rious Propositions: an objection which is not to be removed by any such attempt as that of Dr. Watts to lay down "rules for forming clear ideas, and or guiding the judgment," but by replying that no art is to be censured for not teaching more than falls within its province, and indeed more than can be taught by any conceivable art. Such a system of universal knowledge as should instruct us in the full meaning or meanings of every term, and the truth or falsity, certainty or uncertainty, of every proposition, thus superseding all other studies, it is most unphilosophical to expect or imagine. And to find fault with Logic for not performing this, is as if one should object to the science of Optics for not giving sight to the blind; or as if, like the man of whom Warburton tells a story in his Div. Leg. one should complain of a reading-glass, for being of no service to a person who had never learned to read.

"In fact the difficulties and errors alluded to are not in the process of Reasoning itself which alone is the appropriate province of Logic, but in the subject-matter about which it is employed. This process will have been correctly conducted, if it has conformed to the logical rules, which preclude the possibility of any error creeping in between the principles from which we are arguing, and the conclusions we deduce from them. But still that conclusion may be false, if the principles we start from are so. In like manner, no arithmetical skill will secure a correct result to a calculation unless the data are correct from which we calculate: nor does any one on that account undervalue arithmetic; and yet the objection against Logic rests on no better foundation.

"There is in fact a striking analogy in this respect between the two sciences. All numbers, which are the subject of arithmetic, must be numbers of some things, whether coins, persons, measures, or any thing else; but to introduce into the science any notice of the things respecting which calculations are made, would be evidently irrelevant, and would destroy its scientific character: we proceed, therefore, with arbitrary signs respecting numbers in the abstract. So also does Logic pronounce on the validity of a regularly constructed argument, equally well, though arbitrary symbols may have been substituted for the terms; and consequently, without any regard to the things signified by those terms. And the possibility of doing this, though the employment of such arbitrary symbols has been absurdly objected to, even by writers who understood not only arithmetic but also Algebra, is a proof of the strictly scientific character of the system. But many professed logical writers, not attending to the circumstances which have been just mentioned, have wandered into disquisitions on various branches of knowledge; disquisitions which must evidently be as boundless as human knowledge itself, since there is no subject in which Reasoning is not employed, and to which, consequently, Logic may not be applied. The error lies in regarding every thing as the proper province of Logic, to which it is applicable. A si

milar error is complained of by Aristotle, as having taken place with respect to Rhetoric; of which, indeed, we find specimens in the arguments of several of the interlocutors in Cic de Oratore."

It would appear from the numerous treatises on Logic to which we have adverted, that the majority of them have been written for the adult reader exclusively, or for the advanced student at the University or College; without the consideration on the part of the author, how much might be done, consistently with every other design, through the medium of method, arrangement, and all the advantages derivable from typographic distinction, further to facilitate and render more general, the acquisition of a science whose importance is co-extensive with every interest existing in society. In numerous schools and respectable seminaries, it is no uncommon thing to find boys of fourteen or fifteen years of age, that. have creditably passed through several of the first books of Euelid, and the more difficult parts of algebra; and in a very reputable academy* in this city, several young ladies of a similar age, have with much benefit to themselves and credit to their instructor, successfully studied Euclid, Algebra, Fergus's Nat. Philosophy, and Butler's Analogy. Now we would ask, what is there in Logic more difficult, than in any of the sciences and works just mentioned? If there be any difficulty, it is not in the art itself certainly, but it may exist in the obscure and injudicious manner of exhibiting it. Every art has its definitions, axioms, rules, and a few technicalities peculiar to itself, but these once learned, and their use by a little practice become familiar, the difficulty is over, the rest is a pleasure, a and permanent advantage.

In addition to every other reason calculated to render a science less generally studied, is the want of proper method and judicious arrangement. In every treatise we find matter of principal, secondary and remote importance. A work with the whole of this blended indiscriminately, is at once forbidding, inconvenient in the business of tuition, and can never be used as a book of reference.. A reader to whom a work of this description is presented, though his design is only to learn the general scope and intention of the author, has only one alternative; that is to read the whole through, whether the whole, in his case, be necessary or not. Very possibly, on first opening the book, his object might be, particularly if his time be not very ample, to discover merely what are the leading. points, or what has the first claim to his attention; but if this be mixed up, without distinction, in the general mass, and he a learner, he is supposed neither to have the discrimination nor the leisure to make this selection for himself; and the consequence is, either that he closes the book in discouragement, or has the fortitude patiently to wade through matter of first, second and third rate importance, and after a dozen readings of this kind, the cloud. proba-

*

Special reference is made to the seminary of Rev..C..H. Alden.

bly remains, and his memory cannot be refreshed by easy and ready reference. The work, therefore, is finally abandoned, not because its subject had no intrinsic merit, but because its author never anticipated the peculiar exigencies of the learner, nor knew how to adapt the arrangement to the circumstances of those whose time is limited. Whoever became accurately acquainted with the French by toiling through the 540 octavo pages of Chambaud's Grammar, where Rule, Exception, Illustration, Example, Remark, Exercise and Note are crowded into one chaos? Or what mere learner has the power to separate so much ore from the more precious metal? The mere want of judicious method alone, has done more to disserve the cause of Education, to impede the teacher and discourage the learner, than is commonly imagined.

Since we cannot perceive any peculiar difficulty in the science or art of Logic itself, at least, certainly nothing greater than what is implied in learning the simple art of English Grammar, it remains only to remove whatever prejudices may have arisen from the misrepresentations of those who never understood the science themselves, or the obscurities of others, who, in accommodation to the learner or the man of business, never knew how to exhibit it. By the latter, a man of business, we are addressed. He says, "what is

Logic, its nature and object? To read that book, would not suit me: I have look'd at its pages in vain: I have not time: I want something to strike the eye at once. Show me the picture, the full length portrait: if there be a cloud, or dust, remove it: let me see not only it at one look, but its shape, features, color, &c.: and then, by a few glances, by looking at a picture, I read a whole book, an entire volume: my first intention is answered: and if I am satisfied I will return, and view the picture again, or many times, till the picture is no longer on canvass only, but painted on my eye, my memory, my understanding; and what I know, I can surely explain to others. But if you cannot treat me in this way; if you hand me that heavy prosing volume, where instead of a single line visible or distinct, or anything like the ready picture, all lines and all colors are put on with one brush, for such a painter's pi I have no time, business calls, and though I was 'almost persuaded' to become a logician, I shall be compelled to remain altogether," what I was, unacquainted with the nature and design of logic."

Logic is certainly an essential part of a liberal education, and desirable for all who wonld possess a well cultivated mind. And if, as is certainly the fact, there is less difficulty in it, than there is in arithmetic, and the impediments to a clear view, and ready attainment of it may be removed, as we have laboured to effect in this volume, we see no reason why it should not become, to the advantage and credit of this nation; a general study: no reason why, that all possessing any native talent, or those at least that are competent to attend to the study of arithmetic or grammar, should not learn it; nor any reason why it could not with advantage be intro

duced into the schools as well as into the colleges: that all, not only the Divine, the Barrister, the Senator, the Politician, the Lecturer, the Author, and the Teacher, who would eminently find their account therein, should not thorougly understand it; but also the merchant, the tradesman, and the mechanic, many of whom are men of considerable talent, and know not yet what social or civil duties they may have to fulfil; and in short, all who are aware that the mind is an endowment so much more valuable than the body, and that it is infinitely more worthy of the ornaments of every mental excellency and acquisition, than the latter can be of the finest and most costly apparel.

To promote this object, and furnish every facility that students of every class, and persons in every situation can require, the following arrangement will be found to prevail throughout the present volume. 1st. The definitions and rules and whatever, in the development of the science, calls for principal attention, will be distinguished on the page from the illustrations, notes and examples; and the former, for the convenience of those who wish to impress them on the memory, will be expressed with the utmost brevity, and numbered throughout for the purpose of reference. 2dly. The whole work will be divided into chapters, and each chapter will close with an interrogatory exercise on the subjects it explains, accompanied with apposite examples to evince that the pupil not only remembers but also understands the rule or definition he recites. This brings again under consideration and inquiry, and that in a different or inverse manner, every subject that was more directly treated by the chapter to which it refers. The very nature of a recapitulatory exercise is to require, at some convenient stage of the student's progress, a repetition of what he has already learned, in order to prove that he retains his past acquisitions. It is of the nature of those cross examinations, that prevail in our courts of judicature, by which the evidence that before appeared plausible or correct, often proves to be fallacious. A similar necessity obtains in the classical department: a boy must be in the habit of both reading and writing Latin before he can be proficient. In reading he attends chiefly to the sense of his author; but in writing, he becomes solicitous about the mood, tense, case and concord; and thus what the first method left undone, is effected by the second. 3dly. To furnish every accommodation that can be requisite, a small key to the problems or examples proposed for solution, will be given at the end of the volume. 4thly. A synopsis, or memorial view of all the principal points of the science, will be furnished for practical purposes, in its proper place. 5thly. And additional exercises will also be added at the end of the work, consisting either of examples not in syllogistic form, proposed for reduction into regular order; or of apparent syllogisms for the detection of the fallacies they contain. 6thly. And to the work will also be added, for the convenience of all engaged in teaching, examples of logical parsing with suitable parsing exercises.

Throughout the whole of this work, it has been the endeavor of the author to afford every facility for the purpose of either private or public instruction. In the latter, or for young persons, it will be proper, 1st. That the learner should every evening, commit to memory and study, two or more, according to his capacity, of the definitions, axioms or rules, contained in the treatise, and repeat them on the following morning. 2dly. And at the end of every section, that he should repeat the whole of that section, by learning it the second time, in order that it may be more completely infixed in his memory. 3dly. Before he proceeds to a higher class, it is recommended, that his proficiency should be examined and his recol lection confirmed, by the interrogatory exercise at the close of the chapter. 4thly. It is peculiar to this volume to be arranged for the purpose of enabling the tutor to convene together, once a week, all his pupils learning the art, in classes or otherwise, for the purpose of collective examination, and mutual argument or dispu tation, on subjects or syllogisms that might be selected for the purpose, at the discretion of the tutor.

It was the intention of the present writer to notice particularly the several authors to whom he is, in the production of this volume, more or less indebted. But in a work, the original intention of which was to unite as far as possible the various excellencies of every treatise of eminence, quotations would naturally abound. In such cases it is usually deemed sufficient to make the acknowledgment once for all. The frequent alterations made in the language, and the inconvenience of crowding the page with names, tend to justify the exclusion of perpetual reference. To concentrate every useful illustration and improvement is a duty indispensably incumbent on every author. We infer the propriety from its evident advantage, the sanction from universal custom, and the warrant from Seneca, who observes, we ought to imitate the bees, that wander up and down, and taste the flowers eligible for the production of honey. What they collect, with a certain mixture and peculiar property of their own, they change into its sweetness. These bees we ought to imitate, and to analyze whatever we from various reading treasure up. Then the care and energy of our own genius being added, to transfuse these various extracts into one flavor. So that even if it should appear, from whence it had been taken, it may, however, appear, something else than those from whence it was taken."*

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* " Apes debemus imitari, quæ vagantur, et flores ad mel faciendum idoneos carpunt: et quæ collegerunt, in hunc saporem mixturâ quâdam et proprietate spiritûs sui mutant, nosque has apes debemus imitari, et quæcunque ex diversâ letione congessimus, separare, Deinde adhibitâ ingenü nostri curâ et facultate, in unum saporem varia illa libamenta confundere ut, etiam si apparuerit unde sumptum sit, aliud tamen esse, quam unde sumptum est, appareat."-Seneca.