Or do they not rather come hither slowly, sit here uneasily, and depart desirously? All which is but too evident a sign that men repair to the house of God, not as to a place of fruition, but of task and trouble, not to enjoy, but to afflict themselves. 2. We should come full of reverence to such sacred places; and where there are affections of reverence, there will be postures of reverence too. Within consecrated walls we are more directly under God's eye, who looks through and through every one that appears before him, and is too jealous a God to be affronted to his face. 3. And lastly; God's peculiar property in such places should give us a confidence in our addresses to him here. Reverence and confidence are so far from being inconsistent, that they are the most direct and proper qualifications of a devout and filial approach to God. For where should we be so confident of a blessing as in the place and element of blessings; the place where God both promises and delights to dispense larger proportions of his favor, even for this purpose, that he may fix a mark of honor upon his sanctuary; and so recommend and endear it to the sons of men, upon the stock of their own interest as well as his glory; who has declared himself the high and the lofty One that inhabits eternity, and dwells not in houses made with men's hands, yet is pleased to be present in the assemblies of his saints. To whom be rendered and ascribed, as is most due, all praise, might, majesty, and dominion, both now and for evermore. Amen. SERMON VIII. A SERMON PREACHED AT WESTMINSTER ABBEY, PROV. XVI. 33. The lot is cast into the lap; but the whole disposing of it is of the Lord. CANNOT think myself engaged from these words to discourse of lots, as to their nature, use, and allowableness; and that not only in matters of moment and business, but also of recreation; which latter is indeed impugned by some, though better defended by others; but I shall fix only upon the design of the words, which seems to be a declaration of a divine perfection by a signal instance; a proof of the exactness and universality of God's providence from its influence upon a thing, of all others, the most casual and fortuitous, such as is the casting of lots. A lot is properly a casual event, purposely applied to the determination of some doubtful thing. Some there are who utterly proscribe the name of chance, as a word of impious and profane signification; and indeed, if it be taken by us in that sense in which it was used by the heathen, so as to make any thing casual in respect of God himself, their exception ought justly to be admitted. But to say a thing is a chance, or casualty, as it relates to second causes, is not profaneness, but a great truth; as signifying no more than that there are some events, besides the knowledge, purpose, expectation, and power of second agents. And for this very reason, because they are so, it is the royal prerogative of God himself, to have all these loose, uneven, fickle uncertainties under his disposal. The subject, therefore, that from hence we are naturally carried to the consideration of, is, the admirable extent of the divine Providence, in managing the most contingent passages of human affairs; which that we may the better treat of, we will consider the result of a lot: I. In reference to men. II. In reference to God. I. For the first of these, if we consider it as relating to men, who suspend the decision of some dubious case upon it, so we shall find that it naturally implies in it these two things: 1. Something future. 2. Something contingent. From which two qualifications these two things also follow: 1. That it is absolutely out of the reach of man's knowledge. 2. That it is equally out of his power. This is most clear; for otherwise, why are men in such cases doubtful, and concerned, what the issue and result should be ? for no man doubts of what he sees and knows nor is solicitous about the event of that which he has in his power to dispose of to what event he pleases. The light of man's understanding is but a short, diminutive, contracted light, and looks not beyond the present: he knows nothing future, but as it has some kind of presence in the stable, constant manner of operation belonging to its cause; by virtue of which we know, that if the fire continues for twenty years, it will certainly burn so long; and that there will be summer, winter, and harvest, in their respective seasons: but whether God will continue the world till to-morrow or no, we can not know by any certain argument, either from the nature of God or of the world. But when we look upon such things as relate to their immediate causes with a perfect indifference, so that in respect of them they equally may or may not be, human reason can then, at the best, but conjecture what will be. And in some things, as here in the casting of lots, a man can not, upon any ground of reason, bring the event of them so much as under conjecture. The choice of man's will is indeed uncertain, because in many things free; but yet there are certain habits and principles in the soul, that have some kind of sway upon it, apt to bias it more one way than another; so that, upon the proposal of an agreeable object, it may rationally be conjectured, that a man's choice will rather incline him to accept than to refuse it. But when lots are shuffled together in a lap, urn, or pitcher, or a man blindfold casts a die, what reason in the world can he have to presume that he shall draw a white stone rather than a black, or throw an ace rather than a size? Now, if these things are thus out of the compass of a man's knowledge, it will unavoidably follow, that they are also out of his power. For no man can govern or command that which he can not possibly know; since to dispose of a thing implies both a knowledge of the thing to be disposed of, and of the end that it is to be disposed of to. And thus we have seen how a contingent event baffles man's knowledge, and evades his power. Let us now consider the same in respect of God; and so we shall find that it falls under, 1. A certain knowledge. And 2. A determining providence. 1. First of all then, the most casual event of things, as it stands related to God, is comprehended by a certain knowledge. God, by reason of his eternal, infinite, and indivisible nature, is, by one single act of duration, present to all the successive portions of time; and consequently to all things successively existing in them: which eternal, indivisible act of his existence makes all futures actually present to him; and it is the presentiality of the object which founds the unerring certainty of his knowledge. For whatsoever is known, is some way or other present; and that which is present can not but be known by him who is omniscient. But I shall not insist upon these speculations ; which when they are most refined serve only to show how impossible it is for us to have a clear and explicit notion of that which is infinite. Let it suffice us in general to acknowledge and adore the vast compass of God's omniscience. That it is a light shining into every dark corner, ripping up all secrets, and steadfastly grasping the greatest and most slippery uncertainties. As when we see the sun shine upon a river, though the waves of it move and roll this way and that way by the wind; yet for all their unsettledness, the sun strikes them with a direct and a certain beam. Look upon things of the most accidental and mutable nature, accidental in their production, and mutable in their continuance; yet God's prescience of them is as certain in him as the memory of them is or can be in us. He knows which way the lot and the die shall fall, as perfectly as if they were already cast. All futurities are naked before that all-seeing eye, the sight of which is no more hindered by distance of time than the sight of an angel can be determined by distance of place. 2. As all contingencies are comprehended by a certain divine knowledge, so they are governed by as certain and steady a providence. There is no wandering out of the reach of this, no slipping through the hands of omnipotence. God's hand is as steady as his eye; and certainly thus to reduce contingency to method, instability and chance itself to an unfailing rule and order, argues such a mind as is fit to govern the world; and I am sure nothing less than such an one can. Now God may be said to bring the greatest casualties under his providence upon a twofold account : (1.) That he directs them to a certain end. (2.) Oftentimes to very weighty and great ends. (1.) And first of all, he directs them to a certain end. Providence never shoots at rovers. There is an arrow that flies by night as well as by day, and God is the person that shoots it, who can aim then as well as in the day. Things are not left to an equilibrium, to hover under an indifference whether they shall come to pass or not come to pass; but the whole train of events is laid beforehand, and all proceed by the rule and limit of an antecedent decree: for otherwise, who could manage the affairs of the world, and govern the dependence of one event upon another, if that event happened at random, and was not cast into a certain method and relation to some foregoing purpose to direct it? The reason why men are so short and weak in governing is, because most things fall out to them accidentally, and come not into any compliance with their preconceived ends, but they are forced to comply subsequently, and to strike in with things as they fall out, by postliminious after-applications |