DEAR SIR, 25 LETTER II. 1824. THE first argument insisted upon by those who abandon the Scripture, and would prove the existence of a deity by the power of reason alone, is an analogical argument drawn from experience, that man, as a piece of mechanism, must have had a maker. We know that in the production of artificial objects a cause is necessary. We also know that the reproduction of man is from natural causes. But it is further argued, that because a particular sort of machines must have had an inventor and a beginning to be made, so, as a machine, man must have had an inventor and a beginning. It is answered that the terms of agreement, necessary to form an analogy, are wanting in this case. There is not a sameness of nature, which the schoolmen hold to be essential to this kind of reasoning. We cannot reason from objects of art and labour to objects which are naturally produced. former are the mere temporary instruments of some known moving power; the latter are selfmoved: the former never can possess the power of reproduction; the latter does possess that power within itself. We therefore argue may The more speciously, that the power of reproduction has always been exercised in the formation of man; for from the immutability of the laws of nature, unless we have some assurance of there having been a first cause, we may look upon the laws of nature themselves as uncaused. If, therefore, we abandon the revelation of God, which says that "in Him we live, and move, and have our being," it is more rational, because it is more simple, to believe, that man is from everlasting, than to ascribe his being to another self-existing power. It is sounder reasoning to argue, that the earth is self-poised in the air, than that it rests upon the back of the elephant. If it be asserted that the power of reproduction is an effect, and must have had a cause; same objection may be brought with equal plausibility against whatever object is endued with the first action of that cause. If, therefore, we are called upon to grant that there must be an independent power, we may claim that power for nature, as it cannot be shown why nature is not her own creator. Should men in the choice of dilemmas choose a deity, what authority is to restrain them from polytheism ? the In looking at this subject through the light of revelation, it is asked if that can be a correct exercise of the powers of the mind which would lead to an erroneous conclusion? This apparent error lies not in the reasoning, but in the attempt to make the faculty of reason reach farther than its powers can extend; it has not strength to soar so high; it cannot comprehend 66 an uncaused cause," and, therefore, the subject, by being above the understanding, becomes a proper object of faith, and is only to be known so far as it is revealed by the first uncaused Cause himself. Another, and a more pleasing analogy has been advanced, and most ably insisted on by Butler and Paley: an able writer also of the present day, in a celebrated periodical work, forcibly uses the same; which is, to prove the existence of the Deity from the design and order of creation. As far as this argument extends to the physical laws of creation, it has no force beyond what may be drawn from any curious, or brilliant experiment in natural philosophy: it proves no more than that matter is subject to certain mechanical laws, and still leaves open the question of, who imposed those laws upon it? But this argument forms the ground of a most plausible assertion, viz. that there is a moral design in creation, for the happiness of mankind, by naturally rewarding virtue and punishing vice. And the structure erected upon this foundation is so pleasing, that it would be painful to think that it is built on the sand, did not the truth reveal to us a still more pleasing prospect. Is virtue always rewarded in |
