But contracts and promises are not confined to commercial dealings: they ferve alfo to make benevolence a duty; and are even extended to connect the living with the dead: a man would die with regret, if he thought his friends were not bound by their promises to fulfil his will after his death and to quiet the minds of men with refpect to futurity, the moral fenfe makes the performing fuch promifes our duty. Thus, if I promise to my friend to erect a monument for him after his death, confcience binds me, even tho' no perfon alive be entitled to demand performance: every one perceives this to be my duty; and I must expect to fuffer reproach and blame, if I neglect my engagement.

To fulfil a rational promife or covenant, deliberately made, is a duty no lefs inflexible than those duties are which arife independent of confent. But as man is fallible, often misled by ignorance, and liable to be deceived, his condition would be deplorable, did the moral fenfe compel him to fulfil every engagement, however imprudent or irrational. Here the moral fenfe gives way to human infirmity: it relieves from deceit, from impofition, : VOL. IV.

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from

1

from ignorance, from error; and binds a man by no engagement but what answers the end fairly intended. There is ftill lefs doubt that it will relieve us from an engagement extorted by external violence, or by overbearing paffion. The dread of torture will force moft men to fubmit to any terms; and a man in imminent hazard of drowning, will voluntarily promife all he has in the world to fave him. The moral fenfe would be ill fuited to the imbecillity of our nature, did it bind men in confcience to fulfil engagements made in fuch circumstances.

The other branch of duties, thofe we owe to ourselves, fhall be difcuffed in a few words. Propriety, a branch of the moral fenfe, regulates our conduct with respect to ourselves; as Justice, another branch of the moral fenfe, regulates our conduct with refpect to others. Propriety dictates, that we ought to act up to the dignity of our nature, and to the ftation allotted us by Providence: it dictates in particular, that temperance, prudence, modefty, and uniformity of conduct, are felf-duties. Thefe duties contribute to private happiness, by preferving health,

peace

peace of mind, and self-esteem; which are inestimable bleffings: they contribute no lefs to happiness in fociety, by gaining the love and efteem of others, and aid and support in time of need.

Upon reviewing the foregoing duties: respecting others, we find them more or less extensive; but none fo extensive as tọ have for their end the good of mankind in general. The most extenfive duty is that of restraint, prohibiting us to harm others: but even that duty has a limited; end; for its purpofe is only to protect o thers fram mifchief, not to do them any pofitive good. The active duties of doing pofitive good are circumfcribed within still narrower bounds, requiring fome relation that connects us with others; such as those of parent, child, friend, benefactor. The flighter relations, unless in peculiar circumstances, are not the foundation of any active duty neighbourhood, for example, does not alone make benevolence a duty: but fuppofing a neighbour to be in diftrefs, relief becomes our duty, if it can be done without distress to ourselves. The duty of relieving from diftrefs, feldom goes farther; for tho' we always. fympathife

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thife with our relations, and with thofe under our eye, the distresses of the remote. and unknown affect us very little. Pactions and agreements become neceffary, if we would extend the duty of benevolence beyond the limits mentioned. Men, it is true, are capable of doing more good than is required of them as a duty; but every fuch good must be a free-will offering.

And this leads to arbitrary or discretionary actions, fuch as may be done or left undone; which make the second general head of moral actions. With refpect to these, the moral fenfe leaves us at freedom: a benevolent act is approved, but the omiffion is not condemned. This holds ftrictly in fingle acts; but in viewing the whole of a man's conduct, the moral fenfe appears to vary a little. As the nature of man is complex, partly focial, partly felfish, we have an intuitive perception, that our conduct ought to be conformable to our nature; and that in advancing our own intereft, we ought not altogether to neglect that of others. The man accordingly who confines his whole time and thoughts within his own little

sphere,

fphere, is condemned by all the world as guilty of wrong conduct; and the man himself, if his moral perceptions be not blunted by selfishness, must be sensible that he deferves to be condemned. On the other hand, it is poffible that free benevolence may be extended beyond proper bounds: where it prevails, it commonly leads to excefs, by prompting a man to facrifice a great intereft of his own to a small interest of others; and the moral fenfe dictates, that fuch conduct is wrong. The just temperament, is a fubordination of benevolence to felf-love.

Thus, moral actions are divided into two claffes: the first regards our duty, containing actions that ought to be done, and actions that ought not to be done; the other regards arbitrary or difcretionary actions, containing actions that are right when done, but not wrong when left undone. Society is indeed promoted by the latter; but it can scarce fubfift, unless the former be made our duty. Hence it is, that actions only of the first class are made indifpenfable; thofe of the other class being left to our free-will. And hence alfo it is, that the various propenfities that difpofe