12. The Application of this Dif- Ch. 2. courfe to my Subject admits of no Difficulty; and it is, firft, That no Chriftian Doctrine, no more than any ordinary Piece of Nature, can be reputed a Myftery, because we have not an adequate or compleat Idea of whatever belongs to it. Secondly, That what is reveal'd in Religion, as it is most useful and neceffary, so it must and may be as eafily comprehended, and found as confiftent with our common Notions, as what we know of Wood or Stone, of Air, of Water, or the like. And, Thirdly, That when we do as familiarly explain such Doctrines, as what is known of natural things, (which I pretend we can) we may

then be as properly faid to comprehend the one as the other.

13.They trifle then exceedingly,and difcover a mighty Scarcity of better Arguments, who defend their Mysteries by this pitiful Shift of drawing Inferences from what is unknown to what is known, or of infifting upon adequate Ideas; except they will agree,as fome do, to call every Spire of Grafs, Sitting and Standing, Fish or Flefh, profound Myfteries. And if out of a pertinacious or

worse

Sect. 3. worse Humour they will be still fool

ing, and call these things Mysteries, I'm willing to admit as many as they please in Religion, if they will allow me likewife to make mine as intelligible to others as these are to me.

14. But to finish this Point, I conclude, that neither GOD himself, nor any of his Attributes, are Myfteries to us for want of an adequate Idea: No, not Eternity. The Mysterious Wits do never more expofe themselves than when they treat of Eternity in particular. Then they think themselves in their impregnable Fortrefs, and ftrangely infult over those dull Creatures that cannot find a thing where it is not. For if any Bounds (as Beginning or End) could be affign'd to Eternity, it ceases immediately to be what it fhould; and you frame only a finite,or rather a negative Idea, which is the Nature of all Limitation. Nor can it be faid, that therefore Eternity 25 above Reafon in this Refpect, or that it is any Defect in us not to exhauft its Idea; for what greater Perfection can be afcrib'd to Reason than to know precifely the Nature of things? And

does

does not all its Errors lie in attribut. Ch. 2. ing those Properties to a thing which it w has not, or taking any away that it contains? Eternity therefore is no more above Reason because it cannot be imagin'd, than a Circle, because it may; for in both Cafes Reafon performs its Part according to the different Natures of the Objects, whereof the one is effentially imaginable, the other not.

15. Now it appears that the pretended Myfteriousness of Eternity do's not confift in the want of an adequate Notion, which is all that we confider in it at prefent. The Difficulties rais'd from its Duration, as, that Succeffion Seems to make it finite, and that all things must exist together if it be inftantaneous, I despair not of folving very eafly and rendring Infinity also (which is infeparable from it, or rather a different Confideration of the fame thing) as little mysterious as that three and two make five. But this falls naturally into my fecond Difcourfe, where I give a particular Explication of the Christian Tenets, according to the general Principles I am establishing in this.

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心

16. As

Sect. 3.

16. As we know not all the Proper ties of things, fo we can never conceive the Effence of any Subftance in the World. To avoid Ambiguity, I distinguish, after an excellent modern Philofopher, the Nominal from the Real Effence of a thing. The nominal Effence is a Collection of thofe Properties or Modes which we principally observe in any thing, and towhich we give one common Denomination or Name. Thus the nominal Effence of the Sun is a bright, hot, and round Body, at a certain Distance from us, and that has a conftant regular Motion. Whoever hears the word Sun pronounc'd, this is the Idea he has of it. He may conceive more of its Properties, or not all thefe; but it is still a Collection of Modes or Properties that makes his Idea. So the Nominal Effence of Honey confifts in its Colour, Tafte, and other known Attributes.

17. But the real Effence is that intrinfick Conftitution of a thing which is the Ground or Support of all its Properties, and from which they naturally flow or refult. Now tho we are perfwaded that the Modes of things must

have

have fuch a Subject to exift in, (for Ch. 2. they cannot fubfift alone) yet we are abfolutely ignorant of what it is. We conceive nothing more diftinctly than the mention'd Properties of the Sun, and those whereby Plants, Fruits, Metals, &c. are known to us; but we have no manner of Notion of the feveral Foundations of thefe Properties, tho we are very fure in the mean time, that fome fuch thing must neceffarily be. The obfervable Qualities therefore of things is all that we understand by their Names, for which Reason they are call'd their Nominal Effence.

18. It follows now very plainly, that nothing can be faid to be a Mystery, because we are ignorant of its real Effence, fince it is not more knowable in one thing than in another, and is never conceiv'd or included in the Ideas we have of things, or the Names we give 'em. I had not much infifted upon this Point, were it not for the fo often repeated Sophiftry of fome that rather merit the Encomiums of great READER'S than great REASONERS When they would have the most palpable Abfur

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