-seven, they proceed as follows.

As it is chiefly from the King's alliance with the Empress Queen of Hungary and Bohemia, that the King of England, Elector of Hanover, has sought to take advantage for stirring up the states of Germany against their most Christian and Imperial Majesties, and cover with a specious pretext his pernicious attempts against the quiet and safety of the empire; the first thing must be to deface the false impressions intend ed by him to be made on the pub. lic.

To this end it will be demonstrated, that this alliance which His Britannic Majesty has pretended to be so very unnatural and so dangerous for the Germanic liber ty, has, on the contrary, been quite natural; that the Kings of England and Prussia have them. selves rendered it necessary, and that if the liberty of the empire is threatened with the greatest dan gers, it is from those who have at. tacked it, and who, in contempt of the Germanic constitutions, and of whatever among Sovereigns is most sacred, labour to oppress it, and not from those who defend it, pursuant to their engagements, in conformity to the resolutions of the empire, and at the hazard of their own safety.

"It is manifest, that on the first hostilities in North America of the King of England against the French, the King formed the design of confining himself to his own defence against the English, in order, were it possible, to pre. serve to Europe in general, and the empire in particular, the ad. vantages of peace, of which he

found himself deprived by the injustice and ambition of his enemies.

But very different were the thoughts of other powers: the King of Prussia, dazzled, as he himself owns, by the King of Eng land's glittering promises, quitted the alliance of France; and suddenly came to light a particular treaty betwixt the courts of London and Berlin, containing the most dangerous views, and which, among other objects, imposed laws on the princes of Germany, interdicting them the liberty of foreign succours, which is reserved to them by the Germanic constitu tions, in case of their being attacked.

These vo courts indeed gave out, that this treaty tended only to the support of the tranquillity of Germany, and that it was the motive for the clause expressing. that they would suffer no foreign troops to enter it under any pre tence whatever; but as the em pire had in no wise commissioned them with this care, and the King of Prussia, in concert with the King of England, was making immense preparations of war, at a time when he had no enemies to fight, it was easy to judge, that the real scope of a clause so contrary to the Germanic con stitutions, was to hinder any opposition coming from without Germany to the war which those two princes had determined to kindle within, if they should not find the court of Vienna favourable to the project of exciting a general war, in which France might be impli cated.

"If the expression of this clause drew a suspicion on their views, they were entirely laid open by

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