existence of a Deity: They acknowledge a felf-existent Being; and feem willing to bestow on that Being power, wisdom, and every other perfection. But then they maintain, that the world, or matter at least, must also be self-exiftent. Their argument is, that ex nihilo nihil fit, that it is inconfiftent for any thing to be made out of nothing, out of a nonens. To confider nothing or a nonens as a material or fubftance out of which things can be formed, like a ftatue out of stone or a fword out of iron, is I acknowledge a grofs abfurdity. But I perceive no abfurdity nor inconfistence in fuppofing that matter was brought into existence by Almighty power; and the popular expreffion, that God made the world out of nothing, has no other meaning. It is true, that in the operations of men nothing can be produced but from antecedent materials; and fo accustomed are we to fuch operations, as not readily to conceive how a thing can be brought into existence without antecedent materials, or made out of nothing, as commonly expreffed. But will any man in fober sense venture to fet bounds to Almighty power, where he cannot point out a clear inconD d 2 fiftence?

fiftence? It is indeed difficult to conceive a thing fo remote from common apprehenfion; but is there lefs difficulty in conceiving matter to exift without a caufe, and to be intitled to the awful appellation of felf-existent, like the Lord of the Universe, to whom a more exalted appellation cannot be given? Now, if it be within the utmost verge of poffibility for matter to have been created, I conclude with the highest probability, that it owes its exiftence to Almighty power. The neceffity of one felfexiftent being is intuitively certain; but I perceive no neceffity, nor indeed probability, that there fhould be more than one. Difficulties about the creation of matter, teftify our ignorance; but to argue from our ignorance that a thing cannot be, has always been held very weak reasoning. Our faculties are adapted to our present ftate, and perform their office in perfection. But to complain that they do not reach the origin of things, is no lefs abfurd than to complain that we cannot afcend to the moon in order to be acquainted with its inhabitants. At the fame time, it is a comfortable reflection, that the queftion, whether matter was created or no,

iš

may

a pure fpeculation, and that either fide be adopted without impiety. To me it appears more fimple and more natural to hold it to be a work of creation, than to be felf-existent, and confequently independent of the Almighty either to create or to annihilate. I chearfully make the former an article of my Creed; but without anathemifing those who adopt the latter. I would however have it understood, that I limit my conceffion to matter in its original rude ftate. I cannot poffibly carry my complaisance fo far as to comprehend the world in its present perfection. That immense machine compofed of parts without number fo artfully combined as to fulfil the intention of the maker, must be the production of a great being, omniscient as well as omnipotent. To affign blind fatality as the caufe, is an infufferable abfurdity.

Many grofs and abfurd conceptions of Deity that have prevailed among rude nations, are urged by fome writers as an objection against a sense of Deity. That objection fhall not be overlooked; but it will be answered to better purpose, after these gross and abfurd conceptions are ex

amined in the chapter immediately fol lowing.

The proof of a Deity from the innate fenfe here explained, differs materially from what is contained in effays on morality and natural religion (a). The proof there given is founded on a chain of reafoning, altogether independent on the innate fenfe of Deity. Both equally produce conviction; but as fense operates intuitively without reasoning, the sense of Deity is made a branch of human nature, in order to enlighten those who are incapable of a long chain of reasoning; and to fuch, who make the bulk of mankind, it is more convincing, than the most perspicuous reasoning to a philofopher.

(a) Part 2. fect. 7.

CHAP.

СНА Р. II.

Progress of Opinions with respect to Deity.

THE fenfe of Deity, like many other delicate fenfes, is in favages so faint and obfcure as easily to be biassed from truth. Among them, the belief of many fuperior beings, is univerfal. And two caufes join to produce that belief. The first is, that being accustomed to a plurality of vifible objects, men, mountains, trees, cattle, and fuch like, they are naturally led to imagine a like plurality in things not visible; and from that flight bias, flight indeed but natural, is partly derived the fyftem of Polytheifm, univerfal among favages. The other is, that favages know little of the connection between cauíes and effects, and ftill lefs of the order and government of the world: every event that is not familiar, appears to them fingular and extraordinary; and if fuch event exceed human power, it is

without