and neglects the great salvation which the God of mercy has provided: "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God; for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man. But every man is tempted when he is drawn away of his own lust and enticed. Then when lust hath conceived, it bringeth forth sin; and sin when it is finished bringeth forth death." But "the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." "He that confesseth and forsaketh his sin, shall find mercy." "Whosoever believeth in him shall not perish, but shall have everlasting life." "But he that believeth not, is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God."

"That man" was at last found out. The very means which he had employed to enable him to sin secretly, became the means of his detection. But before he

was found out by man, his most secret sins were fully known to his own conscience, and to God. So are yours. No impenitent sinner can ultimately escape: "Be sure thy sin will find thee out." There are some sins which go beforehand to the judgment-seat, and wait there till the sinner himself arrives, when they bear swift witness against him, and secure his condemnation. How awful will then be the public execution of an immortal soul! How deep and terrible will be its sepulchre of despair! How keen will be the torment of the undying worm, and the unquenchable fire! And how will the last lamentation of Christ, the chief mourner at his funeral, echo in his conscience for ever-" OH! THAT THOU HADST KNOWN, IN THAT THY DAY, THE THINGS WHICH MADE FOR THY PEACE; BUT NOW THEY ARE HID FROM THINE EYES!"

a basis of certitude to us, he here does his best to supply us with another, and we have now to consider with what success. We hope our readers bear in mind what we stated last month, regarding the distinction between the logical consciousness and the intuitional consciousness. If they have not succeeded in mastering this most abstruse idea, we fear we shall hardly succeed in interesting them; nor, if Mr. Morell's theories be true, will they be able to understand either in what sense the Scriptures are inspired, or by what means religious certitude may be obtained. It may aid those of them, however, who have not yet penetrated so far into the regions of metaphysical abstraction, to bear in mind, that by intuitions (a word Mr. M. often employs), he means what we usually term conceptions, and often, indeed, uses the one word for the other.

The following observations regarding certitude generally, though to some they may be dry, are yet necessary to introduce the subject. In page 299, Mr. Morell states, that "certitude, as arising from the legitimate action of the faculties, may be of three kinds; it may be purely logical or purely intuitional, or a mixed result of both." We have logical certitude when the logical faculty employs itself rightly on any given data. Intuitional certitude is the agreement of our intuitions with truth. While mixed certitude "is that in which the testimony of intuition is blended with a logical inference or definition." "The intuitional faculty in man," he continues, "is not absolutely perfect, and often our perception of truth is affected by disturbing causes within ourselves." "There are some cases, indeed, in which the intuitions we enjoy are very explicit," and may be possessed by men universally. "Such are the intuitions of time, space, number, &c., on which the mathematical and mechanical sciences are grounded." But it is otherwise with our intuitions of moral and spiritual truth. There may be a "colouring" in them, or in the expression given to them, "derived from the idiosyncrasies of the individual," and "hence the necessity arises for our having certain criteria by which" our intuitions may be tested. The three great criteria which have been ofttimes recognized by philosophical thinkers aredistinctness, uniformity, and universality." When an intuition will bear the application of these tests, then, observes Mr. M., we may "regard it as possessing the marks of certitude-so far, indeed, as human certitude can at all exist."

He then proceeds to show the bearing of these remarks on the case of religious truth. After adverting to the "different shades or phases of the religious life," evolved by "different communities," and the "different sys

tems of Christian theology" thence arising, he puts the question, How may we obtain "a certitude on which the most morally earnest and critically reflective minds will repose with satisfaction and peace?" We need not follow him in his discussion of that theory of religious certitude" which asserts, that Christianity is simply a question of facts;" nor in his observations on the two following, the first of which bases certitude upon the intellect, and the other on tradition. It is not till he proceeds _to_consider the claims of the word of God, and to reject them for what we shall take the liberty of designating the Christian consciousness of the age, that we come into more direct conflict with him. As we are anxious to do him the fullest justice, our readers will hear him explain his own views:

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"The Bible," he says, page 329, "as we now have it, consists of a collection of writings, composed at different periods, by men of exceedingly different mind and character; containing history, politics, precept, devotion, doctrine, and prophecy." "This book being put into our hands, the main question for us to consider is this:What is necessary to the due comprehension of the Bible, so that it may be, in any sense, an authoritative intellectual appeal?” human understanding is necessary at once to grasp and interpret the written word." "The term understanding, however, thus popularly used, is extremely indefinite. Admitting that reason or understanding is necessary to interpret the word, we have to inquire, how much reason, or how much understanding, is necessary to give us a right to view the Bible as a fixed basis of certitude? A thoroughly ignorant man, teeming with prejudice, cannot surely be said to derive any great degree of theological certainty from his perusal of the Scriptures." He then goes on to suppose the case of a "truth-seeker," not beset with these prejudices-" honest and intelligent"

his "heart and mind alike cultivated;" and represents the various difficulties he must encounter in interpreting the Scriptures;-difficulties arising from his own habits and tendencies of mind," "national feelings," ""educational bias," and from the necessity of his appealing to "professed critics and theologians" to "settle the text and canon of Scripture with perfect accuracy;" to "determine in what sense the Scriptures are inspired," and "what are the true principles of Biblical interpretation," &c., &c., while "even when this is accomplished, still but small progress is yet made in coming to fixed results; for the truth.... has to be brought into a systematic whole; and to do this some logical organum is absolutely necessary, whether the Aristotelian, whether the Baconian, or

If all this be not sufficient to convince our readers of the folly of seeking religious certitude from the Scriptures, and to deter them from ever again attempting it; "let it only be considered (Mr. M. says) that ...if we proceed on the hypothesis, that the mode of obtaining certitude is by interpretating the letter (of the Bible) by the aid of the individual reason, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the test of truth lies in the reason itself." This theory, therefore, "insensibly merges into the very foundation principle of rationalism." What then, it may be asked, is the use of the Bible? Mr. M. replies, "surely it is assigning the very highest place at once to its value and its power, to ascribe to it a perpetual moral influence over the human heart; to estimate it as the great means of awakening the soul of man to the spiritual world which lies around us on every side; to show how it can educate our minds to the clear intuition of the Divine realities there presented; and, finally, to recognize in it a perpetual canon with which our fluctuating religious life can ever be compared. In fine, profess what we may as a matter of theory, yet we never do* obtain a fixed and confiding certitude in regard to any religious truth until it has entered the heart as a spiritual principle; until it has verified its proper validity by producing a similar influence upon others; and until we can apply to it the very same criteria by which we acknowledge the certitude of any truth whatever within the whole range of human knowledge."

Now, in commenting on these extracts, we beg to call the attention of our readers at the outset to the closing paragraph, in which Mr. Morell strongly affirms what we cannot help thinking even he himself must, on reconsideration, admit to be utterly untrue. We grant the statement contained in the first part of the paragraph at once. "We never do obtain a fixed and confiding certitude in regard to any religious truth, until it has entered the heart as a spiritual principle;" but this, we contend, is all that is necessary to certitude. Thousands of our fellow-beings have lived and died possessing no other certitude than that springing from a mind enlightened, and a heart renewed by the word and spirit of God. Far removed from Christian society, they have, through means of a Bible, or a Christian book, acquired some knowledge of religious truth, have felt its power, and lived under its influence. There have been many instances in which individuals, who have never met with other Christians at all, have yet, through the simple teaching of

The italics here, and throughout the extracts, are Mr. M.'s.

strong, a certitude so unwavering, that it has cheered them in the dungeon and sustained them at the stake. Yet, Mr. Morell affirms, that "we never do obtain a fixed and confiding certitude regarding any religious truth,.. until it has verified its proper validity by producing a similar influence upon others, and until we can apply to it the very same criteria," &c. What opportunities had Paul of applying these tests to his conceptions of religious truth, when "he preached Christ in the synagogues (of Damascus), that he is the Son of God?" Or (if it be said there was miracle in this case), the Ethiopian, when "he went on his way rejoicing?" Or Luther, when he began to arouse a slumbering nation by preaching the doctrine of justification by faith? In spite of the confident assertion before us, that we never do obtain certitude otherwise, we venture to affirm that but few Christians have felt the application of such tests, especially the criterion of universality, even in the "certain sense" Mr. Morell afterwards speaks of, to be necessary to certainty at all. Indeed, his own certitude on this point, though he here so strongly asserts it, seems to have been so wavering, that in the following passage, from page 303, he expressly contradicts it: "A given intuition may be so distinct and unvarying to an individual mind, that it carries with it its own evidence of veracity; but this will not answer as a ground of certitude to all mankind..... In this case, the individual thus favoured must enjoy his own evidence; but the rest of mankind must wait the purification and development of their own power of spiritual perception, ere the intuition can be so expressed as to bear the criteria of universal certitude." We are thus informed in one passage that universality is necessary as a criterion of certitude, and in another passage that it is not necessary at all. Such loose and contradictory statements, we certainly did not expect to find in a work on "The Philosophy of Religion."

In proceeding with our comments, we must remind our readers, that in all cases of mixed certitude-i. e., logical and intuitional combined; when the logical faculty acts rightly, and yet error is manifested in the result the source of it must be sought in the intuitions or conceptions with which we started in our reasoning. The logical faculty is so much the same in all men, that if theologians but possessed clear conceptions of the primary truths of Christianity, the theology they would deduce from those truths would be perfectly harmonious. The endless variations of our theology arise from the different data which theologians assume. Were these data invariably the same, the logical faculty might

be employed ad infinitum on them, and yet, in the results, there would be neither clashing nor contradiction. It is so in mathematical science. Mathematicians having the same data to reason from, never come into collision. Whatever direction the logical faculty may take in its excursions, the conclusions of one are always harmonious with those of every other. Now in theology, the difficulty is with our primary conceptions of Christian truth. Were they but as clear, and uniform, and fully recognized as those of mathematical science, there would be as constant a harmony among theological reasoners as there is among mathematical reasoners. We may

therefore regard our future controversy with Mr. Morell as confined entirely to the field of the intuitional consciousness, and leave the logical faculty quite out of view. It would do its work as well in theology as it does in mathematics, could we but present it with material as well shaped out and as accurately defined.

Where, then, is this material to be obtained? How may we acquire clear and accurate conceptions of those Divine realities which form the groundwork of our theology? And how may their validity be ascertained? In answer to these inquiries, our readers, we doubt not, would at once refer us to the Bible. "It is in his own word," they would say, "that God teaches us his truth; and if you would have certitude as to your conceptions of that truth being accurate, you must compare them with that word." Now, strange to say, this is, in substance, the very reply which Mr. Morell himself gives us. He tells us above, that "the word of God can educate our minds to the clear intuition of the Divine realities there presented ;" and again, in page 346, that "rightly did the Christians of the second century consider that the utterances" of "the first disciples," contained in "the writings they left behind them," "possessed, and ever must possess, to the church a canonical authority." And what need we more than this? If Mr. Morell grants that "the word of God can educate our minds to the clear intuition of Divine realities," and that "the utterances" of apostles "ever must possess to the church a canonical authority," he yields the whole question, and might have saved himself the labour of writing this chapter on certitude. But, as we shall see by-and-by, though he has asserted this, he does not grant it. What can we think, then, of his consistency, or rather, perhaps, of the “distinctness and uniformity" of his own intuitions, when writing the chapter before us? We much doubt that they could themselves abide the test of these two criteria of certitude, and we are sure they could not bear that of universality.

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As to the difficulties which Mr. Morell enumerates as being in the way of the Bible being to us a basis of religious certitude, we should like him to tell us if they are not equally in the way of its "educating our minds to the clear intuition of Divine realities," and being to us a perpetual canon." In order to this, must we not first repair to "professed critics and theologians," that they may "settle the text and canon with perfect accuracy," "determine in what sense the Scriptures are inspired," and what "are the true principles of Biblical interpretation," &c., &c. Then would not some logical organum be absolutely necessary, whether the Aristotelian," &c.? And should we not be in danger here also of "bringing our own habits and tendencies of mind," &c., to the work of interpretation? We put it to Mr. Morell, if these difficulties may not be brought with as great fairness against the views maintained by himself, as against those which he is combating? The sword which he here employs has two edges, and if with the one edge he wounds his opponents, with the other he inflicts quite as desperate a wound upon himself.

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But we must hasten on to consider the basis of certitude which he proposes to us in exchange for the word of God, and the grounds on which he urges its adoption. And here he narrows for us very considerably the ground of controversy, by reminding us at the outset that the question is not one of logic, but one of intuition. "The real principles of religious certitude," he says, page 342, "can be deduced without much difficulty from the very nature of intuition. Intuition implies a direct gazing upon truth in its concrete unity. Were the power of doing so perfect, no farther certitude would be required..... The power of spiritual vision, however, in man is dim and inconstant." Page 344. "We are thus brought to the same great criteria; for we require in Christian conceptions, as in all others, that they should possess clearness, uniformity, and, in a certain sense, universality, to substantiate their full claim to be regarded as sure and certain."...." All we can justly demand, under the idea of universality, is, that the conception we would verify be clearly shown to be one towards which humanity in its development necessarily tends, and which is universally testified to by minds sufficiently elevated in their whole moral being to realize it."

Our readers will be able to make out clearly enough, from these extracts, the views maintained by Mr. Morell, to which we may say, at once, that we have many and insuperable objections. His hypothesis, briefly stated, is this: Our minds possess the power of gazing directly upon truth, even upon those spiritual truths