right and wrong be applicable to rewards and punishments.

We have seen that there is an invariable ftandard of right and wrong, which depends not in any degree on private opinion or conviction. By that ftandard, all pecuniary claims are judged, all claims of property, and, in a word, every demand. founded on intereft, not excepting reparation, as will afterward appear. But with respect to the moral characters of men, and with respect to rewards and punishments, a different standard is erected in the common fenfe of mankind, neither rigid nor inflexible; which is, the opinion that men have of their own actions. It is mentioned above, that a man is efteemed innocent in doing what he himself thinks right, and guilty in doing what he himfelf thinks wrong. In applying this standard to rewards and punishments, we reward those who in doing wrong are however convinced that they are innocent; and punish those who in doing right are however convinced that they are guilty.*. Some, it is true, are fo pervert

ed

* Virtuous and vicious, innocent and guilty, fignify qualities both of men and of their actions. Appro

ed by improper education or by fuperftition, as to espouse numberlefs abfurd tenets, contradictory to the standard of right and wrong; and yet fuch men are no exception from the general rule: if they act according to confcience, they are innocent, and safe against punishment however wrong the action may be; and if they act against conscience, they are guilty and punishable however right the action may be it is abhorrent to every moral perception, that a guilty perfon be rewarded, or an innocent perfon punished. Further, if mifchief be done contrary to Will, as where a man is compelled by fear or by torture, to reveal the fecrets of his party; he may be grieved for yeilding to the weakness of his nature, contrary to his firmeft refolves; but he has no check of confcience, and upon that account is not liable to punishment. And lastly, in order that perfonal merit and demerit may not in any measure depend on chance, we are fo conftituted as to place innocence and guilt, not on the event, but on the in

*

Approbation and disapprobation, praise and blame, fignify certain emotions or fentiments of those who fee or contemplate men and their actions.

1

tention

tention of doing right or wrong; and accordingly, whatever be the event, a man is praised for an action well intended, and condemned for an action ill intended.

But what if a man intending a certain wrong happen by accident to do a wrong he did not intend; as, for example, intending to rob a warren by shooting the rabbits, he accidentally wounds a child unfeen behind a bufh? The delinquent ought to be punished for intending to rob; and he is alfo fubjected to repair the hurt done to the child: but he cannot be punished for the accidental wound; because our nature regulates punishment by the intention, and not by the event *

A

During the infancy of nations, pecuniary com◄ pofitions for crimes were universal; and during that long period, very little weight was laid upon intention. This proceeded from the cloudiness and obfcurity of moral perceptions among barbarians, making no distinction between reparation and pecuniary punishment. Where a man does mifchief intentionally, or is verfans in illicito, as expreffed in the Roman law, he is juftly bound to repair all the harm that enfues, however accidentally; and from the resemblance of pecuniary punishment to reparation, the rule was childishly extended to punish,

ment.

A crime against any primary virtue is attended with fevere and never-failing punishment, more efficacious than any that have been invented to enforce municipal laws on the other hand, the preferving

ment. But this rule, fo little confiftent with moral principles, could not long fubfift after pecuniary compofitions gave place to corporal punishment; and accordingly, among civilized nations, the law of nature is restored, which prohibits punishment for any mifchief that is not intentional. The English must be excepted, who, remarkably tenacious of their original laws and cuftoms, preferve in force, even as to capital punishment, the above-mentioned rule that obtained among barbarians, when pecuniary compofitions were in vigour. The following paffage is from Hales (Pleas of the Crown, chap. 39.)

Regularly he that voluntarily and knowingly in"tends hurt to the person of a man, as for example "to beat him, tho' he intend not death, yet if

death enfues, it excufeth not from the guilt of "murder, or manflaughter at least, as the circum

ftances of the cafe happen." And Fofter, in his Crown law, teaches the fame doctrine, never once fufpecting in it the leaft deviation from moral principles. "A fhooteth at the poultry of B, and by "accident killeth a man: if his intention was to "steal the poultry, which must be collected from "circumstances, it will be murder by reason of "that felonious intent; but if it was done wantonly, and without that intention, it will be barely "manslaughter." (p. 259-)

primary

primary virtues inviolate, is attended with little merit. The fecondary virtues are directly oppofite: the neglecting them is not attended with any punishment; but the practice of them is attended with illuftrious rewards. Offices of undeferved kindnefs, returns of good for ill, generous toils and fufferings for our friends or for our country, are attended with confcioufnefs of felf-merit, and with univerfal praife and admiration; the higheft rewards a ge nerous mind is fufceptible of.

From what is faid, the following obfervation will occur: The pain of tranfgreffing justice, fidelity, or any duty, is much greater than the pleasure of performing; but the pain of neglecting a generous action, or any fecondary virtue, is as nothing compared with the pleasure of performing. Among the vices oppofite to the primary virtues, the most striking moral deformity is found; among the secondary virtues, the most striking moral beauty.

VOL. IV.

I

SECT.