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SKETCHES

OF THE

HISTORY OF MAN.

воок III.

Progrefs of SCIENCES.

SKETCH II.

Principles and Progrefs of Morality.

T

degrees.

HE principles of morality are little understood among favages: and if they arrive at maturity among enlightened nations, it is by flow

This progrefs points out the historical part, as first in order: but as that hiftory would give little fatisfaction, without a rule for comparing the morals of different ages, and of different nations, VOL. IV. A

I

I begin with the principles of morality, fuch as ought to govern at all times, and in all nations. The present sketch accordingly is divided into two parts. In the first, the principles are unfolded; and the fecond is altogether historical.

PART I

Principles of Morality.

SECT. I.

Human Actions analysed.

HE hand of God is no where more

TH

visible, than in the nice adjustment of our internal frame to our fituation in this world. An animal is endued with a power of felf-motion; and in performing animal functions, requires no external aid. This in particular is the cafe of man, the nobleft of terreftrial beings. His heart beats, his blood circulates, his stomach digefts, &c. &c. By what means? Not

furely

furely by the laws of mechanism, which are far from being adequate to fuch operations. They are effects of an internal power, beftow'd on bestow'd on man for preferving life. The power is exerted uniformly, and without interruption, independent of will, and without confciousness.

Man is a being fufceptible of pleasure and pain: these generate defire to attain what is agreeable, and to fhun what is difagreeable; and he is poffeffed of other powers which enable him to gratify his defires. One power, termed inftinet, is exerted indeed with confcioufnefs; but without will, and confequently without defiring or intending to produce any effect. Brute animals act for the most part by inftinct: hunger prompts them to eat, and cold to take fhelter; knowingly indeed, but without exerting any act of will, and without forefight of what will happen. Infants of the human fpecies are, like brutes, governed by inftinct: they apply to the nipple, without knowing that fucking will fatisfy their hunger; and they weep when pained, without any view of relief. But men commonly are governed by defire and intention. In the progrefs from infancy

to maturity, the mind opens to objects without end, agreeable and disagreeable, which raife in us a defire to attain the former and avoid the latter. The will is influenced by defire; and the actions thus performed are termed voluntary.

But to have an accurate conception of human nature, it is neceffary to be more particular. To incline, to intend, to confent, to refolve, to will, are acts of the mind preparatory to external action. These feveral acts are well understood, tho' they cannot be defined, being perfectly fimple. As every act implies a power to act, the acts mentioned must be the effects of mental powers. The mind cannot determine without having a power to determine, nor will without having a power to will.

Inftinctive actions are exerted without any previous defire or motive, and without any previous act of will. Actions influenced by defire or motives are very different. In fuch actions, will is effential to connect the defire or motive with the ex-. ternal act. A man who defires or is moved to perform an external act in view, must have a power to determine himself; that power is termed will; and the deter

mination

mination is an act of will. With respect to external acts influenced by defire, we cannot even move a finger, without a previous act of will directing that motion. We are very fenfible of this determination or act of will, when we deliberate upon motives that tend to different ends. The mind for fome time is fufpended, deliberates, and at laft determines according to the strongest motive. But there muft alfo be a determination where there is but a fingle motive, though not fo perceptible. Being called to dinner when hungry, I inftantly obey the call. I cannot go to dinner without first determining to rise from my feat. And it is this determination that intitles it to be called a voluntary act, as much as where the determination is the refult of the moft anxious deliberation..

Some effects require a train of actions; walking, reading, finging. Where thefe actions are uniform, as in walking, or nearly fo, as in playing on a mufical inftrument, an act of will is only neceffary at the commencement: the train proceeds, by habit without any new act of will. The body is antecedently adjusted to the uniform progrefs; and is disturbed if any.

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