temperament, is a fubordination of benevolence to felf-love.

Thus, moral actions are divided into two claffes: the first regards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done, and actions that ought not to be done; the other regards arbitrary or difcretionary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone.. Society is indeed promoted by the latter; but it can scarce. fubfift, unless the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the firft clafs are made indispensable; thofe of the other clafs being left to our free-will. And hence alfo it is, that the various propenfities that difpofe us to actions of the first class, are diftinguished by the name of primary virtues; leaving the name of Secondary virtues to thofe propenfities which difpofe us to actions of the other clafs *.

The deduction above given makes it evident, that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of fociety, and of wrong actions, to obftruct that good. Univerfal benevolence is indeed not required of man; because to put it in practice, is beyond his utmost abilities. But for promoting the general good, every thing

is

*Virtue fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives the afcendant to moral principles. Vice fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives little or no afcendant to moral principles.

is required of him that he can accomplish; which will appear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibition of harming others is an eafy task; and upon that account is made univerfal. Our active duties are very different: man is circumfcribed both in capacity and power: he cannot do good but in a flow fucceffion; and therefore it is wifely ordered, that his obligation to do good fhould be confined to his relations, his friends, his benefactors. Even diftrefs makes not benevolence a general duty all a man can readily do, is to relieve those at hand; and accordingly we hear of diftant misfortunes with little or no concern.

But let not the moral fyftem be misapprehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to profecute what upon the whole we reckon the most beneficial to fociety, balancing ill with good, The moral sense permits not a violation of any person's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby accrue to another, A man for example in low circumftances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich mifer, faves himself and a hopeful family from ruin. In that cafe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance: but the moral fense permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjuft act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moralifts agree, That we

-3.

muft

muft not do ill to bring about good; the final cause of which fhall be given below *.

SECT. IV.

Principles of Duty and of Benevolence.

AVING thus fhortly delineated the moral

HA

laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great importance, which is, to inquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to thefe laws. The moral fenfe is an un-` erring guide; but the most expert guide will not profit those who are not disposed to be led. This confideration makes it evident, that to complete the moral fyftem, man ought to be endued with fome principle or propenfity, fome impulfive power, to enforce obedience to the laws dictated by the moral fenfe.

The author of our nature leaves none of his works imperfect. In order to render us obfequious to the moral fenfe as our guide, he hath implanted in our nature the principles of duty, of benevolence, of rewards and punishments, and of reparation. It may poffibly be thought, that rewards and punishments, of which afterward, are fufficient of themselves to enforce the laws of nature, without neceffity of any other principle. Human

*Sect. 7.

Human laws, it is true, are enforced by these means; because no higher fanction is under command of a terrestrial legiflator. But the celestial legiflator, with power that knows no control, and benevolence that knows no bounds, hath enforced his laws by means no lefs remarkable for mildness than for efficacy: he employs no external compulfion; but, in order to engage our will on the right fide, hath in the breaft of individuals eftablished the principles of duty and of benevolence, which efficacioufly excite them to obey the dic tates of the moral sense.

The restraining and active duties being both of them effential to fociety, our Maker has wifely ordered, that the principle which enforces thefe duties, fhould be the most cogent of all that belong to our nature. Other principles may folicit, allure, or terrify; but the principle of duty affumes authority, commands, and infifts to be obeyed, without giving ear to any oppofing motive.

As one great purpose of fociety, is to furnish op. portunities of mutual aid and fupport; nature feconding that purpose, hath provided the principle of benevolence, which excites us to be kindly, be neficent, and generous. Nor ought it to escape obfervation, that the author of nature, attentive to our wants and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It excites us to be kind, not only to thofe we are connected with, but to our neighbours, and even to

thofe

4

Providence

those we are barely acquainted with. is peculiarly attentive to objects in diftrefs, who require immediate aid and relief. To the principle of benevolence, it hath fuperadded the paffion of pity, which in every feeling heart is irrefiftible. To make benevolence more extenfive, would be fruitlefs; because here are objects in plenty to fill the most capacious mind. It would not be fruitlefs only, but hurtful to fociety: I fay hurtful; because frequent difappointments in attempting to gratify our benevolence, would render it a troublesome gueft, and make us cling rather to selfishness, which we can always gratify. At the fame time, though there is not room for a more extenfive lift of particular objects, yet the faculty we have of uniting numberlefs individuals into one complex object, enlarges greatly the fphere of benevolence. By that faculty, our country, our government, our religion, become objects of public fpirit, and of a lively affection. The individuals that compofe

the

group, confidered apart, may be too minute, or too diftant, for our benevolence: but when united into one whole, accumulation makes them great, greatness makes them confpicuous; and affection, preserved entire and undivided, is beftowed upon an abstract object, as upon one that is fingle and vifible; but with energy proportioned to its greater dignity and importance. Thus the principle of benevolence is not too fparingly fcattered among men. It is indeed made fubordinate to felf-intereft,