what he thought a bold conjecture, That moral duties are fufceptible of demonftration: how agreeable to him would have been the discovery, that they are founded upon intuitive perception, ftill more convincing and authoritative!

By one branch of the moral sense, we are taught what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do; and by another branch, what we may do, or leave undone. But fociety would be imperfect, if the moral fenfe ftopped here. There is a third branch that makes us accountable for our conduct to our fellow-creatures; and it will be made evident afterward in the third sketch, that we are accountable to our Maker, as well as to our fellow

creatures.

It follows from the standard of right and wrong, that an action is right or wrong, independent of what the agent may think. Thus, when a man, excited by friendship or pity, rescues a heretic from the flames, the action is right, even tho' he think it wrong, from a conviction that heretics ought to be burnt. But we apply a different standard to the agent: a man is approved and held to be inno

cent

cent in doing what he himself thinks right: he is difapproved and held to be guilty in doing what he himself thinks wrong. Thus, to affaffinate an atheist for the fake of religion, is a wrong action; and yet the enthusiast who commits that wrong, may be innocent: and one is guilty, who against conscience eats meat in Lent, tho' the action is not wrong. In fhort, an action is perceived to be right or wrong, independent of the actor's own opinion: but he is approved or disapproved, held to be innocent or guilty, according to his own opinion.

SECT. III.

Laws of Nature respecting our Moral Conduct in Society.

A

Standard being thus established for regulating our moral conduct in fociety, we proceed to investigate the laws that refult from it. But firft we take under confideration, what other principles

concur with the moral fenfe to qualify men for fociety.

When we reflect on the different branches of human knowledge, it might feem, that of all fubjects human nature fhould be the best understood; because every man has daily opportunities to study it, in his own paffions and in his own actions. But human nature, an interesting fubject, is feldom left to the investigation of philofophy. Writers of a fweet difpofition and warm imagination, hold, that man is a benevolent being, and that every man ought to direct his conduct for the 'good of all, without regarding himself but as one of the number (a). Those of a cold temperament and contracted mind, hold him to be an animal entirely selfish; to evince which, examples are accumulated without end (b). Neither of these systems is that of nature. The selfish fyftem is contradicted by the experience of all ages, affording the clearest evidence, that men frequently act for the fake of others, without regarding themselves, and fometimes in direct oppofition to their own

(a) Lord Shaftesbury.

(b) Helvetius.

interest

intereft*. And however much felfishness may prevail in action; man cannot be an animal entirely felfish, when all men conspire to put a high estimation upon generofity, benevolence, and other social virtues: even the most selfish are difgufted with felfishness in others, and endeavour to hide it in themselves. The most zea-. lous patron of the felfish principle, will not venture to maintain, that it renders us altogether indifferent about our fellowcreatures. Laying afide felf-interest with every connection of love and hatred, good fortune happening to any one gives pleafure to all, and bad fortune happening to any one is painful to all. On the other hand, the system of univerfal benevolence, is no lefs contradictory to experience;

*Whatever wiredrawn arguments may be urged for the selfish fyftem, as if benevolence were but refined felfifhnefs, the emptinefs of fuch arguments will clearly appear when applied to children, who know no refinement. In them, the rudiments of the focial principle are no lefs vifible than of the felfish principle. Nothing is more common, than mutual good-will and fondness between children: which must be the work of nature; for to reflect upon what is one's intereft, is far above the capacity of children.

from

from which we learn, that men commonly are disposed to prefer their own interest before that of others, especially where there is no ftrict connection: nor do we find that fuch bias is condemned by the moral fenfe. Man in fact is a complex being, compofed of principles, fome benevolent, fome felfish: and these principles are so justly blended in his nature, as to fit him for acting a proper part in fociety. It would indeed be lofing time to prove, that without fome affection for his fellow-creatures he would be ill qualified for fociety. And it will be made evident afterward (a), that univerfal benevolence would be more hurtful to fociety, than even abfolute selfishness *.

We

"Many moralifts enter fo deeply into one paf"fion or bias of human nature, that, to use the "painter's phrafe, they quite overcharge it. Thus "I have feen a whole fyftem of morals founded

upon a fingle pillar of the inward frame; and "the entire conduct of life and all the characters "in it accounted for, fometimes from fuperftition, "fometimes from pride, and most commonly from

intereft. They forget how various a creature "it is they are painting; how many fprings and