ture.

have reached the perfection of intellectual and moral excellence,' or if he should say this, it would be regarded as an evidence of mental derangement. Indeed the farther we advance in the cultivation of our minds, and in the attainment of virtue, the more distant appears the end of our journey. And can powers which have apparently but just begun to blossom, suddenly droop and die? The tender plant does not yield to the storms of winter, without reserving to itself its principle of life, and when the genial warmth of Spring returns, it again puts forth its blossoms, and lives, and grows, until it has reached the perfection of its naThe animal does not stop in its progress towards maturity at the threshold of life; nor do the corporeal powers of man. Then why should the powers of his mind? It is true, the decline of the mind, like the decay of the body, is in most instances gradual, and it might seem that the commencement of its decline must be the perfection of its improvement. But when the mind from its connexion with the body, begins to sink under the infirmities of age, it has but just begun its career of improvement, whereas the body has reached its perfection and must die. The man of fifty or sixty, let him be the best man on earth, feels himself to be a child in moral and intellectual excellence, and if he cherishes proper sentiments, he longs to advance in his career, and after the winter of old age is past, and death has unfettered his soul, he hopes to rekindle with the ardour of youth, and to resume his progress towards perfection.

Another evidence of a future state is "the natural apprehensions of the mind when under the influence of remorse." Ask the sinner who has suffered all the anguish of remorse and all the other punishments which this world affords, if he is not deserving of something more, and if he speaks the language of his couscience he will acknowledge that he is; and it should be remembered that the lan

guage of an enlightened, and an unbiassed conscience, is the language of truth, else God has planted in our moral constitution a principle which deludes us.

Among the other evidences of a future state, which Mr. Stewart mentions are the following.

1. The natural desire of immortality; and the anticipations of futurity inspired by hope.

2. The information we are rendered capable of acquiring, concerning the more reremote parts of the universe; the unlimited range which is opened to the human imagination through the immensity of space and of time; and the ideas however imperfect, which philosophy affords us of the existence and attributes of an over-ruling mind:-Acquisitions, for which an obvious final cause may be traced, on the sup position of a future state; but which if that supposition be rejected, could have no other effect than to make the business

of life appear unworthy of our regard.

3. The tendency of the infirmities of age and of the pains of disease, to strength. en and confirm our moral habits; and the difficulty of accounting, upon the bypoth esis of annihilation, for those sufferings which commonly put a period to the existence of man.

4. The discordance between our moral judgements and feelings and the course of

human affairs.

5. The analogy of the material world; in some parts of which the most complete order may be traced; and of which our views always become the more satis factory, the wider our knowledge extends. that can furnish a key to the present disor It is the supposition of a future state alone, ders of the moral world; and without it, many of the most striking phenomena of buman life must remain forever inexplicable. 6. The inconsistency of supposing, that the moral laws which regulate the course of human affairs have no reference to any thing beyound the limits of the present scene; when all the bodies which com. pose the visible universe appear to be related to each other, as parts of one great physical system

Of the different considerations now mentioned,there is not one perhaps, which taken singly, would be sufficient to establish the truth they are brought to prove; but taken in conjunction, their force appears irresistible. They not only terminate in the same conclusion, but they mutually reflect light on each other; and they have that sort of consistency and connexion among themselves, which could hardly be supposed to take place among a series of false propositions.

In order to feel the force of the second of these arguments we should if possible, lay aside for a few moments all expectations of a hereafter. What then would be the aspect under which the business of life would present itself, were our hopes to terminate here? I lift my views to the starry heavens; I behold a countless multitude of worlds, which are in all probability inhabited by intelligent beings. I look in imagination beyond my fancy expatiates in the outer regions of all that is visible,' and a new universe of worlds bursts upon my view. I look again, and perceive that these millions of worlds must have had a cause. Some Almighty arm too must be abroad over them, to suspend them in existence, and to wheel them around in their orbits with an inconceivable velocity. I ask for what purpose these worlds were made; and as I consider the ends to which one of their number seems to be subservient, and by an analogical inference, give to them all the accommodations, and the ultimate designs which prevail here, my soul is overwhelmed with a perception of Almighty goodness. How glorious a discovery, that the inconceivable power which gave birth to these worlds after worlds, and systems after systems, and which upholds them in existence, and makes them wheel their majestic rounds through immensity with an ease which seems like the playful activity of a child, how glorious the discovery, that such tremendous power is under the guidance of boundless goodness! Were it otherwise, unutterable despair would overwhelm the intelligent creation. Not a ray of hope would be left. This boundless theatre above, would be hung in mourning, and the darkness of midnight would spread through immensity. Now, what is man that thou art mindful of him, or the son of man that thou condescendest to visit him. Nay, what would be man, were he the mere creature of a day, and were his hopes to expire for ever in this narrow world. In view of these grand conceptions, Vol. 3.-No. V. 32

does not the business of human life, if this life comprehends our whole existence, seem absolutely unworthy of our regard?' Our readers may say there is more of declamation in all this, than argument; but we ask them to consider, why we were made capable of rising to these sublime contemplations, if their only effect is to render us dissatisfied with these few fleeting years of our existence. Why unfold to us the glories of the universe, if their only effect is to make us almost despise this little ball on which we are to tread for a moment, and then to vanish forever? Why especially fill our souls with the enrapturing discoveries of God who sits in the heavens and rules throughout immensity, if instead of being permitted to dwell on the sublime contemplation, instead of rising to a nearer view of his glory, and expanding our love and our gratitude, and our adoration, and our joy forever before his throne, we must soon close our eyes in endless night? But introduce into this dreary picture, the bright dawn of a hereafter, and how changed the scene! The little insect of a day now rises into dignity. The meanest act of his life, if performed from a solemn regard to his duty, assumes a high importance, for it has a bearing on an eternal state of existence. The earth, with all its furniture acquires a value which outstretches calculation, for it becomes the cradle of myriads of im mortal beings; and these high conceptions of God and his wonderful works, and this unlimited range of the imagination through the immensity of space and of time, are now the richest of Heaven's blessings, and the noble pledges of sublimer joys hereafter.

After all that has been said however by writers on natural Theology, to prove a future state of existence, the arguments are not so convincing as to supersede the necessity of a revelation. The following lines present so striking and so grand a representation of the subject, that we cannot withhold them from our readers,

"Dim as the borrowed beams of moon and stars

To lonely, weary, wandering travellers,
Is reason to the soul; and as on high
Those rolling fires discover but the sky,
Not light us here, so reason's glimmering ray
Was lent, not to assure our doubtful way,
But guide us upward to a better day.
And as those nightly tapers disappear,
When days' bright lord ascends our hem-

isphere,

So pale grows Reason in Religion's sight, So dies, and so dissolves in supernatural light."

We would now call the attention of our readers to the chapter on the moral attributes of the Deity. So far as they are discoverable by the light of nature, they are according to Mr. Stewart, Benevolence and Justice. For the Benevolence of the Deity, he thinks we have a strong presumptive, a priori, argument, inasmuch as the exquisite pleasure which we know by our own experience accompanies the exercise of benevolence," the peculiar satisfaction with which we reflect on such of our actions as have contributed to the happiness of mankind, and the peculiar sentiment of approbation with which we regard the virtue of beneficience," it would seem, render it difficult to conceive what other motive could have induced a Being completely and independently happy, to have called his creatures into existence than that of benevolence.

On the question concerning the origin of evil, the author mentions three of the most celebrated theories.

1. "The doctrine of Pre-existence.
2. The doctrines of the Manicheans.
3. The doctrine of Optimism.

According to the first hypothesis, the evils we suffer at present are punishments and expiations of moral delinquencies, committed in a former stage of our being. This hypothesis, it is obvious, (to mention no other objection) only removes the diff culty a little out of sight, without affording any explanation of it.

The Manicheans account for the mix ture of good and evil in the Universe, by the opposite agencies of two co-eterual and independent principles. Their doc. trine has been examined and refuted by many authors, by reasonings a priori; but the most satisfactory of all refutation is its obvious inconsistency with that unity of design which is every where conspicu

ous in nature.

The fundamental principle of the Optimists is, that all events are ordered for the best; and that the evils which we suffer, are parts of a great system conducted by Almighty power, under the direction of infinite wisdom and goodness.”—p. 209.

It is unnecessary to add that Mr. Stewart holds to the doctrine of the

Optimists. He belongs to that class of Optimists however, who admit, the freedom of human actions. He believes that "every thing is right so far as it is the work of God," and that "the creation of beings endowed with free will, and consequently liable to moral delinquency, and the government of the world by general laws, from which occasional evils must result, furnish no solid objection to the perfection of the Universe." At the same time he holds that "although the permission of moral evil does not detract from the goodness of God, it is nevertheless imputable to man as a fault, and renders him justly obnoxious to punishment," inasmuch as it is an abuse of his free agency for which his own conscience condemns him.

To the question, why has moral evil been permitted ?-he thinks it sufficient to reply, that "perhaps the object of the Deity in the government of the world, is not merely to communicate happiness, but to form his creatures to moral excellence ;-or that the enjoyment of high degrees of happiness, may perhaps necessarily equire the previous acquisition of virtuous habits."

That virtue is in fact, an ultimate good, and consequently an ultimate object of benevolence,and that it may, for this reason, be an end of our being, as is here suggested by Mr. Stewart, or that at least so much importance is attached to it in the economy of the universe, as to furnish good reasons for believing that without it, a high degree of happiness cannot, from the nature of things, be attained, appears to us far from being improbable; else why should almost every thing in the world, even happiness itself, be made so subservient to its encouragement? It is for the encouragement of virtue, that the sinner suf

It is probably for the encouragement of virtue, that this world is visited with so much suffering and sorrow. Indeed as Mr. Stewart has elsewhere remarked, it seems probable, that "notwithstanding the seemingly promiscuous distribution of happiness and misery in this life, the reward of virtue, and the punishment of vice, are the great objects of all the general laws by which the world is governed."

It should also be remembered that virtue is desirable on its own account, and not merely because it is connected with the highest happiness. Indeed the man who loves her solely for the happiness she confers, and not for her intrinsic excellence and amiableness, is not the man whom we venerate for his high moral dignity and worth. His virtue (if indeed it deserves the name,) is but a more respectable sort of selflove, and not the noble disinterestedness of a man who is resolved to perform his duty, regardles of consequences.

But if virtue is lovely for its own sake, and if it seems to be the great object of the general laws by which this world is governed, to encourage it, where is the difficulty in supposing, that it is an ultimate good, and as such, is an ultimate object of benevolence, and an end of our being? If this supposition be admitted however, much of the reasoning drawn from the existence of evil to prove that the Divine benevolence, so far as it is manifested by the light of nature, is not perfect, but limited, is entirely without foundation; for evil, so far

as it results from an abuse of our free agency, is only the consequence of something, which for aught that appears to the eye of reason, is absolute ly necessary to the existence of virtue, at least in such a world as ours; and as for that portion of evil which does not result from an abuse of our free agency, but which is sent, as it were, directly from heaven, we shall soon attempt to shew that ti is favorable to our progress in moral excellence, and perhaps also an unavoidable result of that mode of governing the world, which is most favorable to human happiness. We say it does not appear evident to the unassisted eye of reason, that moral evil is not a necessary result of free agency in such a world as ours; for although we may easily conceive of a state, where nothing is permitted to dwell but an assemblage of qualities, resembling in bright miniature the pure spirits of heaven, yet that is not the state, where the tenement of our souls must be a tenement of clay, and a large number of appetites and passions, an essential part of our moral constitutions.

With respect to physical evils, Mr. Stewart admits, that although the amount of them in the world is trifling compared with the amount of physical good; still there are some evils of this kind of which he acknowledges it is difficult to give a satisfactory explanation.

Our own views of this subject, are as follows. The greater part, if not the whole of what is called Physical evil, is either the result of moral evil, and is chargeable to man himself, or it is what unavoidably attends the government of the world by general laws.

So far as it is the result of moral evil, we have already attempted to dispose of it. So far as it is what must unavoidably attend the government of the world by general laws, the permission of it does not detract from the goodness of God, unless some mode of governing the world from which such laws are excluded, would be more favorable to virtue and happiness. And can any such mode

be pointed out? If it can, we will subscribe to the doctrine, that the light of nature discovers to us a God of limited benevolence. But if it cannot, we must still hold to the doctrine which we are endeavoring to support. This at least we do know, that the tendency of these laws is in the highest degree beneficial. In the moral world, they secure to man his free agency, and are at the same time attended by no evils, which he does not voluntary bring upon himself. Were there to be at all times an interposition of Divine Power, whenever man should be seen to be in danger of abusing his free agency, his free agency would be destroyed; for there is no freedom, where there is no power of doing wrong as well as right. This must be admitted as sound reasoning, unless the human mind may be led in such a manner by Divine Power, to the contemplation of mofives, as not to interfere with freedom of choice; and also unless the motives which are thus presented to the mind may be so well fitted to persuade it to choose that which is morally good, that mankind, constituted as they are in part with passions and appetites, and perhaps necessarily so constituted if they must breathe the air of this lower world, would never deviate from the path of perfect rectitude.

The necessity of general laws in the Physical world will appear evident, if we take into consideration, that without them, there would be no such thing as an established connexion between means and ends-between causes and effects. And were this connexion once dissolved, the business of human life would instantly stop, and the whole world would fall asleep. The consequences which such a catastrophe would bring along with it to human happiness and human virtue, are very obvious. Mankind were never made for a state of inactivity. Were they to live in such a state they would be miserable. It is true, the poets have made this an

ingredient in the happiness of their Elysium, but it is not an ingredient in the happiness of the world in which we live. They may give us nothing but ambrosia to eat, nothing but nectar to drink, nothing but incense to breathe, and nothing but flowers to tread on; but alas, the creature of thier imagination would yawn himself to death before a single month of his golden time had revolved.

"The keenest pangs the wretched find
Are raptures to the dreary void,
The leafless desert of the mind,
The waste of feeling unemployed.
Who would be doomed to gaze upon
A sky without a cloud or sun."

Activity is no less necessary to virtue than to happiness. The very nature of things may be such as to render it absolutely essential to both. What for example, would become of the godlike virtue of benevolence, were human life exposed to no evils? It could evidently find no room for action. The cry of suffering humanity would no longer solicit its regards, for it would no longer be heard. The tears of anguish could no longer be wiped away for they would cease to flow. We do not speak of that instinctive compassion, or that amiable humanity, which loves to breathe its consolations over the face of suffering and sorrow. True benevolence is a disposition of a higher character. It loves to pro mote the happiness of man, because it loves to walk in the path of duty. But the field of usefulness and of duty, were there no evil in the world, would be very much contracted. So wonderful is the present constitution of things in this world! Human virtue is made to nourish itself on human sufferings, and since virtue is in itself the great source of human happiness, and possibly an essential source of the highest degrees of it, human happiness itself is a plant which grows on a soil watered by the tears of human sorrow ;-and not merely grows on such a soil, but on no other soil does it seem possible