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pofe us to actions of the first class, are diftinguished by the name of primary virtues; leaving the name of fecondary virtues to thofe propenfities which difpofe us to actions of the other clafs *.

The deduction above given makes it evident, that the general tendency of right actions is to promote the good of society, and of wrong actions, to obstruct that good. Univerfal benevolence is indeed not required of man; because to put it in practice, is beyond his utmost abilities. But for promoting the general good, every thing is required of him that he can accomplish; which will appear from reviewing the foregoing duties. The prohibition of harming others is an eafy tafk; and upon that account is made univerfal. Our active duties are very different man is circumfcribed both in capacity and power: he cannot do good but in a flow fucceffion; and therefore it is wifely ordered, that his obligation to do good fhould be confined to his relations, his

*Virtue fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives the afcendant to moral principles. Vice fignifies that difpofition of mind which gives little or no afcendant to moral principles.

friends,

friends, his benefactors. Even diftrefs makes not benevolence a general duty: all a man can readily do, is to relieve thofe at hand; and accordingly we hear of distant misfortunes with little or no concern.

But let not the moral fyftem be mifapprehended, as if it were our duty, or even lawful, to profecute what upon the whole we reckon the most beneficial to fociety, balancing ill with good. The moral fenfe permits not a violation of any perfon's right, however trivial, whatever benefit may thereby accrue to another. A man for example in low circumstances, by denying a debt he owes to a rich mifer, faves himself and a hopeful family from ruin. In that cafe, the good effect far outweighs the ill, or rather has no counterbalance: but the moral fense permits not the debtor to balance ill with good; nor gives countenance to an unjust act, whatever benefit it may produce. And hence a maxim in which all moralifts agree, That we must not do ill to bring about good; the final cause of which shall be given below (a).

(a) Sect. 7.

SECT.

SECT. IV.

Principles of Duty and of Benevolence.

HAving thus fhortly delineated the moral laws of our nature, we proceed to an article of great importance, which is, to enquire into the means provided by our Maker for compelling obedience to these laws. The moral fenfe is an unerring guide; but the most expert guide will not profit those who are not difpofed to be led. This confideration makes it evident, that to complete the moral fyftem, man ought to be endued with fome principle or propenfity, fome impulfive power, to enforce obedience to the laws dictated by the mo→ ral sense.

The author of our nature leaves none of his works imperfect. In order to render us obfequious to the moral fenfe as our guide, he hath implanted in our nature the principles of duty, of benevolence, of rewards and punishments, and of repara

tion. It may poffibly be thought, that rewards and punishments, of which afterward, are fufficient of themselves to enforce the laws of nature, without necefsity of any other principle. Human laws, it is true, are enforc'd by these means; because no higher fanction is under command of a terrestrial legislator. But the celestial legislator, with power that knows no control, and benevolence that knows no bounds, hath enforc'd his laws by means no lefs remarkable for mildness than for efficacy: he employs no external compulfion; but, in order to engage our will on the right side, hath in the breast of individuals established the principles of duty and of benevolence, which efficacioufly excite them to obey the dictates of the moral fenfe.

The restraining and active duties being both of them effential to fociety, our Maker has wifely ordered, that the principle which enforces thefe duties, should be the most cogent of all that belong to our nature. Other principles may folicit, allure, or terrify; but the principle of duty affumes authority, commands, and insists VOL. IV.

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to

to be obey'd, without giving ear to any oppofing motive.

As one great purpofe of fociety, is to furnish opportunities of mutual aid and fupport; nature feconding that purpose, hath provided the principle of benevolence, which excites us to be kindly, beneficent, and generous. Nor ought it to escape observation, that the author of nature, attentive to our wants and to our well-being, hath endued us with a liberal portion of that principle. It excites us to be kind, not only to those we are connected with, but to our neighbours, and even to those we are barely acquainted with. Providence is peculiarly attentive to objects in diftrefs, who require immediate aid and relief. To the principle of benevolence, it hath fuperadded the paffion of pity, which in every feeling heart is irrefiftible. To make benevolence more extenfive, would be fruitlefs; because here are objects in plenty to fill the most capacious mind. It would not be fruitless only, but hurtful to fociety: I fay hurtful; becaufe frequent difappointments in attempting to gratify our benevolence, would render it a troublesome guest, and

make