philofophy, have been substituted in place of the ten categories, are more perfect.

Locke has reduced all things to three categories; to wit, fubftances, modes, and relations. In this divifion, time, space, and number, three great objects of human thought, are omitted.

The author of the Treatife of Human Nature has reduced all things to two categories; to wit, ideas and impreffions: a divifion which is very well adapted to his fyftem; and which puts me in mind of another made by an excellent mathemati→ cian in a printed thefis I have feen. In it the author, after a fevere cenfure of the ten categories of the Peripatetics, maintains, that there neither are nor can be more than two categories of things; to wit, data and quæfita.

There are two ends that may be propofed by fuch divifions. The firft is, to methodize or digest in order what a man actually knows. This is neither unimportant nor impracticable; and in proportion to the folidity and accuracy of a man's judgment, his divifions of the things he knows, will be elegant and ufeful. The fame subject may admit, and even require, various divifions, according to the different points of view from which we contemplate it: nor does it follow, that because one divifion is good, therefore another is naught. To be acquainted with the divifions of the logicians and metaphyficians, without a fuperftitious attachment to them, may be of ufe in dividing the fame fubjects,

B 4

fubjects, or even thofe of a different nature. Thus, Quinctilian borrows from the ten categories his divifion of the topics of rhetorical argumentation. Of all methods of arrangement, the most antiphilofophical feems to be the invention of this age; I mean, the arranging the arts and fciences by the letters of the alphabet, in dictionaries and encyclopedies. With these authors the categories are, A, B, C, &c.

Another end commonly proposed by fuch divifions, but very rarely attained, is to exhauft the fubject divided; fo that nothing that belongs to it fhall be omitted. It is one of the general rules of divifion in all fyftems of logic, That the divifion fhould be adequate to the subject divided: a good rule, without doubt; but very often beyond the reach of human power. To make a perfect divifion, a man must have a perfect comprehenfion of the whole subject at one view. When our knowledge of the fubject is imperfect, any divifion we can make, must be like the firft sketch of a painter, to be extended, contracted, or mended, as the fubject fhall be found to require. Yet nothing is more common, not only among the ancient, but even among modern philofophers, than to draw, from their incomplete divifions, conclufions which fuppose them to be perfect.

A divifion is a repofitory which the philofopher frames for holding his ware in convenient order. The philofopher maintains, that fuch or such a

thing is not good ware, because there is no place in his ware-room that fits it. We are apt to yield to this argument in philofophy, but it would appear ridiculous in any other traffic.

Peter Ramus, who had the spirit of a reformer in philofophy, and who had force of genius fufficient to shake the Ariftotelian fabric in many parts, but infufficient to erect any thing more folid in its place, tried to remedy the imperfection of philofophical divifions, by introducing a new manner of dividing. His divifions always confifted of two members; one of which was contradictory of the other; as if one should divide England into Middlesex and what is not Middlesex. It is evident that these two members comprehend all England: for the logicians obferve, that a term along with its contradictory, comprehend all things. In the fame manner, we may divide what is not Middlefex into Kent and what is not Kent. Thus one may go on by divifions and fubdivifions that are abfolutely complete. This example may serve to give an idea of the fpirit of Ramean divifions, which were in no fmall reputation about two hundred years ago.

Ariftotle was not ignorant of this kind of divifion. But he used it only as a touchstone to prove by induction the perfection of some other divifion, which indeed is the beft ufe that can be made of it. When applied to the common purpose of divifion, it is both inelegant, and burdenfome to the

memory;

memory; and, after it has put one out of breath by endless fubdivifions, there is ftill a negative term left behind, which fhews that you are no nearer the end of your journey than when you began.

Until fome more effectual remedy be found for the imperfection of divifions, I beg leave to propose one more fimple than that of Ramus. It is this: When you meet with a divifion of any fubject imperfectly comprehended, add to the laft member an et cætera. That this et cætera makes the divifion complete, is undeniable; and therefore it ought to hold its place as a member, and to be always understood, whether expreffed or not, until clear and pofitive proof be brought that the divifion is complete without it. And this fame et catera is to be the repository of all members that fhall in any future time fhew a good and valid right to a place in the subject.

SECT. 3. On Diftinctions.

Having faid fo much of logical divifions, we fhall next make fome remarks upon diftinctions. Since the philofophy of Ariftotle fell into dif repute, it has been a common topic of wit and raillery, to inveigh against metaphyfical diftinctions. Indeed the abuse of them in the fcholaftic ages, feems to justify a general prejudice against them: and fhallow thinkers and writers have good reason to be jealous of diftinctions, because they make

fad

fad work when applied to their flimfy compofitions. But every man of true judgment, while he condemns diftinctions that have no foundation in the nature of things, muft perceive, that indifcriminately to decry diftinctions, is to renounce all pretenfions to juft reasoning: for as falfe reafoning commonly proceeds from confounding things that are different; fo without diftinguishing fuch things, it is impoffible to avoid error, or detect fophiftry. The authority of Aquinas, or Suarez, or even of Aristotle, can neither ftamp a real value upon distinctions of bafe metal, nor hinder the currency of those of true metal.

Some diftinctions are verbal, others are real. The first kind diftinguish the various meanings of a word; whether proper, or metaphorical. Diftinctions of this kind make a part of the grammar of a language, and are often abfurd when tranflated into another language. Real diftinctions are equally good in all languages, and fuffer no hurt by tranflation. They diftinguish the different fpecies contained under fome general notion, or the different parts contained in one whole.

Many of Ariftotle's diftinctions are verbal merely; and therefore, more proper materials for a dictionary of the Greek language, than for a philofophical treatise. At leaft, they ought never to have been tranflated into other languages, when the idiom of the language will not justify them: for this is to adulterate the language, to introduce fo