ftory of their various opinions, would fignify little but to darken the subject: the reader will have more fatisfaction in feeing these qualities explained, without entering at all into controversy.

No perfon is ignorant of primary and fecondary qualities, a distinction much infifted on by philofophers. Primary qualities, fuch as figure, cohesion, weight, are permanent qualities, that exist in a Sefubject whether perceived or not. condary qualities, fuch as colour, tafte, fmell, depend on the percipient as much as on the subject, being nothing when not perceived. Beauty and uglinefs are qualities of the latter fort: they have no existence but when perceived; and, like all other secondary qualities, they are perceived intuitively; having no dependence on reason nor on judgement, more than colour has, or smell, or taste (a).

The qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are fecondary, like beauty and ugliness and the other secondary qualities mentioned. Like them, they are objects of intuitive perception, and depend not in any degree on reafon. No argu

(a) Elements of Criticifm, vol. 1. p. 207. edit. 5.

ment is requifite to prove, that to rescue an innocent babe from the jaws of a wolf, to feed the hungry, to clothe the naked, are right actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. As little is an argument requifite to prove, that murder, deceit, perjury, are wrong actions: they are perceived to be fo intuitively. The Deity has bestow'd on man, different faculties for different purposes. Truth and falfehood are investigated by the reafoning faculty. Beauty and ugliness are objects of a fenfe, known by the name of taste. Right and wrong are objects of a fenfe termed the moral fenfe or confcience. And fuppofing thefe qualities to be hid from our perception, in vain would we try to discover them by any argument or process of reafoning: the attempt would be abfurd; no lefs fo than an attempt to discover by reafoning colour, or tafte, or fmell *.

Right

Every perception myft proceed from fome faculty or power of perception, termed fenfe. The moral fenfe, by which we perceive the qualities of right and wrong, may be confidered either as a branch of the fenfe of feeing, by which we perceive the actions to which thefe qualities belong, or as a

fenfe

Right and wrong, as mentioned above, are qualities of voluntary actions, and of no other kind. An inftinctive action may be agreeable, may be difagreeable; but it cannot properly be denominated either right or wrong. An involuntary act is hurtful to the agent, and disagreeable to the fpectator; but it is neither right nor wrong. Thefe qualities alfo depend in no degree on the event. Thus, if to fave my friend from drowning I plunge into a river, the action is right, tho' I happen to come too late. And if I aim a stroke at a man behind his back, the action is wrong, tho' I happen not to touch him.

-The qualities of right and of agreeable, are infeparable; and fo are the qualities of wrong and of difagreeable. A right action is agreeable, not only in the direct perception, but equally fo in every fubfe

fenfe diftinct from all others. The fenfes by which objects are perceived, are not separated from each other by diftinct boundaries: the forting or claffing them, feems to depend more on tafte and fancy, than on nature. I have followed the plan laid down by former writers; which is, to confider the moral fenfe as a fenfe diftinct from others, because it is the cafieft and cleareft manner of conceiving it.

quent

quent recollection. And in both circumftances equally, a wrong action is difagreeable.

Right actions are distinguished by the moral sense into two kinds, what ought to be done, and what may be done, or left undone. Wrong actions admit not that distinction: they are all prohibited to be done. To fay that an action ought to be doné, means that we are tied or obliged to perform; and to fay that an action ought not to be done, means that we are reftrained from doing it. Tho' the neceffity implied in the being tied or obliged, is not phyfical, but only what is commonly termed moral; yet we conceive ourfelves deprived of liberty or freedom, and neceffarily bound to act or to forbear acting, in oppofition to every other motive. The neceffity here described is termed duty. The moral neceffity we are under to forbear harming the innocent, is a proper example: the moral fenfe declares the restraint to be our duty, which no motive whatever will excufe us for tranfgreffing.

The duty of performing or forbearing any action, implies a right in fome perfon to exact performance of that duty; and accordingly,

accordingly, a duty or obligation neceffarily infers a correfponding right. My promise to pay L. 100 to John, confers a right on him to demand performance. The man who commits an injury, violates the right of the perfon injured; which entitles that person to demand reparation of the wrong.

Duty is twofold; duty to others, and duty to ourselves. With respect to the former, the doing what we ought to do, is termed just the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed unjuft. With respect to ourselves, the doing what we ought to do, is termed proper: the doing what we ought not to do, and the omitting what we ought to do, are termed improper. Thus, right, fignifying a quality of certain actions, is a genus; of which juft and proper are fpecies: wrong, fignifying a quality of other actions, is a genus; of which unjust and improper are species.

Right actions left to our free will, to be done or left undone, come next in order. They are, like the former, right when done; but they differ, in not being wrong when left undone. To remit a just debt

for