special nomenclature. Above all, I would not insist upon any particular order in analysis. The point I make is that some classification, some grouping and some order of analysis will prove essential to good social case work.

The big groups which I propose, namely, disease, ignorance, vice, crime and poverty, are doubtless not the only groups of evil in the world. Indeed I hear many of you say that ugliness and the unbeautiful form an evil which is not always due to disease, to ignorance, to vice, crime or poverty. I am bound to say, however, that most of the uglinesses that lead to any social mal-adjustment are often found to have their origin in one or other of the five groups I mention. Still, one ought not to be dogmatic upon such a point.

Again, the social case analyst may find it important to consider the economic situation of his social patient before his medical plight. Indeed, I think that the history of social service, deriving as it does so much from philanthropy, rather inclines the social work analyst to put poverty ahead of medical conditions, which he regards as less common. I sometimes think that the socialistically bent are persons who improperly put the question of economic level ahead of more important questions of educational or moral level. However that may be, my point now is that some order, not necessarily any particular order, and not necessarily the order I present today, is essential in social case analysis.

Miss Richmond's book on Social Diagnosis, like many medical books on social diagnosis, deals with the methods of collection of data, and not so much with the process types of logical analysis of the data themselves. Now, the point is that many listeners at my lectures at the Boston School were inclined to think I was somehow proposing an order in which the case data were to be collected. Far from it; my considerations deal with analysis of the data after they are all handed in and either on paper or in the minds of the analysts. We all have attended many a social case conference at which the upshot was that the district workers would best fare forth and get more facts. The upshot of the conference would often be that such and such a line of inquiry would be most profitable because there was such and such a hiatus in the facts at hand. Now, we would all concede that the labor of the social case worker is infinite and that no case exists in which more data of one sort or other might not be of value. My point is that the application of logical processes of case analysis should begin only when enough data are in hand to justify some sort of action. It is idle to analyze unless the pragmatic issue is on the cards. Of course, in many a case not enough data will ever be at hand to warrant profound analysis. The pragmatic result here will naturally be a blundering failure or (what is not much better for the future of our art) a blundering success. Let our social case conferences, then, deal for the most part with cases in which sufficient data are at hand. Let us learn what under ideal circumstances should be done in all types of maladjustment which society provides. But are not these, you will inquire, infinite in number and variety? Probably not, one must reply who looks at the history of logical analysis in some of the most complex sciences and arts. At all events, I wish to inquire whether or not every case of social maladjustment will not fall into at least one of the following great groups of evils, namely:

REGNUM MALORUM

MORBI Disease

ERRORES Ignorance

VITIA Vices and bad habits

DELICTA Crime and delinquency

PENURIAE Poverty and resourcelessness

Some of you will inquire whether there are not cases of more general maladjustment, cases which it would be best to call simply cases of maladjustment or maladaptability. I think, however, that in every case of such supposed generality of nature so far presented to me, I have been able to determine that the phenomena in question could be classified under one or more of these five groups. For example, a case of social maladjustment was narrated to me in which a certain person, herself a social worker, possessed a wonderful and healthy physique, was a person of the highest and best education, was not the victim of any vices or bad habits, was involved in no legal difficulties whatever, and was a person of great wealth and resourcefulness in the world. Somehow, nevertheless, this social worker was described to me as not getting on, as socially maladjusted. A very slight logical dissection, however, betrayed the fact that, although she was a woman of perfect physique, her mental attitude was one of a slightly psychopathic nature. The misfit was inborn, or at least developed in early life and in such wise as to exclude the effects of poor education, poor moral training, and the like. This instance, doubtless not at all unlike several in your experience, will serve to point an important moral, namely, that the diseases or Morbi must include not only the obvious, acquired diseases, but various defects, and these defects must be held to include mental defects and perversions. In short, we must count among the Morbi a variety of psychopathies.

In this connection I conned with greatest interest the pages of Miss Richmond's book and found that fully half of the cases in the book had most important psychopathic factors at work, whether outand-out psychoses, mild psychopathias, alcoholism, or attitudes of mind toward diseases and other maladaptations which wTere not exactly wholesome. At the time I conned over the Richmond group of cases, I was more particularly interested in psychopathic conditions; doubtless one who should analyze her book to learn the exact proportion of diseases in general which had a grave effect upon the social maladjustments therein depicted, would find far more than half the Richmond group to be afflicted in an important sense with some one or other of the Morbi. The great size of the psychopathic fraction in Miss Richmond's book is of particular value to us at this juncture because her book was collected rather with the aim of displaying methods of collecting data than with displaying the nature and treatment of the conditions themselves.

To sum up my contentions thus far, I would say that my view of the task of social case analysis is doubtless somewhat "medicated." Not only have I suggested a method which is immediately derived from medical studies, but I have been tempted to demolish what seems to be an erroneous pet view of social workers. That is to say, I want to replace the family as the unit of social inquiry with the individual as the unit of social inquiry. Wherever a family is in question, showing social maladjustment, I want the social service catalogues to contain all the different individuals in said family which may be found to deserve social analysis. I would even go so far as to think that most of the minors in these families with social maladjustments require individual analysis before a proper decision can be made and treatment rendered. Insisting upon the individual as the unit of interest in social case analysis, I then suggested, on the basis of medical studies, that the analysis of social maladjustment should proceed in a certain order. The order suggested was that of disease, ignorance, vice, delinquency and poverty. As partial justification for placing disease first in order of analysis, I called attention to the great number of cases in Miss Richmond's random series which presented important medical features which must indispensably be met if a complete adjustment is to be made.

I submit that this classification, however erroneous, is at least brief. I think there are few cases, even amongst the most complex, which the Psychopathic Hospital has afforded, but can be successfully analyzed by entering the collected data under one or other of these headings. I find the allocation of these collected data to the various headings to be a very practical matter. Shall, or shall not, a physician be called in for more exact diagnosis and possibly for treatment? Here is the question which is brought up forthwith by the attempt to eliminate the Morbi from the logical scene of social maladjustment. But if the physician does not come in question, or if his work gets properly done, is there a remainder of difficulty which falls not to the physician's lot, but to the lot of the educator, the expert, or the man who knows? Is there, perhaps, nothing the matter with this particular case save that the man cannot speak the language of his community? Can we, perhaps, solve the bread-winning question by a course in English? Is the whole or a part of the trouble due merely to ignorance, merely to the error, e. g., of not knowing a certain language? Or, perchance, has there not been a false education in the matter of mental or physical hygiene; a false education, the effects of which can be destroyed or annulled by proper management? Or is the matter not so much an intellectual matter of education and false information, as a matter of poor moral training, a matter of vice and bad habits—anything from the profoundest perversions, on the one hand, to biting fingernails, on the other? What we may need here, of course, is not education in the intellectual sense of the term, but moral training, inhibition, and habituation of the type shown, e. g., in animal training. The field of the delinquencies is not exactly coterminous with the field of vices. I am not quite satisfied with the term delinquency, inasmuch as the group of evils which I place fourth ought to include all manner of legal entanglements and public disabilities in which the onus of responsibility may well be lacking; thus a man or woman in a divorce complication, or in a legal entanglement as to estates and incomes, may be legally maladjusted when he would not suitably be charged with crime in the ordinary sense, or even with delinquency. May it not be better to put the question thus? Suppose we can eliminate the necessity of a physician, and again, the necessity of an intellectual guide, and again, the necessity of a moral teacher; can we fourthly, also exclude the necessity of calling in some expert in legal, public, or official matters? If all four of these experts and their fonts of knowledge are to no purpose, then I will concede that the social maladjustment might prove to be nothing more or less than poverty.

What is the cause of poverty, and what is its "cure"? This is surely one of the leading questions in every social worker's mind. When I look over material accessible to me both as Director of the Psychopathic Hospital and as a citizen of a community, I seem practically to find that there are no cases of pure poverty. This is not tantamount to saying that it would be disadvantageous to raise the economic level. My point rather is that I am familiar with no case of social mal-adjustment in which the cause appears to be poverty alone. I am prepared to admit that there may be such cases, and indeed hope that there are great numbers of them because I feel that their "cure" is amongst the easiest things we in this world now do. But, where your social case analyst proceeds beyond a superficial account of general family conditions and proceeds to an analysis of the individuals in the family, then I protest that in virtually all instances important deficiencies will be found to exist in one or more of these other directions.

I would like to penetrate the still more attractive vistas which open out in social case analysis. With the data concerning social maladjustment all in hand, how shall we analyze them? I have spoken of the major categories in which these data are likely to fall. Highly specialistic inquiries will have to be made to determine the details and subheadings under each of the categories mentioned. No one has, so far as I know, before attempted to classify the Kingdom of Evil. Many attempts exist in philosophy to classify goodness and its types. From time to time, pessimists have appeared, but for the most part their pessimism has been of the blanket order, and indeed I think the majority of the pessimists will be found either psychopathic or else strongly under the influence of psychopathic suggestions. Now and again, a psychopath like Rousseau or like Schopenhauer catches the ear of a generation and develops disciples whose work lasts a decade or two, only to be swallowed by the unfailing optimism of the race. Whether the unfailing optimism of the race is or is not an evil, is perhaps subject to dispute. Herbert Spencer could use the data of Darwinism to show how the millennium was at least on the way. On the other hand, such persons as Haeckel and Nietzsche could use the self-same data of Darwinism for essentially materialistic and pessimistic purposes. On the whole, most of us mature and worldly persons feel that the world is compounded both of good and evil, and every one of us here at least is engaged in some part of the battle against evil. If most of us were put to it for a percentile account of good and evil in the world, we should probably think goodness formed 51 per cent of the world all told rather than 49 per cent.

Yet, though no one apparently has attempted to classify the evils, can any one say that such classification is not the first duty of the sociologist? He will find at hand practically no attempts at classification of the field. For instance, in the ecclesiastical jurisprudence of the middle ages, something of importance can be found with respect to the sins and their relative deserts. No doubt also, in certain works on criminology something can be found, though a recent superficial search of outstanding textbooks failed to indicate that much of a logical nature had been accomplished by criminologists as to the true nature and origin of those social maladjustments called crimes. Is not this, then, an attractive task lying before us as applied sociologists?

But suppose we had all these matters in hand and could describe to a jot the various subforms of evil, what would be the pragmatic, that is to say, the therapeutic, outcome? Should we be witnesses of mere ruins and wrecks without possible relief in action? Such might be the theoretical view, particularly of one inclined to pessimism, but those of us who at all practically deal with social maladjustments must inevitably hold otherwise; wherever we can nail our evil down to the platform of a particular group, there almost always something appropriate can be done; and if not, some value attaches to our knowledge that nothing can be done.

Should we eventually get in hand not only the bare verbal outlines of a classification of the Kingdom of Evil and some command of the process of diagnosis by which one would arrive at placing the social patient, what then? I should like to talk on about the still more general and philosophical situation in which we should then find ourselves. Consider, for instance, what the word patient means. Sometimes physicians are inclined to wonder why social workers call their objects of attention patients. For my part, noting the basic meaning of the term patient, namely, sufferer, victim, or person to whom something has happened, I cannot see that the physician is more especially entitled to the use of the