the moral fenfe is the only judge in this controverfy, not the faculty of reafon.. I fhould however not be afraid of a fentence against me, were reafon to be the judge. For would not reafon dictate, that the lefs a man, wavers about his duty, or, in other words, the lefs influence vitious motives have, the more praife-worthy he is; and the more blameable, the lefs influence virtuous motives have.

Nor are we led by common fenfe to dif fer from reafon or from the moral fenfe. A man commits murder, overcome by a fudden fit of revenge which he could not refift: do we not reflect, even at first view, that the man did not defire to refift; and that he would have committed the mur der, tho' he had not been under any neceffity? a person of plain understanding will fay, What fignifies it whether the criminal could refift or no, when he committed the murder wittingly and willingly? A man gives poifon privately out of revenge. Does any one doubt of his guilt, when he never once repented; tho' after adminiftering the poifon it no longer was in his power to draw back? A man may be guilty and blame-worthy, even where there

1

there is external compulfion that he cannot refift. With fword in hand I run to attack an enemy: my foot flipping, I fall headlong upon him, and by that accident the fword is push'd into his body. The external act was not the effect of Will, but of accident: but my intention was to commit murder, and I am guilty. All men acknowledge, that the Deity is neceffarily good. Does that circumstance detract from his praise in common apprehenfion? On the contrary, he merits from us the highest praife on that very

account.

A

It is commonly faid, that there can be no virtue where there is no ftruggle. Virtue, it is true, is best known from a ftruggle: a man who has never met with a temptation, can be little confident of his virtue. But the obfervation taken in a ftrict fenfe, is undoubtedly erroneous. man, tempted to betray his truft, wavers; but after much doubting refuses at last the bribe. Another hesitates not a moment, but rejects the bribe with disdain: duty is obftinate, and will not fuffer him even to deliberate. Is there no virtue in the lat

ter?

!

ter? Undoubtedly more than in the for

mer.

Upon the whole, it appears that praise and blame reft ultimately upon the difpofition or frame of mind *. Nor is it obvious, that a power to act against motives, could vary in any degree these moral fentiments. When a man commits a crime, let it be fuppofed that he could have refifted the prevailing motive. Why then did he not refist, instead of bringing upon himself shame and mifery? The anfwer muft be, for no other can be given, that his difpofition is vitious, and that he is a deteftable creature. Further, it is not a little difficult to conceive, how a man can refift a prevailing motive, without having any thing in his mind that fhould engage him to refift it. But letting that país, I make the following fuppofi

* Malice and refentment, tho' commonly joined together, have no refemblance but in producing mifchief. Malice is a propenfity of nature that operates deliberately without paffion: refentment is a paffion to which even good-natured people are fubject. A malicious character is efteemed much more vitious than one that is irafcible. Does not this fhew, that virtue and vice confift more in dif pofition than in action?

VOL. IV.

P

tion,

tion. A man is tempted by avarice to accept a bribe: if he refift upon the principle of duty, he is led by the prevailing motive: if he refift without having any reafon or motive for refifting, I cannot difcover any merit in fuch refiftance: it feems to refolve into a matter of chance or accident, whether he refift or do not refift. Where can the merit lie of refisting a vitious motive, when refistance happens by mere chance? and where the demerit of refifting a virtuous motive, when it is owing to the fame chance? If a man, actuated by no principle, good or bad, and having no end or purpose in view, fhould kill his neighbour, I fee not that he would be more accountable, than if he had acted in his fleep, or were mad.

Human punishments are perfectly confiftent with the neceffary influence of motives, without fuppofing a power to withftand them. If it be urged, That a man ought not to be punished for committing a crime when he could not refift: the anfwer is, That as he committed the crime intentionally and with his eyes open, he is guilty in his own opinion, and in the opinion of all men. Here is a juft foun

dation for punishment. And its utility is great; being intended to deter people from committing crimes. The dread of punishment is a weight in the scale on the fide of virtue, to counterbalance vitious. motives.

The final caufe of this branch of our nature is admirable. If the necessary influence of motives had the effect either to leffen the merit of a virtuous action, or the demerit of a crime, morality would be totally unhinged. The most virtuous action would of all be the least worthy of praise; and the most vitious be of all the leaft worthy of blame. Nor would the evil stop there: instead of curbing inordinate pasfions, we should be encouraged to indulge them, as an excellent excufe for doing wrong. Thus, the moral fentiments of approbation and difapprobation, of praise and blame, are found perfectly confiftent with the laws above mentioned that govern human actions, without neceffity of recurring to an imaginary power of acting against motives.

The only plaufible objection I have met with against the foregoing theory, is the remorfe a man feels for a crime he fud