This uniformity of fentiment, which may be termed the common fenfe of mankind with refpect to right and wrong, is effential to focial beings. Did the moral fentiments of men differ as much as their faces, they would be unfit for fociety: difcord and controverfy would be endlefs, and major vis would be the only rule of right and wrong. But fuch uniformity of fentiment, tho' general, is not altogether univerfal: men there are, as above mentioned, who differ from the common fenfe of mankind with respect to various points of morality. What ought to be the conduct of fuch men? ought they to regulate their conduct by that standard, or by their private conviction? There will be occafion afterward to observe, that we judge of others as we believe they judge of themselves; and that private conviction is the ftandard for rewards and punishments (a). But with respect to every controverfy about property and pecuniary intereft, and, in general, about every civil right and obligation, the common sense of mankind is to every individual the standard, and not private con(a) Sect. 5. viction viction or confcience; for proof of which take what follows. We have an innate fenfe of a common nature, not only in our own fpecies, but in every species of animals. And that our perception holds true in fact, is verified by experience; for there appears a remarkable uniformity in creatures of the fame kind, and a difformity, no lefs remarkable, in creatures of different kinds. It is accordingly a fubject of wonder, to find an individual deviating from the common nature of the fpecies, whether in its internal or external ftructure: a child born with averfion to its mother's milk, is a wonder, no less than if born without a mouth, or with more than one. Secondly, This fenfe dictates, that the common nature of man in particular, is invariable as well as univerfal; that it will be the fame hereafter as it is at prefent, and as it was in time paft; the fame among all nations, and in all corners of the earth: nor are we deceived; becaufe, allowing for flight differences occafioned by culture and other accidental circumftances, the fact correfponds to our perception. Thirdly, We perceive that this common nature nature is right and perfect, and that it ought to be a model or standard for every human being. Any remarkable deviation from it in the ftructure of an individual, appears imperfect or irregular; and raises a painful emotion: a monftrous birth, exciting curiofity in a philosopher, fails not at the fame time to excite averfion in fpectator. every This fenfe of perfection in the common nature of man, comprehends every branch of his nature, and particularly the common fenfe of right and wrong; which accordingly is perceived by all to be perfect, having authority over every individual as the ultimate and unerring standard of morals, even in contradiction to private conviction. Thus, a law in our nature binds us to regulate our conduct by that standard and its authority is univerfally acknowledged; as nothing is more ordinary in every dispute about meum et tuum, than an appeal to common fenfe as the ultimate and unerring ftandard. At the fame time, as that standard, through infirmity or prejudice, is not confpicuous to every individual; many are mifled into erroneous opinions, by mif taking a false standard for that of nature. And hence a diftinction between a right and a wrong sense in morals; a distinction which every one understands, but which, unless for the conviction of a moral standard, would have no meaning. The final caufe of this branch of our Nature is confpicuous. Were there no standard of right and wrong for determining endless controverfies about matters of interest, the strong would have recourse to force, the weak to cunning, and fociety would diffolve. Courts of law could afford no remedy; for without a standard of morals, their decifions would be arbitrary, and of no authority. 'Happy it is for men to be provided with fuch a standard it is neceffary in fociety that our actions be uniform with respect to right and wrong; and in order to uniformity of action, it is neceffary that our perceptions of right and wrong be alfo uniform: to produce fuch uniformity, a standard of morals is indifpenfable. Nature has provided us with that standard, which is daily apply'd by courts of law with fuccefs (a). (a) See Elements of Criticism, vol. 2. p. 490. edit. 5. In reviewing what is faid, it must afford great fatisfaction, to find morality established upon the folid foundations of intuitive perception; which is a fingle mental act complete in itself, having no dependence on any antecedent propofition. The most accurate reafoning affords not equal conviction; for every fort of reafoning, as explained in the sketch immediately foregoing, requires not only felf-evident truths or axioms to found upon, but employs over and above various propofitions to bring out its conclufions. By intuitive perception folely, without reafoning, we acquire knowledge of right and wrong; of what we may do, of what we ought to do, and of what we ought to abstain from and confidering that we have thus greater certainty of moral laws than of any propofition discoverable by reasoning, man may well be deemed a favourite of Heaven, when he is fo admiduty. rably qualified for doing his The moral fense or confcience is the voice of God within us; conftantly admonishing us of our duty, and requiring from us no exercise of our faculties but attention merely. The celebrated Locke ventured VOL. IV. what D |