to the calling upon him by the name Trinity, it is deducible from this affertion, that he looked upon the two words as fynonimous, and confequently that the word Trinity, though it might found oddly, was expreffive of the idea, which he chooses rather to exprefs by the term God; a term perhaps more pleasing to his ear.

Thus far I have written, not with a view of derogating from the real worth of Mr. Lindsey, nor of lessening the value of fuch worth in the eyes of mankind; but with a purpose of preventing the merits of the honeft confcientious man being carried over to his cause, and concluded to be the merits of his argument, I am myfelf defirous that the favour which is due to his virtue fhould attend his perfon, but not be converted into partiality for his cause. I seek not to obtain the favour of the public to myfelf, but their unprejudiced ear, and that Men fhould yield their convictions to truth only, and not take prepoffeffions for conviction. Preliminaries being, I hope, fettled, I fhall now no longer withhold my reader from that line of argument, by which alone it seems to me poffible to inquire into the fubject before us, and by the purfuit of which, I truft, I fhall be able to evince the Divinity of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ.

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On the Province of Reason, with Respect to its Enquiry into Scipture Truths.

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R. Lindsey commences with an affertion, that, "the unlearned reader fees at once, that the God who made him, and whom he is to adore, is one, without multiplicity or divifion, even as he knoweth himself to be one, being one person and not many;" and on this position he proceeds to argue. If Mr. Lindsey mean by the unlearned reader, the reader of his book, who has never read the Bible, perhaps he is right; but I believe that every reader, who has read the Bible, will fee the fallacy of this great foundation of all that follows in confutation of a trinity of Perfons in the Godhead. On a fuppofition that nature has fuggefted, and philofophy refined upon the fuggeftion of a God, I do not doubt that natural religion might acquiefce in this affertion; but are we to come to the fcriptures, which all men allow to be the foundation of our religion, with a religion already formed, and to judge of the revelation made by the God of truth, according to its correspondence with our previous perfuafions? Are we to exalt our own reason, and say, that it is a standard whereby to measure the infinite extents of power and wifdom? or are we to fet bounds to infinity, and annihilate all that stretches beyond the grafp of our limited comprehenfion? The fhort-fighted man may, with equal truth, and equal wisdom, deny the exiftence of all objects beyond the reach of his vifion. And yet one of these consequences must be inferred from the affertion, either that our reafon is infi

nite to measure infinite wisdom; or that the wisdom of God is finite, and narrowly limited, in order to be conformable to our reafon; for the faculty must be commensurate to the object, before it can take it into observation and determine upon it.

I should be forry to have it understood, that I wish to fet up one boundary which original nature has suffered reafon to pafs. I think, however, that, as there are boundaries already formed, beyond which fhe is not permitted to expatiate, it is an object of confequence to mankind to find where they are fixed; for, by an acquaintance with our limits, we fhall alfo poffefs a definite idea of that which is within our comprehenfion; and fo, inftead of idly fquandering our useful hours in pursuit of knowledge that is too high for us, and which, when we conceive that we have attained unto it, terminates not in conclufion, but at the very beft in fpecious fallacy, we fhall turn the force of our faculties against objects which muft yield to our vigorous exertions, atchieve that which, retained, may be ferviceable to ourselves, or, communicated, prove beneficial to our fellow creatures.

My purpofe is only to inquire into thofe limits by which reafon is circumfcribed with regard to fcripture truths, and into the proper conduct of reason within thofe limits.

By the word Reafon, I mean that faculty of the mind by which it perceives the relative qualities of the objects of our perception; by which it compares the objects of our perception; and, upon comparison, fees the conclufions, of whatsoever nature they be, which refult.

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The word Comparison I use in an extensive sense, for every manner of laying together the relative qualities in order to infer; and I choose to fay, that reafon fees rather than forms the conclufions, because I fuppofe them to have been formed, and exifting at all times, whether obferved or not, and no more to be annihilated by my withdrawing my observation, than Mr. Hume is by my blowing out the candle, by the light of which I had (according to his own philosophy) seen him into existence.

That great truth of fcripture which I wish to hold forth for the affent of mankind, and which I wish alfo to prefcribe and purfue a proper manner of inquiring into, is, that Jefus Chrift is one with the Father and the Holy Ghost, God.

It has often been afferted, that reafon abfolutely contradicted the poffibility of fuch a union of divine perfection and human imperfection, and thence the impoffibility of fuch a union is inferred, and the Godhead of Jefus Chrift denied upon this unweighed affertion; whereas, were it confidered, that the relative qualities of God and of Man are the objects of comparison, and that the incompatibility of thefe two natures, upon a perception of the qualities of each, must be seen from the comparison, perhaps men who deny our Saviour's divinity would hefitate a moment before they would even pronounce that their reafon had, upon natural premifes, given any teftimony whatfoever concerning him; for, in the procefs, it must be enquired into, whether the objects of the comparison be really the objects of their perception, how far even the nature of man is within their comprehenfion, and how far the nature of God is beyond it; and if, upon enquiry, it be found, that the relative qualities of the two natures

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are altogether unknown, reafon must be declared incompetent to make a comparison, and confequently to see any conclufion whatsoever. Reason, therefore, can never have denied, that Jefus Chrift is both God and Man, however ignorance and prefumption may, under her refpectable name.

I do not defire, on the other hand, to conclude a belief in fcripture truths from the unaffifted light of rea fon; I only defire to put that religion, which we may imagine nature has found by that light, out of the queftion; and then firft to call for the obfervation of reason, when maxims, whence argument may proceed, are established; when we first find objects which we may compare, and from the comparison of which we may conclude: But till fuch are found, and agreed upon, we muft walk upon uncertain ground; and if we should happen to come right in the end, it must be by ways of which we could not have been certain while on our progrefs. To fabricate maxims is not the office of reason, but to observe upon such as are ready made and submitted to her cognizance; I therefore afk no aid to my caufe from any fuggeftions that she may be fuppofed to have made; nor will I allow that she can have afforded any to infidelity. I wifh only to diffuade from looking upon a negative as proved, because the affirmative does not follow from premises not cognizable: From fuch premises we never can argue to any conclufion whatfoever; for no relation being visible, no refult can issue. A declaration from natural religion that God is omnipotent and all-wife, can by no means fet aside a declaration that he has done that which to us may appear weak and foolish; we must be competent to judge of infinite power and infinite wisdom before we can compare the act with the agency; and we must be very sure that the act which is inconfiftent with our degree of wisdom,

must