animate beings; and that thefe laws, produce a regular chain of caufes and effects in the moral as well as the material world, admitting no events but what are comprehended in the original plan (a). Hence it clearly follows, that chance is excluded out of this world, that nothing can happen by accident, and that no event is arbitrary or contingent. This is the doctrine of the effay quoted; and, in my apprehenfion, well founded. But I cannot fubfcribe to what follows, "That we have

an impreffion of chance and contingency, which confequently must be de"lufive." I would not willingly admit any delufion in the nature of man, unless it were made evident beyond contradiction; and I now fee clearly, that the impreffion we have of chance and contingency, is not delufive, but perfectly confiftent with the established plan.

The explanation of chance and contingency in the faid effay, fhall be given in the author's own words, as a proper text to reafon upon. "In our ordinary train "of thinking, it is certain that all events

(a) See Effays on Morality and Natural Religion, part 1. effay 3. VOL. IV.

appear

appear not to us as neceffary. A mul"titude of events feem to be under our

power to cause or to prevent; and we readily make a distinction betwixt events that are neceffary, i. e. that must "be; and events that are contingent, i. e. "that may be, or may not be. This dif "tinction is void of truth: for all things "that fall out either in the material or "moral world, are, as we have feen, a"like neceffary, and alike the result of "fixed laws. Yet, whatever conviction a

philofopher may have of this, the dif"tinction betwixt things neceffary and "things contingent, poffeffes his ordinary train of thought, as much as it poffeffes the most illiterate. We act universally 66 upon that distinction: nay it is in truth "the caufe of all the labour, care, and in66 duftry, of mankind. I illuftrate this "doctrine by an example. Conftant ex"perience hath taught us, that death is "" a neceffary event. The human frame "is not made to laft for ever in its pre"fent condition; and no man thinks of

more than a temporary existence upon "this globe. But the particular time of our death appears a contingent event.

፡፡

"However

"However certain it be, that the time "and manner of the death of each indi"vidual is determined by a train of pre"ceding causes, and is no lefs fixed than "the hour of the fun's rifing or fetting; yet no perfon is affected by this doctrine. In the care of prolonging life, ,66 we are directed by the fuppofed contingency of the time of death, which, to a certain term of years, we confider as "depending in a great measure on our"felves, by caution against accidents, due "ufe of food, exercise, &c. These means are profecuted with the fame diligence

as if there were in fact no neceffary "train of caufes to fix the period of life. "In fhort, whoever attends to his own "practical ideas, whoever reflects upon "the meaning of the following words "which occur in all languages, of things poffible, contingent, that are in our power

66

to caufe or prevent; whoever, I fay, re"flects upon thefe words, will clearly fee,

that they suggest certain perceptions or "notions repugnant to the doctrine above "established of univerfal neceffity."

In order to fhow that there is no repugnance, I begin with defining chance and Q 3 contingency.

contingency. The former is applied to events that have happened; the latter to future events. When we fay a thing has happened by chance, we furely do not mean that chance was the caufe; for no perfon ever imagined that chance is a thing that can act, and by acting produce events: we only mean, that we are ignorant of the cause, and that, for ought we fee, it might have happened or not happened, or have happened differently. Aiming at a bird, I fhoot by chance a favourite fpaniel: the meaning is not, that chance killed the dog, but that as to me the dog's death was accidental. With respect to contingency, future events that are variable and the cause unknown, are said to be contingent; changes of the weather, for example, whether it will be froft or thaw tomorrow, whether fair or foul. In a word, chance and contingency applied to events, mean not that fuch events happen without any cause, but only that we are ignorant of the cause.

It appears to me, that there is no fuch thing in human nature as a fenfe that any thing happens without a caufe: fuch a fenfe would be grofsly delusive. It is

indeed true, that our fenfe of a caufe is not always equally diftinct: with respect to an event that happens regularly, fuch as fummer, winter, rifing or fetting of the fun, we have a diftinct fenfe of a cause our fenfe is lefs diftinct with refpect to events lefs regular, fuch as alterations of the weather; and extremely indistinct with refpect to events that feldom happen, and that happen without any known cause. But with refpect to

no event whatever does our fenfe of a cause vanish altogether, and give place to a sense of things happening without a caufe.

Chance and contingency thus explained, fuggeft not any perception or notion repugnant to the doctrine of universal neceffity; for my ignorance of a caufe, does not, even in my own apprehenfion, exclude a cause. Defcending to particulars, I take the example mentioned in the text, namely, the uncertainty of the time of my death. Knowing that my life depends in some measure on myself, I use all means to preserve it, by proper food, exercise, and care to prevent accidents. Nor is there any delufion here. I am moved to

ufe