more fit, therefore, to reflect new radiance on the brightness which is to follow. The genius of his metaphysical style,-discursive and rapid, and sometimes in consequence of that very rapidity of transition slow in its general results, from the neces sity of recurring to points of inquiry that had been negligently abandoned,--is not of the kind that seems best fitted for close and continuous investigation: and though in the separate views which he gives us of a subject, we are often struck with the singular acuteness of his discernment, and as frequently charmed with an ease of language, which, without the levity of conversation, has many of its playful graces, still, when we consider him as the expositor of a theory, we are not less frequently sensible of a want of rigid order and precision, for which subtlety of thought and occasional graces of the happiest diction are not adequate to atone

It is when we wish to unfold a system of truths, that we are most careful to exhibit them progressively, in luminous or der: for, in the exposure of false opinions the error, whatever it may be, which we wish to render manifest, may often be exhibited as successfully, by varied views of it in its different aspects, as by the closest analytical investigation. The want of strict continuous method, in some of the theoretical parts of Mr HUME's Metaphysical Essays, in which we discover more easily what he wishes us not to believe, than what he wishes us positively to believe, or in which, at least, the limits of the doubtful and the true are not ve y precisely defined to our conception,-may thus, perhaps, in part be traced to the hab. its of refined scepticism, in which it seems to have been the early and tasting passion of Mr. HUME's mind to indulge. It was more in the detection of fallacies in the common systems of belief, than in the discovery of trutus, which might be added to them that he loved to exercise his metapbysical ingenuity; or, rather, the detection of fallacies was that species of discov ery of truth, in which he chictly delighted. pp. 326-331,

That Doct. Brown, when he adopted the essential parts of Mr. Hume's theory, did not himself suppose that it led to the sceptical results in which its Author gloried, is evident in every part of his work; more especially when he inquires into the nature of power and causation as attributed to the Deity. We are tempted to make two or three extracts, as they will exhibit our Author in his loftiest and most splendid style of composition.

The successions of phenomena, whether

spiritual or material, that have been as yet considered by us, are those which are exbibited by created beings, that have deri. ved from a Mightier energy all the quali ties which they display. That original Energy itself, which, in our ignorance bow to offer it a due homage of admiration, we can desiguate only by a title which expresses our ignorance of any limits to its sway. The Omnipotent, who has made every thing around us what it is, and bas given us a spirit susceptible not merely of the influences of external things, that render the soul itself a bright and ever vary. ing mirror of the universe in which it is placed, but of feelings of a nobler order, which reflect on that outward world a beauty, and glory, and sanctity, which no masses of earthly mould can possess,-the Power, to which every secondary power is far less than a single ray to that orb which has never ceased to pour forth its dazzling flood, since the moment at which it was fixed in the heavens, to gladden nature, and be an emblem of more divine maguificence,-the Cause of causes, and Author of every thing which has been, and is, and is to be,-has not yet been considered by us, as distinguished from the works that image his invisible sovereignty.-pp. 98, 99.

It is of so much importance, for the strengthening of human weakness, and the consolation of human suffering, that we should have a full conviction of the dependence of all events on the Great Source of Being; that a doctrine would indeed be perilous, which might seem to loosen, however slightly, that tie of universal nature. But we may err, and in this case, as I conceive, have very gener ally erred, in our notion of the sort of dependence, which seems at once best accordant with the phenomena, and most suitable to the Divine Majesty. The pow er of the Omnipotent is indeed so transcendant in itself, that the loftiest imagery and language, which we can borrow from a few passing events in the boundlessness of nature, must be feeble to express its force and universality. When we attempt therefore, to add to it in our conception, we run some risk of degrading the Excellence, which, as it is far above every earthly glory, it must always be impossible for us to elevate by expressions of earthly praise, that are the only homage which we can offer to it, from the dust on which we worship.

What the holiest views of God and the Universe require of us to believe, is, that all things are what they are, in consequence of that Divine Will, to the fulfillment of whose gracious design it was ne cessary, that every thing should be what it is; and that He, whose will was the source of all the qualities which created things display, may, if it seem good to

Him, suspend, or variously modify, the qualities which Himself had given, or be, in any other way, the direct operator of extraordinary changes. We know GoD, as a Creator, in the things which are really existing, that mark, in the harmony of their mutual agencies, however varied they may seem to be, a general purpose, and therefore a contriver;-and we believe in God, as the Providential Governor of the world;-that is to say, we believe that the world, which he has so richly endowed, and the living beings, for whose use he seems so richly to have endowed it, cannot be indifferent to him who made that magnificent provision, but must on the contrary, be a continued object of his benevolent contemplation; and therefore, since all things are subject to his will, and no greater power seems necessary to suspend any tendency of nature thau what originally produced it,-if there should be circumstances in which it would be of greater advantage, upon the whole, that the ordinary tendency should not continue, we see no reason, a priori, for disbelieving, that a difference of event may be directly produced by Him, even with out our knowledge, in those rare cases, in which the temporary deviation would be for the same gracious end, as that which fixed the general regularity.-pp. 102—

105.

The Omnipotence of God, it must indeed be allowed, bears to every created power the same relation of awful superi ority, which his infinite wisdom and goodness bear to the humble knowledge and virtue of his creatures. But as we know bis wisdom and goodness, only by knowing what that human wisdom and goodness are, which with all their imperfection be has yet permitted to know and adore him; so, it is only by knowing created power, weak and limited as it is, that we can rise to our feeble conception of His Omnipotence. In contemplating it, we consider only His will, as the direct antecedent of those glorious effects, which the Universe displays. The power of God is not any thing different from God, but is the Almighty himself, willing whatever seems to him good, and creating, or altering, by his very will to create or alter. It is enough for our devotion, to trace every where the characters of the Divinity,-of

provident arrangement, prior to this sys. tem of things, and to know, therefore, that, without that Divine will as antecedent, nothing could have been. Wherever we turn our eyes,-to the Earth, to the Heavens, to the myriads of beings, that live and move around us, or to those more than myriads of worlds, which seem themselves almost like animated inhabitants of the infinity through which they range, above us, beneath us, on every side, we discover, with a certainty that admits not

of doubt, Intelligence and Design, that must have preceded the existence of every thing which exists. Yet, when we analyze those great, but obscure conceptions, which rise in our mind while we attempt to think of the creation of things, we feel that it is still only a sequence of events which we are considering, though of events the magnitude of which allows us no com. parison, because it has nothing in com. mon with those earthly changes, which fall beneath our view. We do not imagine any thing existing intermediately, and binding as it were the will of the Omnipotent Creator to the things which are bursting upon our gaze: we conceive only the Divine Will itself, as if made visible to our imagination, and all nature at the very moment rising around.-pp. 125 -128.

In the liveliness of the impression produced by a change so rapid, is to be found the chief sublimity of the celebrated passage in Genesis, descriptive of the creation of light; whatever charm additional it may receive, from the ethereal purity of the very object that is imaged to us,which seems itself of a nature so heavenly, as to have been worthy of being the first material emanation of the divine glory, to connect it afterwards with the grosser forms of earth. It is by stating nothing more than the antecedent and consequent, that the description is majestically simple. God speaks, and it is done. We imagine nothing intermediate. In our highest contemplation of his power, we believe only, that, when he willed creation, a world arose, and that, in all future time, a similar volition will be followed by the rise of whatever he may will to exist,-that his will to destroy any of his works, will be in like manner followed by its non-existence, -and his will to vary the course of things, by miraculous appearances. The will is the only necessary previous change; and that Being has almighty power, whose every will is immediately and invariably followed by the existence of its object.-pp. 130

—132.

In this abstract of Doct. Brown's Inquiry we have merely stated its results, without noticing the reasonings which led to them, still less with an intention of giving a decided opinion of their correctness. We have not omitted to do this however, from an apprehension that the subject was too far removed from religious concerns to be discussed at large in the Christian Spectator; certainly not from a supposition that the Author or his work, is undeserving of partic

admits frankly, that if Mr. Hume's definition of a miracle be admitted, viz. that it is a violation of the laws of nature, then he must be allowed to have demonstrated, that no evidence of testimony can prove the existence of a miracle. If a miracle supposes, that the regular sequence of events, the connection of cause and effect, has been broken, that a new consequent has followed an antecedent, in exactly the same circumstances in which it is usually followed by a different event, then no testimony whatever can make a miracle probable; since the highest possible evidence of testimony is that, in which the supposition of its falsehood would be miraculous. If such testimony were given to prove a miraculous fact, that is, a fact which supposes that the sequence of events,—the connection of cause and effect, is broken, then there would be one miracle to balance another; which never could produce belief, though it might occasion doubt. If we attempt to shew that the falsehood of the testimony is a greater miracle, than the fact which it asserts, because twelve persons, for instance, testify to it, and to suppose their testimony all false, would be to suppose twelve miracles. Doctor Brown meets us with the assertion, that when the water at Cana of Gallilee, for instance, was converted into wine, the conversion of each drop or particle was a miracle, and consequently the number of particular miracles involved in the general one, was indefinitely great. In a word, he denies that there are any degrees in the improbability of a miracle, if it really be "a violation of the laws of nature." According to such a definition, every miracle, is a physical absurdity; and absurdities admit of no gradations. If two are supposed to meet, neither can be believed; we can only doubt. We think with the author, that it is in vain to attempt to prove that the sequence of events, as he understands it, that is, that the connection between cause and effect, has ever failed; since it is only on the supposi

tion of such a connection that we can prove any thing; if we must believe that it has failed, we may as well believe that the failure is in the chain of evidence, as in the supposed fact to be proved by it. If then we suffer Mr. Hume to define a miracle to be "a violation of the laws of nature," and attach to these words the meaning which Doctor Brown does, we must admit that he has indeed demonstrated the impossibility of proving that a miracle ever took place.

The proper method of meeting Mr. Hume's argument, is by denying the correctness of his definition. A miracle is not a violation of the laws of nature;' if by laws of nature be meant the connection between cause and effect. We add that those who believe in miracles, never believe that the connection between cause and effect was broken, or that the sequence of events, properly understood, has ever failed. So far from it, they always take for granted that every effect must have an adequate cause; and since in a miracle, there is no visible cause adequate to the effect, they infer that there must have been the interposition of a higher power. If a being, for example, in the form of man, could, with a word, heal incurable diseases, raise the dead, command the elements, in short, perform such wonders, as were never known to follow human volition, and consequently are not within the limits of human power-such, in a word, as we cannot believe to be the effect of any power less than that which first gave existence and laws to nature; then the belief that every event must be connected with an adequate cause, compels us to believe that such cause has here operated; that the same Almighty Power which gave existence to matter and its properties, has himself interposed to vary the common sequence of events. A miracle then supposes the introduction of a new power producing a new effect; a new antecedent must be premised, where a new consequent is observed. Just as when stones are seen to fall