interest of an individual, but of the kind; not for a limited duration, but for eternity: an object, at least in one respect, adequate to the majesty of God.

Does this appear to the essayist too much like arguing a priori, of which I know he hath a detestation? It is just such an argument, as, presupposing the most rational principles of Deism, results from those maxims concerning intelligent causes, and their operations, which are founded in general experience, and which uniformly lead us to expect, that the end will be proportionate to the means. The Pagans of Rome had notions of their divinities. infinitely inferior to the opinions concerning God, which in Christian countries are maintained even by those, who, for distinction's sake, are called DEISTS. Yet such of the former as had any justness of taste, were offended with those poets, who exhibited the celestials on slight occasions, and for trivial purposes, interfering in the affairs of men. Why? Because such an exhibition shocked all the principles of probability. It had not that verisimilitude which is absolutely necessary to render fiction agreeable. Accordingly it is a precept, with relation to the machinery of the drama, given by one who was both a critic and a poet, That

a god must never be introduced, unless to accomplish some important design, which could not be otherwise effectuated.* The foundation of this rule, which is that of my argument, is therefore one of those indisputable principles, which are found everywhere, among the earliest results of experience.

Thus it appears, that from the dignity of the end, there ariseth a peculiar presumption in favour of such miracles as are said to have been wrought in support of religion.

SECT. VI.

Inquiry into the meaning and propriety of one of Mr. Hume's favourite maxims.

THERE is a method truly curious, suggested by the author, for extricating the mind, should the evidence from testimony be so great, that its falsehood might, as he terms it, be accounted miraculous. In this puzzling case, when a man is so beset with miracles, that he is under a necessity of admitting one, he must always take care it be the smallest; for it is an axiom in this writer's DIALECTIC, that the probability of the fact is in the inverse ratio Nec deus intersit, nisi dignus vindice nodus Inciderit.

HORAT

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of the quantity of miracle there is in it." I weigh," says he, "the one miracle against "the other, and according to the superiority " which I discover, I pronounce my decision, "and always reject the greater miracle."*

Now, of this method, which will no doubt be thought by many to be very ingenious, and which appears to the essayist both very momentous and very perspicuous, I own I am not able to discover either the reasonableness or the use.

First, I cannot see the reasonableness. "A "miracle," to adopt his own definition, im"plies the transgression," or rather the suspension," of some law of nature; and that "either by a particular volition of the Deity,

or by the interposal of some invisible "agent." Now, as I should think, from the principles laid down in the preceding section, that it would be for no trifling purpose, that the laws of nature would be suspended, and either the Deity or an invisible agent would interpose; it is on the same principles, natural to imagine, that the means, or miracle performed, should bear a proportion, in respect of dignity and greatness, to the end pro† Ib. in the note.

* P. 182.

posed. Were I therefore under such a necessity, as is supposed by Mr. Hume, of admitting the truth of a miracle, I acknowledge, that of two contradictory miracles, where all other circumstances are equal, I should think it reasonable to believe the greater. I shall borrow an illustration from the author himself. "A mi

may

either be discover

This alters not its na

"racle," he says, "able by men or not. (6 ture and essence. The raising of a house "or ship into the air is a visible miracle; the "raising of a feather, when the wind wants

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ever so little of a force requisite for that

purpose, is as real a miracle, though not so "sensible with regard to us."* Surely if any miracle may be called little, the last mentioned is entitled to that denomination, not only because it is an undiscoverable and insensible iniracle, but because the quantum of miraculous force requisite, is, by the hypothesis, ever so little, or the least conceivable. Yet, if it were certain, that God, angel, or spirit, were, for one of those purposes, to interpose in suspending the laws of nature, I believe most men would join with me in thinking, that it would be rather for the raising of a house or ship, than for the raising of a feather.

P 182, in the note..

But though the maxim laid down by the author were just, I cannot discover in what instance, or by what application, it can be rendered of any utility. Why? Because we have no rule whereby we can judge of the greatness of miracles. I allow, that in such a singular instance, as that above quoted from the essay, we may judge safely enough. But that can be of no practical use. In almost every case that will occur, I may warrantably aver, that it will be impossible for the acutest intellect to decide, which of two is the greater miracle. As to the author, I cannot find that he has favoured us with any light, in so important and so critical a question. Have we not then some reason to dread, that the task will not be less difficult to furnish us with a measure, by which we can determine the magnitude of miracles; than to provide us with a balance, by which we can ascertain the comparative weight of testimonies and experiences?

If, leaving the speculations of the essayist, we shall, in order to be assisted on this subject, recur to his example and decisions; let us consider the miracle which was recited in the third section, and which he declares, would, on the evidence of such testimony as he supposes, not only be probable but certain. For