employed in stating the doctrine of the Trinity, the word person, is not to be taken in its usual acceptation; but who differ from them in maintaining that these terms ought to be understood as affirming a real threefold distinction in the Godhead. But this is nothing more than a mere evasion introduced into the general statement of the doctrine, for the purpose of rescuing it from the charge of absurdity, to which those who thus express themselves, allow that it would be liable, if the language in which it is usually expressed, were to be understood in its common acceptation.They themselves, however, after giving this general statement, immediately relapse into the common belief. When they speak particularly of the Father, the Son, or the Spirit, they speak of them unequivity, in which the word person is used the Trinity affirms that there are three Gods." The doctrine then, the only doctrine opposed by the Reviewer, on the ground of its absurdity, is that which affirms that there are three Gods, and yet but one God! Is this doctrine maintained by any respectable theologian in this country? Is it the doctrine stated and defended by Mr. Stuart ? ocally as persons in the proper sense of the word. They attribute to them personal attributes. They speak of each as sustaining personal relations peculiar to himself, and performing personal actions, perfeetly distinct from those of either of the others.-p. 374. Those, therefore, whose opinions we are now considering, we conceive to be nominal Trinitarians in their statement of the doctrine, and real Trinitarians in their belief; to hold the true doctrine with an implicit acknowledgment in the very statement which they have adopted, that the true doctrine is untenable; and to have involved themselves therefore in new difficulties, without having effected any escape from those with which they were pressed before.-p. 377. It would seem that if the Reviewer proposed to himself any object in his discussion, it must have been to correct the errours of his own age and country. The question then is whether the great body of Trinitarians, whom he could hope to benefit by his labours, do by the word person, in its present application, intend to denote a distinct being? Where does the Reviewer find proof of this assertion? Does he find it in the statements of the author whom he is reviewing? Does he find it in the statements of any respectable theologian of this country? He has produced no such evidence in support of his assertion; and yet he asserts, as if contradiction were impossible, that in this controversy, "a person is a being"; that no one who has any correct notion of the meaning of words, will deny this; that the doctrine of But the Reviewer, if we rightly understand him, has conceded the very point in debate. Speaking of that statement of the doctrine of the Trin out of its ordinary acceptation, after saying it is made for the purpose of rescuing the doctrine from the charge of absurdity; instead of charging the statement itself with absurdity, he is satisfied to bring the charge against what he conceives to be the actual belief of those who adopt the statement. The inference is, that the statement of the doctrine is not chargeable with absurdity. The Reviewer can, if he please, consider those who adopt the statement now under consideration, as Tritheists, or any thing else. But to argue from what he conceives their creed to be, instead of arguing from the statement which they give of it, is the perfection of trifling. Even on the supposition that they have made declarations, which are inconsistent with their own statement, by what authority does he infer, that these are the true index of their creed, and not their own statement? The Reviewer can employ his ingenuity in forming a creed for Trinitarians, and then charge it with absurdity, and then peradventure substantiate the charge. But what has he accomplished? Is the actual creed of the Trinitarian subverted by such a course? But he says when Trinitarians speak of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit, they ascribe to them personal attributes, personal relations, and personal actions, and he will have it, that when they do this, they "relapse" from their statement into "the common belief" of three Gods. Our an swer is simply that the Reviewer has relapsed into the common belief," that Trinitarians do not use the word person in the sense in which they profess to use it. Only let him be candid enough to affix their own meaning to this term, and all that which he regards as inconsistent with the statement of their creed, becomes at once perfectly consistent with it. For if there really be that distinction in the Godhead which is the ground of those personal relations, personal actions, &c. which Trinitarians ascribe to the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, and if, as they maintain, and as the Reviewer seems to concede, this distinction is consistent with the unity of the Godhead, then these personal relations, &c. do not prove that there are three Gods. It is then perfectly clear that the Reviewer, when he charges us with "relapsing" into "the common belief" of three Gods, has only "relapsed" (a relapse to which he is peculiarly subject,) into the common unfairness of perverting our language. This is not all. Speaking of the statement of the doctrine made by Mr. Stuart, he says, "this is nothing more than a modal or nominal Trinity;" (p. 376) which, as he also says, "is nothing more than simple Unitarianism disguised," &c." (p. 374. Whether the Reviewer be right in supposing this statement to be nothing more than simple Unitarianism, is wholly immaterial to the point now before us. One thing is certain; he perceives nothing in it to distinguish it from simple Unitarianism, and of course he can perceive no more absurdity in it than he can perceive in simple Unitarianism. He has therefore conceded that so far as the perceptions of his intellect can reach, the statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, made by Mr. Stuart, is as free from absurdity as Unitarianism itself. Again, the Reviewer maintains that we know, and can know, nothing of the nature of any being, but by the attributes or properties of that being. We then safely affirm that he knows nothing of God but by his attributes. How then does he know that God may not know something of himself, besides his own attributes, even that he exists in the manner maintained by Trinitarians? This is possible, according to the Reviewer's own confession. What then becomes of all the Reviewer's assertions, which imply that on this subject, Omniscience can know no more than he himself knows! We are now prepared to ask whether the doctrine of the Trinity, as stated by Mr. S. (and there is no doubt that his general statement would be approved by the great body of Trinitarians,) is proved to be an absurdity by Mr. C. or by the Reviewer? We ask whether the term person, as used by Mr. S. and other Trinitarians, to denote an unknown three-fold distinction in the Godhead, does denote three Gods? This is the whole question now at issue. Unless it can be shewn that Trinitarians do believe, and do teach that there are three Gods, and yet but one God, there is not a pretence for the charges of absurdity brought against their doctrine by Mr. C. and the Reviewer. On this point we do think that no one can be at a loss, after reading the extracts we have made from the Letters of Mr. Stuart. To the fact that "a person," in the language of Trinitarians, "is a being," there is not the least evidence, except the assertion of the Reviewer, an assertion made in direct contradiction to the explanations which Trinitarians give of the term in question. But it is a right indefeasible, of Trinitarians as of all men, to use words as they please, if they explain them; and we add that a stronger proof cannot be furnished of conscious defeat in a controversial writer, than to resort to the pitiful subterfuge of denying the meaning which an antagonist puts on his own terms. It belonged to the Reviewer not to reject Mr. Stuart's meaning in the face of his explanation of the term person, but to meet the point in debate, as presented by that explanation. This he has not done, nor pretended to do. All he has done, is to resort to the degrading expedient of insisting that Trinitarians do mean what they most unequivocally affirm, they do not mean. By thus affixing a meaning of his own to their terms, in direct contradiction to their explanation, he has succeeded in the redoubtable exploit of shewing that downright absurdity belongs to a chimera of his own invention! This leaves the doctrine of the Trinity just where he found it. And here it will remain, until Mr. C. or the Reviewer, or some other Unitarian, shall so find out the Almighty to perfection, as to be able to tell us, and to prove that they truly tell us, that there is not, and cannot be such a distinction in the divine nature, as Mr. S. contends for. Till they do this, all they have said, and all they can say on the absurdity of the doctrine, must be regarded as a gross and wilful misrepresentation. The doctrine, that one and the same perwills, two souls, infinitely different from each other, this we think an enormous tax on human credulity.—p. 19. son should have two consciousnesses, two The Reviewer has discussed the same topic, but we are unable to discover any addition to the argument of Mr. C. Let us then hear Mr. Stuart. How shall any man decide, a priori, that the doctrine cannot be true? Can we lim it the omniscient and omnipotent God, by saying that the Son cannot be so united with human nature, so "become flesh and dwell among us," that we recognize and distinguish, in this complex being, but one person, and therefore speak of but one? effected, between natures 30 infinitely diIf you ask me how such a union can be verse as the divine and human; I answer, (as in the case of the distinction in the Godhead,) 1 do not know how this is done; I do not undertake to define wherein that union consists, nor how it is effected. God cannot divest himself of his essential perfections, i. e. he is immutably perfect; nor could the human nature of Christ have. continued to be human nature, if it had ceased to be subject to the infirmities, and sorrows, and affections of this nature, while he dwelt among men. In whatever way, then, the union of the two natures was effected, it neither destroyed, nor essentially changed either the divine or hu The next point of inquiry is the absurdity charged on the doctrine of the twofold nature of Christ. After speaking of this doctrine as a corruption of Christianity alike repugnant to common sense, and to the generaled as the Creator of the Universe; and at Hence, at one time, Christ is representstrain of the Scriptures, Mr. C. says, According to this doctrine, Jesus Christ instead of being one mind, one conscious intelligent principle, whom we can understand, consists of two souls, two minds; the one divine, the other buman; the one weak, the other Almighty; the one ignorant, the one omniscient. Now we maintain, that this is to make Christ two beings. To denominate him one person, one being, and yet to suppose him made up of two minds, infinitely different from each other, is to abuse and confound language, and to throw darkness over all our conceptions of intelligent natures. According to the common doctrine, each of these two minds in Christ has its own consciousness, its own will, its own perceptions. They have in fact no common properties. The divine mind feels none of the wants and sorrows of the human, and the human is infinitely removed from the perfection and happiness of the divine. Can you conceive of two beings in the universe more distinct? We have always thought that one person was constituted and distinguished by one consciousness.— Vol 3.-No. III. 18 man nature. another, as a man of sorrows, and of im perfect knowledge. (John i. 1-18. Heb. i. 10-12. Luke xxii. 44, 45. ii. 52.) If both of these accounts are true, he must, omnipotent; and still a feeble man of im as it seems to me, be God omniscient and ble to reconcile these two things, without perfect knowledge. It is indeed impossi the supposition of two natures. The simple question then is; Can they be joined or united, so that in speaking of them, we may say the person is God, or man; or we may call him by one single name, and by this understand, as designated, either or both of these natures? On this subject, the has nothing to say; for surely no finite bereligion of nature says nothing. Reason ing is competent to decide, that the junction of the two natures is impossible or absurd. pp. 52, 53. Nor is there any created object, to which the union of Godhead with humani. ty can be compared. But shall we deny shall we tax with absurdity, that which it the possibility of it, on this account? Or is utterly beyond our reach to scan? I shrink from such an undertaking, and place myself in the attitude of listening to what the voice of Revelation may dictate, in regard to this. It becomes us here to do so; to prostrate ourselves before the Father of Lights, and say, Speak, Lord, for thy servants hear. Lord what wilt thou have us to believe!-pp. 54. Nothing is plainer than that Unitarians in asserting the impossibility of the twofold nature of Christ, assume that any departure from the mode in which philosophy decides that beings exist, is to be regarded as palpable absurdity. But is such an assumption authorized? Is what God has done in certain cases the limit of what he can do? Because so far as mere philosophy has made any discovery, God has never united two human souls with one body, or because he has never united an angel and a man in one individual, are we authorized to assert that such a union cannot be produced by the Almighty? Would sach an union in a single instance made known by a revelation from God, "throw darkness over all our conceptions of intelligent natures ?" Is Mr. C. or the Reviewer competent to affirm what union of beings of different orders can and cannot be effected by omnipotence, or of what union with creatures, God himself is or is not capable? If they are, then it becomes us to listen to their assertions on the point before us; but if they are not, then all their allegations of absurdity, brought against the union of humanity and divinity in the Lord Jesus Christ, are the assertions of mere ignorance. But says Mr. C. (6 we have always thought, &c.""This we think is an enormous tax on human credulity." And what does this prove? Nothing, unless the thoughts of Mr. C. and his party are ample authority for the faith of other men; nothing we may add, unless what they have always thought and still think, is sufficient authority for rejecting the plain declarations of God. But we wish to present the subject in another light. The fact asserted in the doctrine, that the Lord Jesus Christ is both God and man, we regard as a miraculous fact, as the most stupendous of miracles. Is it then to be reasoned against on the principles of philosophy? Is it to be judged of by reasoning from the natural constitution of things? Would it be legitimate reasoning to attempt by the received principles of philosophy to prove the miracles of the Gospel to be fictitious, and are we with David Hume, to deny that Christ raised the dead by a word, because this is unphilosophical? Surely such reasoning does not become the believer in Christianity. We admit the premises of the Unitarian, but we pronounce their connexion with his conclusion, palpable and arbitrary assumption. The very statement of the argument and of the analogy on which it rests, is enough to detect its fallacy. All other men are mere men, therefore Christ Jesus is a mere man. On such assumption rests the bold, and reiterated allegations of absurdity against the union of divinity and humanity in the Messiah: and to make them "we think is an enormous tax" on human presumption. "There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio, Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” We now come to the second general topic, viz. the testimony of the scriptures to the divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ. The pledge which we are to redeem is, that here also the argument is wholly with Mr. Stuart. So far as Mr. C. or the Reviewer rejects the Trinitarian import of texts on the ground of absurdity, we shall consider our previous remarks as superseding the necessity of any further notice of their objections. Mr. C. remarks, that "in looking through the Gospels of Matthew, and Mark, and Luke, we meet no instance in which Christ is called God.” Mr. S. replies thus : Why should you say in the third paragraph of your note, that in looking through "Matthew, Mark, and Luke, you meet with no instance in which Christ is called God?" Are there no proofs here of his omniscience, of his omnipotence, of his authority to forgive sin, of his supreme, le gislative right? And are not these things better proof of his divine nature than a mere name can be?-p. 115. The first passage adduced by Mr. Stuart, in proof of the divinity of Christ, is John i. 1. "In the beginning was the word, (Logos) and the word was with God, and the word was God." His argument, which is a masterly exhibition of clear and forcible reasoning, is designed to establish two positions. I. That the Logos is a person, and not an attribute of God, as maintained by Dr. Priestly; since it would be trifling, in the last degree, for the Evangelist to instruct his readers that the attributes of a being are with that being; and positively false to affirm that a single attribute of the divine nature is God. II. That the Logos is called God in the proper and highest sense of the term; because an inferior sense is not authorized by the usage of the New Testament, nor even of the Old, except in a few instances, where the meaning is so clearly limited by the context, as to preclude the possibility of mistake. To this evidence, which we think amply sufficient of itself, Mr. Stuart adds the decisive fact, (on which he chiefly insists) that the meaning of the word God in this passage, is defined by a description of the Logos in the third verse, as the Creator of all things. If He be not therefore the supreme God, we have neither from reason nor revelation, the slightest knowledge of such a being. Mr. Channing and the Reviewer, while they reject the orthodox interpretation of this passage, are fatally at variance with each other. The former maintains that the Logos is a distinct being, and denominated God in a lower sense of the term: the latter contends that the Logos is not a distinct being, and that the word God is used in its highest and appropriate meaning. It is thus that in the interpretation of every part of the scriptures, the two great divisions of the Unitarian party are continually em ployed in destroying each others labors. Every blow aimed at the Orthodox, is equally fatal to themselves; and if they could succeed in undermining the foundation on which the church has reposed for ages, they must fight over the ruins until one party or the other perish in the conflict. In denying to the Logos the title of God in the highest sense of the term, Mr. Channing's argument overlooks the fact that the meaning of the word is defined in the third verse, by a description of Him as the Maker of all things. He must therefore abandon the lower sense of the term, or maintain, in opposition to the Apostle, that He who made all things" is not truly God." The Reviewer bestows much labor on the passage before us; and raises so much learned dust from the pages of Philo, the Platonists, and Gnostics, that if his readers are not blinded to the simple meaning of the Evangelist, it will be no fault of his. He has not, however, given us one particle of proof (and yet the fact is essential to his argument) that the introduction to St. John's Gospel, has the slightest reference to these archheretics, who are thus dragged to the judgment seat of the Evangelist to receive sentence of condemnation. "He "thinks,"" we may suppose," " probably," St. John " was not ignorant on these subjects;" but not one particle of proof even to that point; much less to the existence of any design on the part of the Evangelist to correct those errors. Now it is incredible that a man of sense, that an inspired Apostle, should come forward to oppose the most alarming errours on the fundamental doctrine of religion, the unity of God, without making known his intention; without pointing out those errours too clearly to be misunderstood; and meeting them with a direct and formal refutation. Was St. John thus backward to disclose his object, thus exquisitely tender as to the feelings of the erroneous, when he reproved the seven churches of Asia? We might then dismiss the |