ever certainly to know their equality. All that we can do for a measure of time, is to take fuch as have continual fucceffive appearances at feemingly equidif tant periods; of which feeming equality we have no other i meafure, but fuch as the train of our own ideas have lodged in our memories, with the concurrence of other probable reasons, to perfuade us of their equality.

§ 22. Time not the Measure of Motion.

ONE thing feems ftrange to me, that whilft all men manifeftly measured time by the motion of the great and visible bodies of the world, time yet should be defined to be the measure of motion; whereas it is ob vious, to every one who reflects ever fo little on it, that to measure motion, fpace is as neceffary to be confidered as time; and those who look a little far ther, will find also the bulk of the thing moved neceffary to be taken into the computation, by any one who will eftimate or measure motion, fo as to judge right of it. Nor indeed does motion any otherwife conduce to the measuring of duration, than as it conftantly brings about the return of certain fenfible ideas,s in feeming equidiftant periods. For, if the motion of the fun were as unequal as of a fhip driven by unfteady winds, fometimes very flow, and at others ir regularly very fwift; or if being conftantly equally fwift, it yet was not circular, and produced not the fame appearances, it would not at all help us to meafure time, any more than the feeming unequal motion of a comet does..

§ 13. Minutes, Hours, Days and Years, not neceffary Meatures of Duration,

MINUTES, hours, days, and years, are then no more necessary to time or duration, than inches, feet, yards and miles, marked out in any matter, are to extenfion for though, we in this part of the universe, by the con ftant ufe of them, as of periods fet out by the revolu tions of the fun, or as known parts of fuch periods, have fixed the ideas of fuch lengths of duration in ours minds which we apply to all parts of time, whofe lengths we would confider; yet there may be other

parts of the univerfe, where they no more ufe thefe measures of ours, than in Japan they do our inches, feet, or miles; but yet fomething anaolgous to them there must be. For without fome regular periodical returns, we could not measure ourselves, or fignify to others the length of any duration, though at the fame time the world were as full of motion as it is now, but no part of it disposed into regular and apparently equidistant revolutions. But the different measures that may be made ufe of for the account of time, do not at all alter the notion of duration, which is the thing to be measured; no more than the different standards of a foot and a cubit alter the notion of extenfion to those who make ufe of thofe different meaf

ures.

§ 24. Our Measure of Time applicable to Duration before Time.

THE mind having once got fuch a measure of time as the annual revolution of the fun, can apply that meafure to duration, wherein that measure itself did not exist, and with which, in the reality of its being, it had nothing to do for fhould one fay, that Abraham was born in the 2712th year of the Julian period, it is al together as intelligible, as reckoning from the beginning of the world, though there were fo far back no motion of the fun, nor any other motion at all. For though the Julian period be supposed to begin. feveral hundred years before there were really either days, nights, or years, marked out by any revolu tions of the fun; yet we reckon as right, and ther 2by measure duration as well, as if really at that time the fun had exifted, and kept the fame ordinary motion it doth now. The idea of duration equal to an an nual revolution of the fun, is as eafily applicable in our thoughts to duration, where no fun nor motion was, as the idea of a foot or yard, taken from bodies here, can be applied in our thoughts to distances beyond the confines of the world, where are no bodies at all

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FOR fuppofing it were 5639 miles, or millions of miles, from this place to the remoteft body of the univerfe (for being finite, it must be at a certain distance) as we fuppofe it to be 5639 years from this time to the first existence of any body in the beginning of the world; we can, in our thoughts, apply this measure of a year to duration before the creation, or beyond the duration of bodies or motion, as we can this meafure of a mile to space beyond the utmost bodies; and by the one measure duration, where there was no motion, as well as by the other measure space in our thoughts, where there is no body.

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Ir it be objected to me here, that in this way of explaining of time, I have begged what I fhould not, viz. that the world is neither eternal nor infinite, I answer,, That to my prefent purpose it is not needful, in this place, to make ufe of arguments, to evince the world to be finite, both in duration and extenfion: but it being at least as conceivable as the contrary, I have certainly the liberty to fuppofe it, as well as any one hath to fuppofe the contrary: and I doubt not but that every one that will go about it, may eafily conceive in his mind the beginning of motion, though not of all duration, and fo may come to a ftop and non ultra in his confideration of motion. So alfo in his thoughts he may fet limits. to body, and the extenfion belonging to it, but not to fpace where no body is; the utmost bounds of spaceand duration being beyond the reach of thought, as. well as the utmoft bounds of number are beyond the largeft comprehenfion of the mind; and all for the fame reafon, as we fhall fee in another place.

$27. Eternity.

By the fame means, therefore, and from the fame orig inal that we come to have the idea of time, we have alfo that idea which we call eternity: viz. having got the idea of fucceffion and duration, by reflecting on the train of our own ideas caufed in us either by the nat ural appearances of those ideas coming conftantly of

themselves into our waking thoughts, or elfe caufed by external objects fucceffively affecting our fenfes; and having from the revolutions of the fun got the ideas of certain lengths of duration, we can, in our thoughts, add fuch lengths of duration to one another as often as we please, and apply them, so added, to durations paft or to come and this we can continue to do on, without bounds or limits, and proceed in infinitum, and apply thus the length of the annual motion of the fun to duration, fuppofed before the fun's, or any other: motion had its being; which is no more difficult or abfurd, than to apply the notion I have of the moving of a fhadow one hour to-day upon the fun-dial, to the duration of fomething laft night, v. g. the burning of a candle, which is now abfolutely feparate from all actual motion: and it is as impoffible for the duration of that flame for an hour last night to co-exift with any motion that now is, or ever fhall be, as for any part of duration, that was before the beginning of the world, to co-exift with the motion of the fun now. But yet this hinders not, but that having the idea of the length of the motion of the shadow on a dial between the marks of two hours, I can as diftinctly measure in my thoughts the duration of that candle-light last night, as I can the duration of any thing that does now exist : and it is no more than to think, that had the fun fhone then on the dial, and moved after the fame rate it doth now, the fhadow on the dial would have paffed from one hour-line to another, whilft that flame of the candle lafted.

THE notion of an hour, day, or year, being only the idea I have of the length of certain periodical regular motions, neither of which motions do ever all at once exist, but only in the ideas I have of them in my memory, derived from my fenfes or reflection, I can with the fame eafe, and for the fame reason, apply it in my thoughts to duration, antecedent to all manner of motion, as well as to any thing that is but a minute, or a day, antecedent to the motion, that at this very mo❤

ment the fun is in. All things paft are equally and perfectly at reft; and to this way of confideration of them are all one, whether they were before the beginning of the world, or but yesterday; the measuring of any duration by fome motion, depending not at all on the real co-existence of that thing to that motion, or any other: periods of revolution, but the having a clear idea of the length of fome periodical known motion, or other intervals of duration in my mind, and applying that to the duration of the thing I would measure.

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HENCE we fee, that fome men imagine the duration of the world, from its firft existence to this prefent year. 1689, to have been 5639 years, or equal to 5639 annual revolutions of the fun, and others a great deal more; as the Egyptians of old, who, in the time of Alexander, counted 23,000 years from the reign of the fun; and the Chinese now, who account the world 3,269,000 years old, or more; which longer duration of the world, according to their computation, though I fhould not believe to be true, yet I can equally imagine it with them, and as truly understand, and fay, one is longer than the other as I understand, that Meth.ufalem's life was longer than Enoch's. And if the common reckoning of 5639 should be true (as it may be as well as any other affigned) hinders not at all my imagining what others mean, when they make the world 1000 years older, fince every one may with the fame facility imagine (I do not fay believe) the world to be 50, 000 years old, as 5639; and may as well conceive the duration of 50,000 years, as 5639. Whereby it appears, that to the measuring the duration of any thing by time, it is not requifite that that thing should be co-exiftent to the motion we measure by, or any other periodical revolu→ tion; but it fuffices to this purpose, that we have the idea of the length of any regular periodical appearances, which we can in our minds apply to duration, with which the motion or appearance never co-existed.

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FOR as, in the hiftory of the creation delivered by Mor