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ART. XX.

Principles of Interpreting the Language of the Scriptures.

A Statement of Reasons for not believing the doctrines of Trinitarians, concerning the Nature of God, and the Person of Jesus Christ. By Andrews Norton. Cambridge and Boston. 1833.

THIS volume, just published by the late Professor of Sacred Literature in Harvard University, has evidently been prepared, as such a work ought to be, with care and labor. As might be anticipated, it is the result of much reading and reflection, and affords proof of honorable attainments in literature, both sacred and profane. We do not indeed think it distinguished so much by originality, as by patient application of thought. That, however, may have been neither attempted, nor compatible with the general design of the work. But many facts and arguments, that may be found briefly stated elsewhere, are here discussed at full length, and illustrated with a copiousness of examples which the importance of the subject demanded. On some points it is clearer and more satisfactory than anything we have seen. Though controversial throughout, and marked with no deference towards the sentiments opposed, nor even with the least respect for them, it is written in cool temper and in the language of moderation: a circumstance worthy of remark, at a time when religious controversies are too generally characterized by intemperate rudeness, and out-breakings of violent passion.

Still, we must be permitted to suggest a doubt whether, on the whole, it merits the praise of real moderation and good feeling. If we do not judge uncharitably, the author sometimes affects an air of disdain towards his opponents, which is neither becoming, nor consistent with the pains he has taken to confute their doctrines. Were they, indeed, proper objects of contempt, it should not be forgotten that their industrious antagonist might himself be implicated in the charge of misspending his time by laboring to overthrow a cause which was beneath his notice. As regards the promotion of the Christian spirit among our hostile sects, we scarcely need say that nothing is so deeply provoking, as a studied parade of scorn in a disputant, an assumption of superiority to the business in which he condescends to engage, an affectation of humbling himself

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to meddle with the paltry notions he attacks. And when Mr. Norton sighs over the unworthy task which has fallen to his lot, and professes that no scholar or intellectual man can at this late day engage willingly in disproving a doctrine so utterly obsolete with the great body of enlightened individuals in all countries, as that of the Trinity, he gives his opponents more cause of offence than would be felt from the coarsest expressions of direct abuse. There is something very ungracious, to the least, in the manner with which he observes that Trinitarianism presents human nature under the most humiliating aspect. The absurdities that have been maintained are so gross, the zeal in maintaining them has been so ferocious, there is such an absence of any redeeming quality in the spectacle presented, that it spreads a temporary gloom over our whole view of the character and destiny of man. We seem ourselves to sink in the scale of being, and it demands an effort to recollect the glorious powers with which God has endued our race.' Trinitarianism may indeed be thoroughly absurd, and it may have been often supported by the most reprehensible means; but in stating these facts, there was no need to make a show of intolerable disgust, a sickening of his refined nature, at the very thought of the subject. Such an indignity will hardly be atoned for, by the author's subsequent professions of tender esteem for certain friends who hold the disreputable tenet, nor by his inclination to wish that they might leave his book unread, should it chance to fall in their way. We ought to observe, however, that the disdainful airs are confined for the most part to the Preface, and are not obtruded upon our notice in the body of the work. See Preface, pp. iii. iv. XXX. xxxi. xxxiii. &c.

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The object which the author proposes, is, 'to give a view of the doctrines of Trinitarians, respecting the nature of God, and the person of Jesus Christ; to state the reasons for not believing those doctrines; and to show in what manner the passages of Scripture, urged in their support, ought to be regarded.' This design, which embraces a variety of interesting topics, he has illustrated with many important facts and arguments, some of which lie out of the common course of reading. On the whole, we think he has effectually accomplished what he undertook, though some of his explanations of texts seem to us very questionable, and some of his views altogether objectionable.

In the course of executing his main purpose, however, he has occasion to enter into several discussions of relative subjects, which are sufficiently complete in themselves to be read with advantage in a separate form. Of these, one of the most valuable in our estimation, is that in which he points out some of the fundamental principles of interpreting the language of Scripture. We shall lay before our readers his remarks under this head, since they offer important views of the subject, and expose a material defect in the schemes commonly received.

The great fault of most interpreters is, that they do not allow sufficient scope to the natural suggestions of common sense, which, it should never be forgotten, a reader is always supposed to exercise. They would seem to proceed on the principle that the Bible was written for such as had no understanding whatsoever of things, except what it first gave them; and that, of course, we are not to restrain its language by any previous knowledge which we possess, of the nature of the subjects introduced. It is attempted to bind us down to the conclusions of mere philological criticism, how incredible soever may be the result; and we are required to trust that infinite wisdom knows some method of reconciling what appears to us so mysterious and irrational. Now, such interpreters overlook the very ground-work of their art, the intrinsic ambiguity of language; and they exclude the most important consideration, that every writer and every speaker, whether sacred or profane, addresses mankind as rational creatures, creatures who reason about things, as well as understand the use of words, and that he expects them to modify his language by the facts which they already know, and by the dictates of common sense. On these points, however, we will introduce Mr. Norton's remarks:

"The art of interpretation derives its origin from the intrinsic ambiguity of language. What I mean to express by this term, is the fact, that a very large portion of sentences, considered in themselves, that is, if regard be had merely to the words of which they are composed, are capable of expressing not one meaning only, but two or more different meanings; or, (to state this fact in other terms) that in very many cases the same sentence, like the same single word, may be used to express various and often very different senses. Now, in a great part of what we find

written concerning the interpretation of language, and in a large portion of the specimens of criticism which we meet with, especially upon the Scriptures, this fundamental truth, this fact which lies at the very bottom of the art of interpretation, has either been overlooked, or not regarded in its relations and consequences. It may be illustrated by a single example. St. John thus addresses the Christians to whom he was writing, in his first Epistle, ii. 20.

"Ye have an anointing from the Holy One, and know all things."

'If we consider these words in themselves merely, we shall perceive how uncertain is their signification, and how many different meanings, they may be used to express.' pp. 90, 91.

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Having shown that the first clause, Ye have an anointing from the Holy One,' is in itself indefinite, and may be understood in several different senses, he adds:

'I forbear to mention other meanings, which the word anointing might be used to express. These are sufficient for our

purpose.

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The term Holy One, in such a relation as it holds to the other words in the present sentence, may denote either God, or Christ, or some other being.

'Ye know all things, literally expresses the meaning, Ye have the attribute of omniscience. Beside this meaning, it may signify, Ye are fully acquainted with all the objects of human knowledge; or, Ye know every truth connected with Christianity; or, Ye have all the knowledge necessary to form your faith, and direct your conduct; or the proposition may require some other limitation; for all things is one of those terms, the meaning of which is continually to be restrained and modified by a regard to the subject present to the mind of the writer.

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This statement may afford some imperfect notion of the various senses which the words before us may be used to express; and of the uncertainty that must exist about their meaning, when they are regarded without reference to those considerations by which it ought to be determined. I say, imperfect, because we have really kept one very important consideration in mind, that they were written by an Apostle to a Christian community. Putting this out of view, it would not be easy to fix the limit of their possible meanings. It must be remembered that this passage has been adduced merely by way of illustration; and that, if it were necessary, an indefinite number of similar examples might be quoted.

I will mention, and I can barely mention, some of the principal causes of the intrinsic ambiguity of language. 1. Almost every word is used in a variety of senses; and some words in a great variety. Now, as we assign one or another of these senses to different words in a sentence, we change the meaning of the whole sentence. If they are important words, and the different senses which we assign vary much from each other, we change its meaning essentially. 2. But beside their common significations, words may be used in an undefined number of figurative senses. A large proportion of sentences may, therefore, be understood either figuratively or literally. Considered in themselves, they present no intrinsic character that may enable us to determine whether they are literal or figurative. They may often be understood in more than one literal, and in more than one figurative sense; and a choice is then to be made among all these different senses. 3. A very large proportion of sentences which are not what rhetoricians call figurative, are yet not to be understood strictly, not to the letter, but with some limitation, and often with a limitation which contracts exceedingly their literal meaning. 'I do not,' says Mr. Burke, addressing the. friend to whom he is writing, in his Reflections on the French Revolution, 'I do not conceive you to be of that sophistical, captious spirit, or of that uncandid dullness, as to require, for every general observation or sentiment, an explicit detail of the correctives and exceptions, which reason will presume to be included in all the general propositions which come from a reasonable man.' Sentences that are general or universal in their terms, are often to be regarded merely in relation to the subject treated of, or the persons addressed; and their meaning is often to be greatly limited by a regard to one or another of these considerations. 4. In eloquence, in poetry, in popular writing of every sort, and not least in the Scriptures, a great part of the language used is the language of emotion or feeling. The strict and literal meaning of this language is, of course, a meaning which the words may be used to express; but this is rarely the true meaning. The language of feeling is very different from that of philosophical accuracy. The mind, when strongly excited, delights in general, unlimited propositions, in hyperboles, in bold figures of every sort, in forcible presentations of thought addressed indirectly to the understanding through the medium of the imagination, and in the utterance of those temporary false judgments which are the natural result, and consequently among the most natural expressions, of strong emotion. Different senses in which such language may be understood often present themselves; and it is sometimes not easy to determine which to adopt.' pp. 91-94.

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