ligious affection, may just as readily obstruct as promote our faith in a religious miracle. What things in nature are more contrary, than one religion is to another religion? They are just as contrary as light and darkness, truth and error. The affections with which they are contemplated by the same person are just as opposite as desire and aversion, love and hatred. The same religious zeawhich gives the mind of a Christian, a propensity to the belief of a miracle in support of Christianity, will inspire him with an aver sion from the belief of a miracle in support of Mahometanism. The same principle, which will make him acquiesce in evidence less than sufficient in the one case, will make him require evidence more than sufficient in the other.

Before then the remark of the author can be of any use in directing our judgment, as to the evidence of miracles attested, we must consider whether the original tenets of the witnesses would naturally have biassed their minds in favour of the miracles, or in opposition to them. If the former was the case, the testimony is so much the less to be regarded; if the latter, so much the more. Will it satisfy on this head to acquaint us,

Great,

that the prejudices of the witnesses must have favoured the miracles, since they were zealous promoters of the doctrine, in support of which those miracles are said to have been performed? To answer thus would be to misunderstand the point. The question is, Was this doctrine the faith of the witnesses, before they saw, or fancied they saw the miracles? If it was, I agree with him. very great allowance must be made for the prejudices of education, for principles, early perhaps, carefully, and deeply rooted in their minds, and for the reigious affection founded in these principles; which allowance must always derogate from the weight of their testimony. But if the faith of the witnesses stood originally in opposition to the doctrine attested by the miracles; if the only account that can be given of their conversion, is the conviction which the miracles produced in them; it must be a preposterous way of ar guing, to derive their conviction from a religious zeal, which would at first obstinately withstand, and for some time hinder such conviction. On the contrary, that the evidence arising from miracles performed in proof of a doctrine disbelieved, and conse

that obstacle, and conquer all the opposition arising thence, is a very strong presumption in favour of that evidence: just as strong a presumption in its favour, as it would have been against it, had all their former zeal, and principles, and prejudices, co-operated with the evidence, whatever it was, in gaining an entire assent.

Hence there is the greatest disparity in this respect, a disparity which deserves to be particularly attended to, betwixt the evidence of miracles performed in proof of a religion to be established, and in contradiction to opinions generally received; and the evi dence of miracles performed in support of a religion already established, and in confirma tion of opinions generally received. Hence also the greatest disparity betwixt the mi racles recorded by the Evangelists, and those related by Mariana, Bede, or any monkish historian.

THERE is then no peculiar presumption against religious miracles merely as such; if in certain circumstances there is a presumption against them, the presumption ariseth solely from the circumstances, insomuch that,

in the opposite circumstances, it is as strongly in their favour.

SECT. V.

There is a peculiar presumption in favour of such mi. racles as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

In this section I propose to consider the reverse of the question treated in the former. In the former I proved that there is no peculiar presumption against religious miracles; I now inquire whether there be any in their favour. The question is important, and intimately connected with the subject.

THE boldest infidel will not deny, that the immortality of the soul, a future and eternal state, and the connection of our happiness or misery in that state, with our present good or bad conduct, not to mention the doctrines concerning the divine unity and perfections, are tenets which carry no absurdity in thern. They may be true for aught he knows. He disbelieves them, not because they are incredible in themselves, but because he hath not evidence of their truth. He pretends not to disprove them, nor does he think the task incumbent on him. He only pleads, that

before he can yield them his assent, they must

be proved.

Now, as whatever is possible, may be supposed, let us suppose that the dogmas above mentioned are all infallible truths; and let the unbeliever say, whether he can conceive an object worthier of the divine interposal, than to reveal these truths to mankind; and to enforce them in such a manner as may give them a suitable influence on the heart and life. Of all the inhabitants of the earth, man is incomparably the noblest.—Whatever, therefore, regards the interest of the human species, is a grander concern than what regards either the inanimate or the brute creation. If man was made, as is doubtless not impossible, for an after state of immortality, whatever relates to that immortal state, or may conduce to prepare him for the fruition of it, must be immensely superior to that which concerns merely the transient enjoyments of the present life. How sublime, then, is the object which religion, and religion only, exhibits as the ground of supernatural interpositions! This object is no other than the interest of man, a reasonable and moral agent, the only being in this lower world which bears in his soul the image of his Maker; not the