the church's decrees,) they must be sure that they are sure of nothing; and how then are they sure of that? And while they subvert all the order of nature in the world, they pretend that God can do it, and therefore we are to believe that he doth it, merely because these doctors can call themselves the Church, and then can so expound the Scripture. When it is God's settled order in nature, that a man as an animal shall have sense to perceive things sensibly by, and as a man shall have understanding to receive from the imagination and sense these objects, we must now suppose that God hath quite overturned the course of nature, either by making sense no sense, or the object no object, or the medium no fit medium; and yet this is to be believed by men that have nothing but the same senses to tell their understandings that it is written or spoken, or that there is a man in the world.

Suppose we grant it to be no contradiction, and therefore a thing that God can do, no man can question but that he must do it as a miracle, by altering and overturning nature's course. And shall we feign, 1. Miracles to become ordinary things, through all the churches in the world, and every day in the week, or every hour to be done? 2. And miracles to be made a standing church ordinance? 3. And every one in the church, even all the wicked, and every mouse that eateth the host, to be partaker of a miracle? 4. Yea, that every such man and mouse, may all the week long live on a continued miracle, while accidents without substance do nourish them, and turn to flesh and blood? 5. And all this ordinary course of miracles to be wrought at the will of every priest, be he never so ignorant or wicked a man? 6. And yet the same words spoken by the holiest of the Protestant pastors will not do the miracle. 7. But if a Papist priest should be unduly ordained, or forge his own Orders, sobeit the church think him truly ordained, he can do the miracle. All this must be believed.

And the plague of all is, all men must be burnt as heretics, or exterminated, that cannot believe all this, and disbelieve their senses. And yet worse, all temporal lords must be dispossessed of their dominions, who will suffer any such to live therein, and not exterminate them.

An epicure and a sensual infidel, who think man is but of the same species of brutes, do but unman us, and leave us the honour of being animals or brutes. But the Papists do

not leave us this much, but must reduce us to a lower order, and teach us to deny our sense itself; and torment and kill them that will not do it.

And what is it that must persuade us to all this? Why merely a 'hoc est corpus meum,' as expounded by the Councils of Lateran and Trent. And is not David's "I am a worm and no man," (Psal. xxii. 6,) as plain; yea, and that in a prophecy of Christ? Must we believe therefore `that neither David nor Christ was a man, but a worm? Is not "I am the Vine, and ye are the branches," (John xv. 1, 2,) as plain? Must sense be renounced and ordinary miracies believed for such words as these?

And doth not Paul call it bread (1. Cor. xi.) after consecration three times in the three next verses? And is not he as good an expositor of Christ's words as the Council of Trent?

And when did God work miracles which were mere objects of belief against sense? Miracles were done as sensible things, thereby to confirm faith, and that which no sense perceived was not taken for a miracle.

To conclude, when the apostle saith, that "flesh and blood cannot enter into the kingdom of God," (plainly speaking of them formally as now called, and not as they signify sin,) and consequently that Christ's body is now in heaven a spiritual body, and not formally flesh and blood, yet must the bread and wine be turned into his flesh and blood on earth, when he hath none in heaven?

And by their doctrine no baker nor vintner is secured, but that a priest may come into his shop or cellar, and turn all the bread and wine in it, into Christ's body and blood: yea, the whole city or garrison may thus be deprived of their bread and wine, if the priest intend it; and yet it shall not be so in the Sacrament itself, if the priest intend it not. But I have staid too long in this.

XIV. Next to the act of cogitation and volitation itself, and to the most certain objects of sense, there is nothing in all the world so certain, that is, so evident to the intellect, as the being of God: he being that to the mind which the sun is to the eye, most certainly known, though little of him be known, and no creature comprehend him.

XV. That God is true, is part of our knowing him to be perfect, and to be God; and therefore is most certain.

XVI. That man is made by God and for God; that we owe him all our love, obedience and praise, that we have all from him, and should please him in the use of all, with many such like, are notitiæ communes,' certain verities, received by nature, some as principles, and some as such evident conclusions as are not to be doubted of.

XVII. That the Scripture is the word of God, is a certain truth, not sensible, nor a natural principle; but an evident conclusion drawn from that seal or testimony of the Spirit, antecedent, concomitant, impressed and consequent ; which I have often opened in other treatises.

XVIII. That the Scripture is true, is a certain conclusion drawn from the two last-mentioned premises, viz. That God is true, 'verax,' and that the Scripture is his word.

XIX. Those doctrines or sayings which are parts of Scripture evidently perceived so to be by sense and intellective perception, are known to be true, by the same certainty as the Scripture in general is known to be true.

XX. To conclude then, there are two sorts of certain verities in Theology. 1. Natural principles with their certain consequents. 2. Scripture in general, with all those assertions which are certainly known to be parts. And all the rest are to be numbered with uncertainties, except prophetical certainty of inspiration, which I pass by.

CHAP. V.

IV. Of the several Degrees of Certainty.

1. As certainty is taken for truth of being, it admitteth of no degrees: all that is true, is equally true.

2. But certainty of evidence hath various degrees: none doubteth but there are various degrees of evidence: all the doubt is whether any but the highest may be called certainty.

And here let the reader first remember that the question is but de nomine,' of the name, and not the thing. And next, the evidence is called certain, because it is certifying aptitudinally. It is apt to certify us.

3. And then the question will be devolved to subjective

certainty, whether it have various degrees. For if it have so, then the evidence must be said to have so, because it is denominated respectively from the apprehensive certainty.

And here 'de re' it must be taken as agreed, 1. That certainty is a certain degree of apprehension. 2. That there are various degrees of apprehension. 3. That no man on earth hath a perfect intellectual apprehension, at least, of things moral and spiritual; for his apprehension, may be still increased, and those in heaven have more perfect than we. 4. That there are some degrees so low and doubtful, as are not fit to be called certainty.

5. That even these lowest degrees with the greatest doubting, are yet often true apprehensions; and whenever they are true they are infallible, that is, not deceived: therefore this infallibility, which is but, not to be deceived, is indeed one sort of certainty, which is so denominated relatively from the natural truth or certainty of the object; but it is not this sort of certainty which we inquire after.

6. Therefore it followeth that this subjective certainty, containeth this infallible truth of perception, and addeth a degree which consisteth in the satisfaction of the mind.

7. But if the mind should be never so confident and satisfied of a falsehood, this deserveth not the name of certainty, because it includeth not truth. For it is a certain perception of truth which we speak of; and confident erring is not certainty of the truth.

8. As therefore the degrees of doubting are variously overcome, so there must needs be various degrees of certainty.

9. When doubting is so far overcome, as that the mind doth find rest and satisfaction in the truth, it may be called certainty. But when doubting is either prevalent, and so troublesome as to leave us wavering, it is not called certainty.

10. It is not the forgetting or neglect of a difficulty or doubt, nor yet the will's rejecting it, which is properly called certainty. This quieteth the mind indeed, but not by the way of ascertaining evidence. Therefore ignorant people that stumble upon a truth by chance with confidence, are not therefore certain of it. And those that take it upon trust from a priest or their parents, or good people's opinion, are not therefore certain of it. Nor they that say as some

Papists, Faith hath not evidence, but is a voluntary reception of the Church's testimony, and meritorious, because it hath not evidence; therefore though I see no cogent evidence, I will believe, because it is my duty.' Whether this man's faith may be saving or no, I will not now dispute; but certainly it is no certainty of apprehension. He is not certain of what he so believeth. This is but to cast away the doubt or difficulty, and not at all by certainty to overcome it.

11. When a man hath attained a satisfying degree of perception, he is capable still of clearer perception. Even as when in the heating of water, after all the sensible cold is gone, the water may grow hotter and hotter still. So after all sensible doubting is gone, the perception may grow clearer still.

12. But still the objective certainty is the same; that is, there is that evidence in the object which is 'in suo genere sufficient to notify the thing to a prepared mind.

13. But this sufficiency is a respective proportion; and therefore, as it respecteth man's mind in common, it supposeth that by due means and helps, and industry, the mind may be brought certainly to discern this evidence. But if you denominate the sufficiency of the evidence, from its respect to the present disposition of men's minds, so it is almost as various as men's minds are. For recipitur ad modum recipientis ;' and that is a certifying, sufficient evidence of truth, to one man, which to a thousand others is not so much as an evidence of probability. Therefore mediate and immediate sufficiency and certainty of evidence, must be distinguished.

From all this I may infer, 1. That though God be the original and end of all verities, and is ever the first in ordine essendi et efficiendi,' and so 'à Jove princàpium, in methodo syntheticâ ;' yet he is not the 'primum notum,' the first known, in ordine cognoscendi,' nor the beginning in methodo inquisitivâ' (though in such analytical methods as begin at the ultimate end, he is also the first). Though all truth and evidence be from God, yet two things are more evident to man than God is, and but two: viz. The present objects of sense; and our own internal acts, of intellective cogitation and volition. And these being supposed, the being of God is the third evident certainty in the world.