credit and influence. at Vienna, precisely in these circumstances, to bring about the most unjust and illegal proceedings against his Britannic Majesty in the affair of the posts.

The King easily perceived to what the threatenings of his enemies tended. They wanted to throw an indelible stain upon his arms, by disarming the auxiliary troops, who had no other resource left but either to disband or enter into the French armies. The Hanoverian troops were confined in so narrow a space, that it would have been impossible for them to subsist long, but must have perished in misery. Besides, the King, by subscribing to the new terms which they wanted to impose upon him, could not afterwards have claimed the assistance of the British nation for that electorate. The revenues of his German dominions would have been seized, and the country exhausted in such a manner, that nothing could have been expected from it in a long course of years. The King would then have seen himself unable to maintain either his own or subsidiary troops, which by a natural consequence he had been forced to disband. Then would His Majesty's enemies have accomplished the dangerous schemes which Count Fleming foretold, might one day become fatal to the house of Hanover.

Let any one but examine this picture, whose natural colours are much stronger than here represent. ed; let him but listen to the voice of reason, justice, and equity; let him, in short, but put himself in the King's place, it will be impossible for him to hesitate a moment, what part the King had to take in

these circumstances. The court of France itself acknowledged, that the last conditions proposed did not exist in the treaty of Closter-seven, as it wanted them to be granted by new conventions. The King had therefore an undoubted right to reject them. France also maintained that the convention, before it could become obligatory, wanted the ratification of his most Christian Majesty. The King, therefore, had an equal power to grant his, or to refuse it. Was he to renounce this power, and abandon his country and people to the discretion of an enemy, who sought their total ruin and destruction?

The King then took the most just measures, and the most agree. able for his own dignity and preservation; the only measures which the arrogance of his enemies had permitted him to take; measures, in short, which, however dangerous and uncertain they then appeared, could not possibly prove more fatal, than the equally heavy and shameful yoke which France wanted to impose upon the King, by the new convention. He resolved to try, what was possible, to deliver his estates, and those of his allies, from tyranny and oppression, and for this purpose, and to defend him. self, to join in quality of Elector, with his Prussian Majesty. He ordered a person of confidence to be sent to that monarch, to desire him to permit Prince Ferdinand of Brunswick, a prince of the blood. royal, to take the command of his army. This was the first of November, and consequently five days before the battle of Rosbach, when major-general Count de Schulembourg departed from Stade to go to the King of Prussia. In the mean

time, the generals and ministers had not yet received orders to commence hostilities. The King would not permit them to pursue any measures which might give France room to think that he was disposed to enter into her views. General Zastrow's letter, annexed to the Parallel, shews that they conformed exactly to His Majesty's intentions, and that they signified that they thought the King was resolved henceforward to regard the convention as null and void. As soon as we were sure of a general, a resolution was taken to march against the enemy. Duke Ferdinand gave notice of this to marshal Richelieu, by a letter of the 28th of November.

The King gave all the world an account of the just motives of this conduct, in a memorial published the 26th of that month, and hosti. lities were renewed on both sides. This is the justest idea that can be given of an event, which will serve as an eternal monument of France's manner of acting as soon as she thinks she has the superiority on her side; her conduct will convince all the states of the empire, that there is nothing to be gained by yielding to her, and that the pride, and the abuse of her strength, in crease in proportion as they become abject.

We shall examine as we go along, and dissipate the falsehoods with which the court of France has sought to amuse the public with regard to this event, and the sophistry which she has made use of for her justification. It is impossible in doing this, not to fall into some repetitions. The French ministry begin with an exaggerated description of the condition of the Hanoverian army at the signing of

It will be easily granted, that at the time of making the convention, we had no hopes of soon delivering the King's dominions, and those of his allies, by force of arms, because he saw an army making head against us, greatly superior to ours in number. But had not marshal Richelieu reason, on the other hand, to fear a reverse of fortune, if he was resolved to drive an army of forty thousand men to despair, whose valour he had experienced at the affair of Hastenbeck? Besides, it was that marshal, and not the Duke of Cumberland, who was informed of the march of the King of Prussia against the Prince of Soubise. So there is not the least mention made of the haste with which the French army flew to the assistance of the latter, immediately after signing the convention. As to the rest, it is impossible to conceive that this convention can serve as an example of the generous sentiments of his most Christian Majesty. They ingenuously own, that marshal Richelieu granted the capitulation of his own accord, with, out consulting his court. As to the new conditions proposed by the court of Versailles, and with which she connected her ratification, it would be absurd to maintain that they were dictated by sentiments of generosity.

The

The court of France saw very well that she could not claim the right of refusing the capitulation of the treaty of Closter-seven, without giving the same right to his Britannic Majesty. In order, therefore, to throw a false gloss upon the explanation of the treaty, it pretends, that the King of France, 6 out of his zeal for his allies and the empire, approved of the conduct of marshal Richelieu; and to render the capitulation more solid, His Majesty proposed to add to it some explanations, to fix the 'sense of it in so clear a manner, " as to obviate every false interpre

tation; explanations which the court of Copenhagen and Count Lynar had found conformable to the true sense of the capitulation.” But this tale is absolutely contrary to the true state of things. The court of France declared that it would not acknowledge the vali. dity of the convention, unless the

new terms which it intended to add were agreed to, and the auxiliary troops were disarmed. This cir cumstance, which is most clearly related in Count de Lynar's letter, which is known to the court of Copenhagen, and which was the cause that the guaranty of that court was not sought, is also mentioned in marshal Richelieu's own letter, annexed to the Parallel. His words are as follow: His Danish Majesty having offered to guaranty them (the articles of the convention), the King my master thinks that, before he signs his acceptance of them, it will be proper to obviate some obscurities which might occasion difficulties in the exccution, which has been suspended reciprocally, upon words of honour to make no alteration in their substance, and always to execute them, when both sides have come to an understanding relating to any doubts that may arise.'

CHA

An essay towards the character of the King of Prussia, translated from the French of M. Maupertuis.

THE

HE most faithful and scrupulous historian would be the best panegyrist of Frederick King of Prussia. I pretend to be neither: I only attempt the outlines of his character, which even cotemporary jealousy, envy, and malignity, are forced to admire, and which more impartial posterity, if it can be lieve, will almost adore.

By the mere natural strength and superiority of his genius, without experience, he broke out at once a general and a hero. He distinguished with precision what in ferior minds never discover at all, the difference between great difficulties and impossibilities; and being never discouraged by the former, has often seemed to execute the latter.

Indefatigably laborious and active, coolly intrepid in action, he discerns as by intuition, seizes

with rapidity, and improves with skill, the short, favourable, and often decisive, moments of battle. Modest and magnanimous after victory, he becomes the generous protector of his subdued and captive enemies. Resolute and undejected in misfortunes, he has arisen superior to distresses, and struggled with difficulties which no courage, no constancy but his own would have resisted, nor could have surmounted.

But as he cannot always command the success which he always deserves, he may perhaps be obliged to yield at last to the superior numbers of almost all Europe combined against him; their legi. ons may perhaps conquer, but his virtues must triumph.

As a king, he is a man, a citizen, a legislator, and a patriot. His own extensive mind forms all his plans of government, undebased by selfish ministerial interests and misrepresentations. Justice and huma nity are his only ministers*.

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