pear to his eye as it does in the cube. I agree with this thinking gentleman, whom I am proud to call my friend, in his answer to this his problem; and am of opinion, that the blind man, at first fight, would not be able with certainty to fay which was the globe, which the cube, whilft he only faw them: though he could unerringly name them by his touch, and certainly diftinguish them by the difference of their figure felt. This I have fet down and leave with my reader, as an occafion for him to confider how much he may be beholden to experience, improvement, and acquired notions, where he thinks he had not the least use of or help from them: and the rather, because this obferving gentleman farther adds, That having upon the occafion of my book proposed this to divers very ingenious men, he hardly ever met with one, that at first gave the answer to it which he thinks true, till by hearing his reafens they were convinced.

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BUT this is not, I think, ufual in any of our ideas, but thofe received by fight: becaufe fight, the moft comprchenfive of all our fenfes, conveying to our minds the ideas of light and colours, which are peculiar only to that fenfe; and alfo the far different ideas of space, figure, and motion, the feveral varieties whereof change the appearances of its proper object, viz. light and colours; we bring ourselves by use to judge of the one by the other. This, in many cafes, by a fettled habit, in things whereof we have frequent experience, is performed fo conftantly and fo quick, that we take that for the perception of our fenfation, which is an idea formed by our judgment; fo that one, viz. that of fenfation ferves only to excite the other, and is scarce taken notice of itself: as a man who reads or hears with attention and understanding, takes little notice of the characters, or founds, but of the ideas that are excited in him by them.

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NOR need we wonder that this is done with fo little notice, if we confider how very quick the actions of the mind are performed: for as itself is thought to take up

no space, to have no extenfion; fo its actions feem to require no time, but many of them feem to be crowded into an inftant. I fpeak this in comparison to the actions of the body. Any one may eafily observe this in his own thoughts, who will take the pains to reflect on them. How, as it were in an inftant, do our minds. with one glance fee all the parts of a demonftration,. which may very well be called a long one, if we confider the time it will require to put it into words, and step by step show it another; Secondly, We fhall not be fo much furprized, that this is done in us with fo little notice, if we confider how the facility which we get of doing things, by a cuftom of doing, makes them often pafs in us without our notice. Habits, efpecially fuch as are begun very early, come at last to produce actions in us, which often efcape our obfervation.. How frequently do we, in a day, cover our eyes. with our eye-lids, without perceiving that we are at all in the dark? Men that by custom have got the use of a byword, do almoft in every fentence pronounce founds, which, though taken notice of by others, they themselves neither hear nor obferve. And therefore it. is not so strange, that our mind should often change the idea of its fenfation into that of its judgment, and make one serve only to excite the other, without our taking notice of it.

11. Perception puts the Difference between Animals: and inferior Beings.

- THIS faculty of perception seems to me to be that, which puts the diftinction betwixt the animal kingdom and the in-ferior parts of nature. For however vegetables have,. many of them, fome degrees of motion, and upon the different application of other bodies to them, do very brifkly alter their figures and motions, and fo have ob-tained the name of fenfitive plants, from a motion which has fome refemblance to that which in animals follows upon fenfation; yet, I fuppofe, it is all bare mechanifm ;, and no otherwife produced, than the turning of a wild eat-beard, by the infinuation of the particles of moifture; or the shortening of a rope, by the effufion of

water.

All which is done without any fenfation in the fubject, or the having or receiving any ideas.

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PERCEPTION, I believe, is in fome degree in all forts of animals; though in fome, poffibly, the avenues provided by nature for the reception of fenfations are fo few, and the perception they are received with fo obr fcure and dull, that it comes extremely fhort of the quickness and variety of fenfation which is in other animals but yet it is fufficient for, and wifely adapted to, the state and condition of that fort of animals who are thus made. So that the wisdom and goodness of the Maker plainly appear in all the parts of this ftupendous fabric, and all the feveral degrees and ranks of creatures in it.

§ 13.

WE may, I think, from the make of an oyster, or cockle, reasonably conclude, that it has not fo many, nor fo quick senses, as a man, or several other animals; nor if it had, would it, in that state and incapacity of transferring itself from one place to another, be bettered by them. What good would fight and hearing do to a creature, that cannot move itself, to, or from the obs jects, wherein at a distance it perceives good or evil? And would not quickness of fenfation be an inconve nience to an animal that muft lie ftill, where chance has once placed it; and there receive the afflux of cold or warmer, clean or foul water, as it happens to come to it ?

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BUT yet I cannot but think there is fome fmall dull perception, whereby they are diftinguished from perfect infenfibility. And that this may be fo, we have plain instances, even of mankind itfelf. Take one, in whom decrepid old age has blotted out the memory of his past knowledge, and clearly wiped out the ideas his mind was formerly stored with; and has, by deftroying his fight, hearing, and smell, quite, and his tafte to a great degree, stopped up almost all the paffages for new ones to enter: or, if there be fome of the inlets yet

half open, the impreffions made are fcarce perceived, or not at all retained. How far fuch an one (notwithstandig all that is boasted of innate principles) is in his knowledge, and intellectual faculties, above the condition of a cockle or an oyster, I leave to be confidered. And if a man had paffed fixty years in fuch a state, as it is poffible he might, as well as three days; I wonder what difference there would have been, in any intellectual perfections, between him and the lowest degree of animals.

§ 15. Perception the inlet of Knowledge.

PERCEPTION then being the first step and degree towards knowledge, and the inlet of all the materials of it; the fewer fenfes any man, as well as any other creature, hath; and the fewer and duller the impreffions are that are made by them, and the duller the faculties are that are employed about them; the more remote are they from that knowledge which is to be found in fome men. But this being in great variety of degrees (as may be perceived amongst men) cannot certainly be discovered in the feveral fpecies of animals, much lefs in their particular individuals. It fuffices me only to have remarked here, that perception is the first operation of all our intellectual faculties, and the inlet of all knowledge into our minds. And I am apt too to imagine, that it is perception in the lowest degree of it, which puts the boundaries between animals and the inferior ranks of creatures. But this I mention only as my conjecture by the by; it being indifferent to the matter in hand, which way the learned fhall determine of it.

CHAP. X.

OF RETENTION.

1. Contemplation.

THE next faculty of the mind, whereby it makes a farther progrefs towards knowledge, is that which I call retention, or the keeping of thofe fimple ideas, which from fenfation or reflection it hath received.

This is done two ways; firft, by keeping the idea, which is brought into it, for fome time actually in view; which is called contemplation.

§ 2. Memory.

THE other way of retention, is the power to revive again in our minds thofe ideas, which after imprinting have difappeared, or have been as it were laid afide out of fight; and thus we do, when we conceive heat or light, yellow or fweet, the object being removed. This is memory, which is as it were the ftorehouse of our ideas. For the narrow mind of man not being capable of having many ideas under view and confideration at once, it was neceffary to have a repofitory to lay up thofe ideas, which at another time it might have use of. But our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions: in the mind, which ceafe to be any thing, when there is no perception of them, this laying up of our ideas in. the repofitory of the memory, fignifies no more but this, that the mind has a power in many cafes to revive perceptions, which it has once had, with this additional. perception annexed to them, that it has had them before. And in this fenfe it is, that our ideas are faid to be in our memories, when indeed they are actually no where, but only there is an ability in the mind when. it will to revive them again, and as it were paint them anew on itself, though fome with more, fome with lefs difficulty: fome more lively, and others more obfcure-ly. And thus it is, by the affiftance of this faculty, that we are faid to have all thofe ideas in our under-ftandings, which, though we do not actually contemplate, yet we can bring in fight, and make appear again,. and be the objects of our thoughts, without the help of those fenfible qualities which firft imprinted them. there.

§ 3. Attention, Repetition, Pleafure and Pain, fix: Ideas.

ATTENTION. and repetition help much to the fixing any ideas in the memory: but thofe which naturally at firft make the deepest and most lafting impreffion, are those which are accompanied with pleasure or pain..

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