thing unexpected happen: in walking, for example, a man feels a shock if he happen to tread on ground higher or lower than his body was prepared for. The power thus acquired by habit of acting without will, is an illuftrious branch of our nature; for upon it depend all the arts, both the fine and the ufeful. To play on the violin, requires wonderful fwiftnefs of fingers, every motion of which in a learner is preceded by an act of will: and yet by habit folely, an artist moves his fingers with no less accuracy than celerity. Let the most handy perfon try for the first time to knit a ftocking: every motion of the needle demands the ftrictest attention; and yet a girl of nine or ten will move the needle fo fwiftly as almost to escape the eye, without once looking on her work.

If every motion in the arts required a new act of will, they would remain in infancy for ever; and what would man be in that cafe? In the foregoing inftances, we are confcious of the external operation without being conscious of a caufe. But there are various internal operations of which we have no consciousness; and yet that they have existed is made known by their

effects,

effects. Often have I gone to bed with a confused notion of what I was ftudying; and have awaked in the morning completely master of the fubject. I have heard a new tune of which I carried away but an imperfect conception. A week or perhaps a fortnight after, the tune has occurred to me in perfection; recollecting with difficulty where I heard it.

Such

things have happened to me frequently, and probably alfo to others. My mind must have been active in these instances, though I knew nothing of it.

There ftill remains another fpecies of actions, termed involuntary. Strictly speaking, every action influenced by a motive is voluntary, because no such action can be done but by an antecedent act of will. But in a lefs ftrict fenfe, actions done contrary to defire are termed involuntary; and they have more or lefs of that character according to the strength of the motive. A man to free himself from torture, reveals the fecrets of his party: his confeffion is in a degree involuntary, being extorted from him with great reluctance. But let us fuppofe, that after the firmeft refolution to reveal nothing, his mind is unhinged by

exquifite

exquifite torture: the discovery he makes is in the highest degree involuntary.

Man is by his nature an accountable being, answerable for his conduct to God and man. In doing any action that wears a double face, he is prompted by his nature to explain the fame to his relations, his friends, his acquaintance; and above all, to those who have authority over him. He hopes for praife for every right action, and dreads blame for every one that is wrong. But for what fort of actions does he hold himself accountable? Not surely for an instinctive action, which is done blindly, without intention and without will: neither for an involuntary action, because it is extorted from him reluctantly, and contrary to his defire; and least of all, for actions done without confcioufnefs. What only remain are voluntary actions proceeding from defire, which are done as we fay wittingly and willingly: for thefe we must account, if at all accountable; and for these every man in confcience holds himself bound to account.

Further upon voluntary actions. To intend and to will, though commonly held fynonymous, fignify different acts of the

mind. Intention refpects the effect: Will refpects the action that is exerted for producing the effect. It is my Intention, for example, to relieve my friend from distress: upon feeing him, it is my Will to give him a fum for his relief: the external act of giving follows; and my friend is relieved, which is the effect intended. But these internal acts are always united: I cannot will the means, without intending the effect; and I cannot intend the effect, without willing the means.

Some effects of voluntary action follow neceffarily: A wound is an effect that neceffarily follows the stabbing a person with a dagger: death is a neceffary effect of throwing one down from the battlements of a high tower. Some effects are probable only: I labour in order to provide for my family; fight for my country to rescue it from oppreffors; take physic for my health. In such cases, the event intended does not neceffarily nor always fol low.

A man, when he wills to act, must intend the neceffary effect: a person who ftabs, certainly intends to wound. But where the effect is probable only, one may VOL. IV.

B

act

act without intending the effect that follows: a stone thrown by me at random into the market-place, may happen to wound a man without my intending it. One acts by instinct, without either will or intention: voluntary actions that neceffarily produce their effect, imply intention: voluntary actions, when the effect is probable only, are fometimes intended, fometimes not.

蜜

Human actions are diftinguished from each other by certain qualities, termed right and wrong. But as these make the corner-ftone of morality, they are reserved to the following section.

SECT. II.

Divifion of Human Actions into Right, Wrong, and Indifferent.

THE qualities of right and wrong in voluntary actions, are univerfally acknowledged as the foundation of morality; and yet philofophers have been ftrangely perplexed about them. The hi

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