1

But this doctrine fuffers an exception with refpect to one who, having undertaken a trust, is bound in duty to act. A judge is in that state: it is his duty to pronounce fentence in every cafe that comes before him; and if he judge according to his knowledge, he is not liable for confequences. A judge cannot be fubjected to reparation, unless the judgment he gave was intentionally wrong. An officer of the revenue is in the fame predicament. Led by a doubtful clause in a statute, he makes a feizure of goods as forfeited to the crown, which afterward, in the proper court, are found not to be feizable: he ought not to be fubjected to reparation, if he have acted to the best of his judgment. This rule however must be taken with a limitation: a public officer who is grofsly ignorant, will not be excufed; for he ought to know better.

Reparation is due, though the immediate act be involuntary, provided it be connected with a preceding voluntary act. Example: "If A ride an "unruly horfe in Lincolns-Inn Fields, to tame him, "and the horse breaking from A, run over B and grievously hurt him; B fhall have an action "against A for though the mischief was done

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against the will of A, yet fince it was his fault "to bring a wild horfe into a frequented place "where mischief might enfue, he must answer for "the confequences." Gaius feems to carry this rule ftill farther, holding in general, that if a horse,

by

by the weakness or unskilfulness of the rider, break away and do mifchief, the rider is liable *. But Gaius probably had in his eye a frequented place,, where the mifchief might have been foreseen. Thus in general, a man is made liable for the mifchief occafioned by his voluntary deed, though the immediate act that occafioned the mifchief be involuntary.

SECT. VII.

Final Caufes of the foregoing Laws of Nature.

EVERAL final caufes have been already men

tioned, which could not conveniently be referved for the present section, being neceffary for explaining the fubjects to which they relate; the final caufe for inftance of erecting a standard of morals upon the common fenfe of mankind. I proceed now to what have not been mentioned, or but flightly mentioned.

The final cause that prefents itself first to view, refpects man confidered as an accountable being. The fenfe of being accountable, is one of our most vigilant guards against the filent attacks of vice. When a temptation moves me it immediately oc curs, What will the world fay? I imagine my friends expoftulating, my enemies reviling-it would

L 21

*L. 8. § 1. ad leg. Aquil.

would be in vain to diffemble my spirits finkthe temptation vanishes. 2dly, Praife and blame, especially from thofe we regard, are strong incentives to virtue: but if we were not accountable for our conduct, praife and blame would feldom be well directed; for how fhall a man's intentions be known, without calling him to account? And praise or blame, frequently ill-directed, would lofe their influence. 3dly, This branch of our nature, is the corner-ftone of the criminal law. Did not a man think himself accountable to all the world, and to his judge in a peculiar manner, it would be ' natural for him to think, that the juftest sentence pronounced against him, is oppreffion, not justice. 4thly, It promotes fociety. If we were not accountable beings, thofe connected by blood, or by country, would be no less shy and referved, than if they were utter ftrangers to each other.

The final caufe that next occurs, being fimple and obvious, is mentioned only that it may not seem to have been overlooked. All right actions are agreeable, all wrong actions, difagreeable. This is a wife appointment of Providence. We meet with fo many temptations againft duty, that it is not always eafy to perfevere in the right path ; would we perfevere, were duty difagreeable? And were acts of pure benevolence difagreeable, they would be rare, however worthy of praise.

Another final caufe refpects duty, in contradiftinction to pure benevolence. All the moral laws

are

are founded on intuitive perception; and are fo fimple and plain, as to be perfectly apprehended by the moft ignorant. Were they in any degree complex or obfcure, they would be perverted by felfishness and prejudice. No conviction inferior to what is afforded by intuitive perception, could produce in mankind a common fenfe in moral duties. Reafon would afford no general conviction; because that faculty is diftributed in portions fo unequal, as to bar all hopes from it of uniformity either in practice or in opinion. We are taught befide, by woful experience, that reafon, even the moft convincing, has no commanding influence over the greater part of men. Reafon, it is true, aided by experience, fupports morality; by convincing us, that we cannot be happy if we abandon duty for any other intereft. But conviction feldom weighs much against imperious paffion; to control which the vigorous and commanding principle of duty is requifite, directed by the fhining light of intuition.

A propofition laid down above, appears a fort of mytery in the moral fyftem, That though evidently all moral duties are contrived for promoting the general good, yet that a choice is not permitted among different goods, or between good and ill; but that we are strictly tied down to perform or forbear certain particular acts, without regard to confequences; or, in other words, that we muft not do wrong, whatever good it may produce. The

final cause I am about to unfold, will clear this mystery, and fet the beauty of the moral fyftem in a confpicuous light. I begin with observing, that as the general good of mankind, or even of the fociety we live in, refults from many and various circumstances intricately combined; it is far above the capacity of man, to judge in every inftance what particular action will tend the most to that end. The authorifing, therefore, a man to trace out his duty, by weighing endless circumstances, good and ill, would open a wide door to partiality and paffion, and often lead him unwittingly to prefer the preponderating ill, under a falfe appearance of being the greater good. At that rate, the opinions of men about right and wrong, would be as various as their faces; which, as observed above, would totally unhinge fociety. It is better ordered by Providence even for the general good, that, avoiding complex and obfcure objects, we are directed by the moral fenfe to perform certain plain and fimple acts, which admit no ambiguity,

In the next place, To permit ill in order to produce greater good, may fuit a being of universal benevolence; but is repugnant to the nature of man, composed of selfish and benevolent principles. We have seen above, that the true moral balance depends on a fubordination of felf-love to duty, and of difcretionary benevolence to felflove; and accordingly every man is fenfible of in

juftice,