numerous and too powerful to be despised. Confident we are, that the light-heeled enemy has long enough scattered the seeds of errour through the garden of God without molestation; nor are we less confident that they who have embarked in the enterprise of his overthrow, will not forget their high responsibilities, still to wield the weapons that are mighty through God. For the result we have no anxiety. While facts tell us what success may attend the silent and unnoticed mode of propagating opinions adopted by the Unitarian party, facts too will soon tell us with what proficiency their work can go on, amid the shocks of orthodoxy.

We mean not by these remarks to hazard our prophetical character beyond a certain limit. There doubt less may be found in our larger towns, materials for Unitarianism, and perhaps to some extent in the more desolate and uninstructed regions of the country. In the human heart there is nothing to repel, but much. to welcome the system of doctrines which it inculcates; and out of the church of God, there is little except an enlightened conscience, that rears the least barrier to its universal prevalence. We are not therefore surprised at the success which has hitherto attended its efforts at propagation, nor shall we be in future, should it be able to find converts among those who are too ignoraut to discern its abominations, and too wilful to be instructed. But we are much deceived in our anticipations, if the disclosure which has now been made of it, and the occasion thus furnished of unfolding, in still broader aspect, its deformity as a system of religious truth, do not prove an effectual check to its progress in this country. Its present abettors will probably die such; others may rise up among their descendants and friends to fill their places, but the generations who shall come after them, under advantages to judge of truth and evidence without the influence of prejudice

and party attachments, will reap the benefits of this controversy.

Mr. Channing's professed object is to exhibit the distinguishing opinions of his party. He considers first, some of the principles which they adopt in the interpretation of Scripture, and secondly, some of the doctrines, which they suppose the Scriptures thus interpreted, to express. Mr. Stuart confines his reply to some remarks on the first head of the sermon, and to a more extended discussion of the doctrines of the Trinity and of the divinity of the Saviour.The Reviewer instead of formally attempting to meet the arguments of Mr. S. is satisfied with giving to the public the reasons for his own opinions. We shall confine the present article to these three publications as they respect the doctrine above alluded to, and shall sufficiently exhibit the course of the discussion, by some general remarks which we propose to make concerning it.

Before entering directly on the subject, we feel ourselves called to a slight exercise of our critical prerogative in a few auimadversions on the learned Professor's letters.

After justly complaining of the want of fairness and candour in the representation made by Mr. C. of the views of Trinitarians, in which there is not an intimation that they believe in the unity of God, Mr. S. proceeds to exhibit his own views of this doctrine and to evince their general coincidence with those of the great body of Trinitarians. He says,

I believe, then,

I. That GOD is ONE; numerically one, in essence and attributes. In other words; the

infinitely perfect Spirit, the Creator and preserver of all things, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, has numerically the same essence, and the same perfections, so far as they are known to us. To particuralize ; the Son possesses not simply a similar or equal essence and perfections, but numerically the same as the Father, without division, and without multiplication.

II. The Son, (and also the Holy Spirit,) does in some respect truly and really, not the Father-p. 20. merely nominally or logically, differ from

While we award much praise to Mr. S. for the judicious caution, with which his general statements of the doctrines in debate are made, we frankly confess that we doubt the entire judiciousness of the above statement of the doctrine of the divine unity. It is true, and it must be admitted, that God is not one in every possible sense, and also three, in some other sense. If then the commonly received principle of philosophy be correct, viz. that essence and attributes constitute the whole nature of being, it would seem to follow, that a being who is one in essence and in attributes, is one in every possible sense, and cannot therefore be three in any sense. It is indeed impossible as Mr. S. supposes, "to shew what constitutes the internal nature of the divine essence and attributes, or how they are related to each other, or what internal distinctions exist." At the same time it is possible to predicate a numerical oneness of the essence and attributes of God, which shall preclude the possibility of a numerical distinction. And we are greatly deceived, if the assertions of Mr. S. that God is numerically one in essence and attributes, that the Father, Son and Holy Ghost has numerically the same essence, and the same perfections so far as they are known to us, that the Son possesses not simply a similar or equal essence and perfections, but numerically the same as the Father without division, or multiplication, are not understood by a great majority of his readers to declare such an absolute indentity of the Father and the Son as to preclude the possibility of a distinction. It is not known, nor can it be proved, that essence and attributes do constitute the whole nature of God, and therefore the position that God is numerically one in essence and attributes, may not be inconsistent with the Trinity of the Godhead. We do not therefore intend to deny the truth of this statement. We do however regard it as injudicious to affirm any thing more explicitly respecting the

divine unity than the Scriptures une quivocally authorize; and whether they do thus authorize the position of Mr. S. seems to us to depend on the philosophical question, whether essence and attributes, as these terms are ordinarily understood, constitute the whole nature of God. While therefore we can discover neither necessity nor reason for this minuteness of statement, we are disposed to object to it, that it opens the door to a philosophical question on which the general current of opinion would be against the Professor, and also that it assumes more than can be proved to be true respecting the mode of the divine existence. It is not however, our design to dwell on this particular. Whether our remarks are justified, or not, by the language of Mr. S. candour obliges us to regard it as an inadvertence in the use of terms which convey different ideas to the mind of others from those in his own, and the errour, if it be one, is wholly immaterial to the main point in debate. No one we think, can read his letters, with the same views of the foregoing statement which we have, without seeing that it does not at all obscure the gen. eral exhibition given of the doctrine of the Trinity.

We have an exception to make to one part of Mr. Stuart's remarks on the subject of interpretation. On the supposition that the inspiration of the Scriptures be admitted, he says,

My simple inquiry must be, what sentiment does the language of this or that pas sage convey, without violence or perversion of rule? When this question is setthen I either believe what is taught, or else tled philologically (not philosophically,) reject the claim of divine authority. What can my own theories and reasonings, about the absurdity or reasonableness of any particular doctrine, avail in determining whether a writer of the New Testament has taught this doctrine or not? My investigation must be conducted independently of my philosophy, by my philology. And when I have obtained his meaning, by the simple and universal rules of expounding language, I choose the course I will take; I must believe his assertion, or reject his authority.—p. 59.

We think that in these and similar

remarks, Mr. S. has not exactly met the Unitarian, and driven him from his ground. The Unitarian will readily concede, that when the meaning of a writer is fairly ascertained by the right rules of exposition, he must either believe his assertion or reject his authority. But he will not concede, that his investigation is to be conducted by his philology, independently of his philosophy; nor do we think that Mr. S. has shewn or can shew, that it ought to be so conducted. Should we find in a book of acknowledged inspiration, the assertion that Peter and John are one, we should find the language used in such circumstances as to lead us at once to decide, that the meaning is not that they are one being; and our decision would rest on these two principles; first that our received philosophy forbids such an interpretation, and secondly, that the language, according to a common usage has evidently a figurative meaning. Now these are, as we shall have occasion to shew hereafter, precisely the principles which Unitarians adopt in interpreting the texts that speak of the divinity of Christ. The case in the mind of Professor Stuart, was evidently one in which there was no usage to authorize the supposed metaphorical meaning of the passage; or a case in which the second of the above principles could not be applied. To recur to the example given above; the book is inspired, it affirms that Peter and John are one, there are no circumstances to authorize any other than a literal meaning of the terms. Now in such a case Professor Stuart maintains, and justly maintains, that the point at issue is between the authority of the writer, and that of our philosophy, and therefore we are brought to the alternative of believing the writer's assertion, or of rejecting the writer's authority. To all this we have no doubt the Unitarian would readily assent, still he would not feel as it was the Professor's object to make him feel, that he must believe the divinity of Christ, or re

ject the inspiration of the Scriptures; for he would reply that the passages supposed by Trinitarians to assert Christ's divinity, admit according to he common use of language of another interpretation, and that his philosophy decides that of the two meanings of which the passages are capable, that of the Trinitarian cannot be the right one. He therefore rejects that interpretation and maintains the authority of revelation.— We do not here mean to affirm that Mr. S. has not in the subsequent discussion effectually closed the way of escape from his dilemma, against the Unitarian.

We have no doubt at least that he has abundantly furnished the materials. We only regret

that when formally laying down the principles of interpretation, he did not, as we think he might have done, cut off every retreat.

We shall now proceed to those general remarks which we proposed.

As

1. We regard Mr. Stuart's letters, as a complete and triumphant refutation of the sermon of Mr. C. and in effect of the review in the Christian Disciple, on the main questions in debate. the controversy has been conducted in the present instance, it turns almost wholly on two points, the intrinsic absurdity of the doctrines of the Trinity and the supreme divinity of Christ; and the testimony of the scriptures to the latter doctrine. We do not suppose it necessary to prove the assertion, that Unitarians regard the doctrine of the Trinity as absurd. Mr. C. has stated his objections to the doctrine in some diversity of form, but we are utterly unable to discover the least force in either of them, except what results from the supposed absurdity of the doctrine. The following extract, will exhibit Mr. C's. objection in its entire strength.

We object to the doctrine of the Trinity, ding to this doctrine, there are three infithat it subverts the unity of God. Accornite and equal persons, possessing supreme divinity, called the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Each of these persons, as described by theologians, has his own particular consciousness, will, and perceptions—

They love each other, converse with each other, and delight in each other's society. They perform different parts in man's redemption, each having his appropriate office, and neither doing the work of the other. The Son is mediator, and not the Father. The Father sends the Son, and is not himself sent; nor is he conscious, like the Son, of taking flesh. Here then, we have three intelligent agents, possessed of different consciousness, different wills, and different perceptions, performing different acts, and sustaining different relations; and if these things do not imply and constitute three minds or beings, we are utterly at a loss to know how three minds or beings are to be formed. It is difference of properties, and acts, and consciousness, which leads us to the belief of different intelligent beings, and if this mark fail us, our whole knowledge falls; we have no proof, that all the agents and persons in the universe, are not one and the same mind-pp. 13, 14.

dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being, who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eternal? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact, that there are three persons in the Godhead, (in the sense explained ;) that there is a distinction which affords ground for the appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which lays the foundation for the application of the personal pronouns, I, thou, he; which renders it proper, to speak of sending and being sent; of Christ being with God, being in his bosom, and other things of the like nature; and yet, that the divine nature belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation.-pp. 35, 36.

In regard to this distinction, we say, It

You will permit me, then, to add, that we speak of person in the Godhead, to express that which in some respect or other corresponds to persons as applied to men, i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a sepavate consciousness, will, omnipotence, omniscience, &c. p. 34.

Then surely it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and proceed to charge them with absurdities, consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used in a sense somewhat different from their ordinary import. p. 35.

One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, demands that "every word... should be modified and explained, according to the subject which is discussed, according to the PURPOSES, feelings, circumstances and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dispute between us about the meaning of the word person, is forever at an end.

What then, you doubtless will ask, is that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt. By what shall I, or can 1 define it? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and

lation to us, of modes of action, or of rela tion between attributes and substance or essence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures justify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject. We undertake, (at least, the Trinitarians of our country, with whom I am acquainted, undertake,) not at all to describe affirmalively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative des. cription of underived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of self-existence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, because we cannot affirmatively define it.—p. p. 36, 37.

In order to prove that this distinction contradicts the divine unity, must you not be able to tell what it is, and what the divine Unity is? Can you do either?

Allow me, for a moment, to dwell on the subject now casually introduced. It is a clear point I think, that the unity of God cannot be proved, without revelation. It may perhaps be rendered faintly probable. Then you depend on Scripture proof, for the establishment of this doctrine. But have the Scriptures any where told us what the divine Unity is? Wi!! you produce the passage? The oneness of God they assert. But this they assert always, in opposition to the idols of the hea then the polytheism of the Gentiles-the gods superior and inferior, which they worshipped. In no other sense, have the Scriptures defined the ONENESS of the Deity. What then is Oneness, in the uncreated, infinite, eternal Being? In created and finite objects, we have a distinct perception of what we mean by it: but can

created objects be just and adequate representatives of the uncreated ONE? Familiar as the assertion is, in your conversation and in your sermons, that God is ONE, can you give me any definition of this oneness, except a negative one? That is, you deny plurality of it; you say God is but one and not two, or more. Still, in what, I ask, does the divine Unity consist? Has not God different and various faculties and powers? Is he not almighty, omniscient, omnipresent, holy, just, and good? Does he not act differently, i. e. variously, in the natural, and in the moral world? Does his unity consist, then, appropriately in bis essence? But what is the essence of God? And how can you assert that bis unity consists appropriately in this, unless you know what his essence is, and whether oneness can be any better predicated of this, than of his attributes?-pp. 45, 46.

Suppose I should affirm that two subjects A and B are numerically identical in regard to something called X, but diverse or distinct, in regard to something else called Y; is there any absurdity or contradiction in this affirmation? I hope I shall not, by making this supposition, be subjected to the imputation, of endeav ouring to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by the science of Algebra; for my only object in proposing this statement is, to illustrate the answer that we make, to a very common question, which Unitarians put us; "How can three be one, and one three?" In no way, I necessarily and cheerfully reply. "How then is the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity to be vindicated?" In a manner, which is not at all embarrassed by these questions. We do not maintain that the Godhead is three, in the same respects that it is one, but the reverse. In regard to X, we maintain its nnmerical unity; in regard to Y, we maintain a threefold distinction; I repeat it, we maintain simply the fact that there is such a distinction, on Scripture authority. We do not profess to understand in what it consists. p. 47.

Now we think that no one can read the statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, made by Mr. C. and that made by Mr. S. and not see that they are totally diverse. What Mr. C. asserts to belong to the doctrine, Mr. S. denies to be any part of it. Allowing then, the argument which Mr. C. has founded on his statement of the doctrine to be conclusive, still he has opposed a doctrine of the Trinity, not maintained by the Trinitarians of this country; and therefore a doctrine, which, so far as the purpose of discussion is concerned, is a

doctrine of his own fabrication. This doctrine, at least for the present, we will concede, he has completely demolished. But has he approached the real doctrine in debate, the doctrine held and stated by Mr. S. and we may say by the other Trinitarians of this country? He has opposed the doctrine that there are three Gods. Is this the doctrine that there are three persons in the Godhead, as maintained by Mr. Stuart ?

Let us now inquire what the Reviewer has achieved on this point. Requesting our readers to bear it in mind that he is professedly reviewing Mr. S.'s Letters, we give the following as the substance of what he has said on the topic now before us.

The proper modern doctrine of the Trinity, as it is stated in the creeds of latter times, is, that there are three persons in the Divinity, who equally possess all divine attributes; and this doctrine is at the same time connected with an explicit statement that there is but one God. Now we do not believe this doctrine, because taken in connexion with that of the unity of God, it is a doctrine essentially incredible; one, which no man who has compared the two doctrines together with just conceptions of both, ever did, or ever could believe. Three persons, each equally possessing divine attributes, are three Gods. A person is a being. No one who bas any correct notion of the meaning of words will deny this. And the being who possesses divine attributes must be God or a God. The doctrine of the Trinity, then, affirms that there are three Gods. It is affiriped at the same time, that there is but one God. But nobody can believe that there are three Gods, and that there is but one God.-p. 371.

There is no reasonable pretence for say. ing that the great body of Trinitarians, when they have used the word person, have not meant to express proper personality. He who asserts the contrary, asserts a mere extravagance. He closes bis eyes upon an obvious fact, and then affirms what he may fancy ought to have been, instead of what there is no doubt really has been.-p. 371.

The Reviewer then proceeds to state the different forms of the modern doctrine of the Trinity. We suppose the following remarks to apply

to Mr. S.'s statement.

But there are others, who maintain with those last mentioned, that in the terms